LWF Studies

REPORTS AND TEXTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STUDIES

PEACE

WHAT CAN WE DO?

INTERNATIONAL LUTHERAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE ETHICS

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Edited by Eckehart Lorenz

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FOREWORD

The book you have in hand is the result of interdisciplinary stud-
ies and consultative processes that extended over several years;
we owe it to the joint efforts of an international group of Lu-
theran churches.

As early as 1979, the Commission on Studies had assigned to staff
of the LWF the task of conducting studies and consultations on the
subject of Christian peace ethics. In 1980, a first essay was pub-
lished that attempts a historical review of LWF peace ethics, tak-
ing into account also peace-related writings published in the
1970s. (1)

In 1981, a survey on the churches' service for peace was conducted
among LWF member churches in the light of the Helsinki Final Acts
of 1975. The survey provided a deeper insight into contemporary
church commitment in this area; it became apparent that at times
the orientation of their peace engagement varies substantially
from one church to the other.

In the same year, the LWF Executive Committee at its Turku meeting
ratified a "Statement on Peace" (2). And in the fall of 1981 a
conference of approximately twenty Lutheran church leaders after
debating the ambiguous concept of "peaceful coexistence" requested
the Department of Studies to clarify the various understandings to
peacemaking and the different approaches to it, considering that
the very incompatibility of peace concepts contributes to the cur-
rent threat to peace.

Practically at the same time an international planning committee
met in Geneva in order to develop the program and, in particular,
define the emphases, problem areas and working methods of a con-
sultation to coordinate Lutheran peace efforts. The group was com-
posed of representatives of Lutheran churches in Finland, the
United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Demo-
cratic Republic, and Hungary. The consultation they prepared took
place July 5 - 13, 1982, in Chavanod, France, near Geneva. 59 par-
ticipants from churches in 16 countries attended the consultation.
The "Statement on Peace" adopted by the LWF Executive Committee at
its Turku meeting in 1981 describes the aim of the consultation
and the scope of its task when it says that "differing convictions
exist among Christians concerning the methods for promoting peace,
and that respect, dialogue and cooperation between the church mem-
bers whose views differ are essential." In particular, the Execu-
tive Committee recommended to the member churches to "intensify
direct personal communication between Christians living under dif-
ferent social systems..." and also to "increase efforts to share
across ideologically dividing lines reliable first-hand informa-
tion about the life of churches and their societies; that they
consult with each other regarding church actions supporting peace,
disarmament, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, support of nego-

tiations and the pursuit of human rights, social justice and na-
tional independence."

Representatives of Lutheran churches and Christian members of
peace movements were invited. Considerable efforts were made and
great energy expended to ensure strong representation of special-
ists on security policies from Eastern Europe. Unfortunately we
were not successful.

Presentations in Chavanod were in such disciplines as theology,
ethics, psychology and conflict management, security policies, and
international public relations. The responsibility for the prepa-
ration and implementation of the consultation was incumbent on Dr.
Eckehart Lorenz who in the Department of Studies is in charge of
social and human rights issues. The LWF Commission on Studies also
entrusted him with the publication of the study materials.

Several churches were stimulated by the LWF consultative process
and we gratefully note that they engaged in initiatives of their
own. Thus, May 26-26, 1982, the two German National Committees
convened a consultation in East Berlin on the theme "Witness to
Peace and Service for Peace" with participants from the FRG and
the GDR.

The consultation was actually designed as a follow-up to the work-
shop of the International Planning Committee that was held in
Geneva in the fall of 1981. Besides, the Lutheran Church in Ameri-
ca organized a symposium on "Contemporary Issues concerning Peace
and War." Some of the symposium participants had also participated
in the Chavanod consultation and presented papers there.

While we welcome and deeply appreciate these and other endeavors
toward ensuring peace, we also know that ultimately we rely on the
blessings of God who alone can give peace as his gift.

Yoshiro Ishida
Director

Department of Studies

Notes

(1) Eckehart Lorenz, "Is There a Lutheran Peace Ethic?" Lutheran
Forum, Advent 1981, pp. 6-11.

(2) Executive Committee of the Lutheran World Federation, State-
ment on Peace, Turku, Finland, 1981. The statement in extenso is
included in the appendix.

INTRODUCTION

International relations have been deteriorating steadily for some years. Are we headed for another world war? Can a nuclear holocaust be avoided? The Christian churches hold the promise of peace. Under the present circumstances will it be possible for them to bear witness to it? The churches speak with many different voices when it comes to peace prospects, the root causes of conflict and the paths to peace. Does the shared confessional heritage of the churches offer them, at least in principle, a special opportunity to coordinate and to harmonize their contributions to peace? These were the questions raised at a recent study consultation, the results of which are summarized below.

The underlying causes of armed conflict

Chou En Lai once said that the two superpowers lie in the same bed, but they do not share the same dreams. I think that is really a good résumé of the situation. They have to share the same bed because they live under the same threat of an atomic cloud but they still keep to their own dreams. On the Soviet side they still believe that some day the whole world will become reconciled after it has become socialist, while on the American side there is still the view that the status quo can be indefinitely kept, when history teaches us that history precisely is continuous change.

In these words, André Fontaine, publisher of the internationally renowned French newspaper Le Monde refers to the ideological polarity existing between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR. He considers this polarity to be the main underlying threat to world peace. "The USSR and the USA are what I like to call 'fatherlands of ideologies'," Fontaine adds, "the critical factor here being the irreconcilability of the two ideologies." Is it possible, as Fontaine implies, to trace the East-West conflict back to essentially ideological roots? Is it at all possible to show a causal relationship to exist between ideologies and armed conflict? On the contrary, does not the East-West conflict show precisely that the conflict is nourished principally by economic and social factors? The term "military-industrial complex," for example, is frequently used in the USA to indicate that military decisions there are not taken by the elected representatives of the people but are subject to control by the armaments interests. On the other hand, which interests are the ones that determine Soviet military policy: the interests of the people or those of the "Nomenklatura" - the ruling class in the Party, the military establishment and the state? (1)

Which sources nourish the East-West conflict? Perhaps these consist of both ideologies and interests. Is the prohibitively expensive armaments race a result of autonomous processes which, having

gradually gotten out of human control, are now independently fol-
lowing their own development? Which forces pose the greatest
threat to world peace today? From where does the greatest danger
come? Many different answers are proposed, very often conflicting,
which vary according to the party affiliations, scientific and re-
ligious background and knowledgeability of the authors. This also
holds true for the Christian churches.

Which peace are we seeking?

Many people today are united by their fear of a global holocaust
caused by weapons of mass destruction. They are also united by
their longing for a secure and just peace. No sooner do we begin
to express our hopes in more concrete terms than we are confronted
by a whole spectrum of different ideas, often irreconcilable, on
goals to be achieved. Such ideas are propounded with fervor, and
often intransigeantly, both inside and outside the church. Some
people believe that it is possible by means of political measures
to create a human society without conflict in which injustice and
alienation between individuals no longer exist. Others consider
that peace has already been achieved in an exemplary way in the
communist states. Thus, Werner Walde, the SED District Chief in
Cottbus stated on the occasion of the 1981/82 New Year's celebra-
tion that the GDR was itself one big peace movement. Others be-
lieve that social and even political conflicts are inseparably
rooted in human nature. While it is possible to influence man's
nature through education, it is not possible for man to overcome
his basic nature on his own. Those who have this point of view are
not prepared to equate peace with either an empirically arrived at
or a utopian system of society. Under this concept of human nature
peace will depend first of all upon a certain quality of the inev-
itable conflict settlement. In place of force there should be
binding and dependable legal principles. Peace becomes first of
all a question of procedure and this interactional peace concept
is distinguished by mutual intercourse, ability to communicate and
readiness to compromise.

Paths to peace

When concepts of peace and estimates of the seriousness of the
threat differ so widely, is it any wonder that there is no agree-
ment on the paths to be followed to achieve peace? Radically paci-
fist attitudes, pacifist nuclear demands, the notion of individ-
ual, calculated one-sided disarmament steps together with adequate
dissuasive measures; the desire for a reciprocally verifiable
freeze on the production and relocation of nuclear weapons on both
sides - all these compete, but occasionally complement one anoth-
er. Still others propose a reduction in the dissuasive capabili-
ties on both sides through gradual disarmament together with an
increasing equilibrium of arms potentials between the two sides.
Their main argument is as follows: the more than 100 armed con-
flicts that have taken place since the end of the Second World
War, despite all their dissimilarities, had this in common: prior

to the outbreak of war, in each region there had been a signifi-
cant imbalance in military power. It is also in the interest of
peace to reduce the worldwide imbalance in the distribution of in-
come and chances of survival. Thus churches are just as disunited
on the question of development strategies as they are on the ques-
tion of the most urgent steps to be taken towards peace. The dif-
ferences in opinion outlined herein are presented merely as exam-
ples, to which it would not be difficult to add many more. They
characterize the dispute among Christians on how God's peace
"which is higher than all reason" can be witnessed truthfully un-
der present-day conditions. In addition, the official declarations
of the Evangelical Lutheran churches on international tensions
differ widely. The common tradition of faith does not necessarily
guarantee agreement on questions of political ethics.

Discussions and results

As early as 1979, significant differences on the peace question
became apparent at international conferences of the Lutheran World
Federation (LWF). The LWF has as one of its tasks the working out
of differences on opinion within and among its member churches on
important questions. In July 1982, a consultation on the coordina-
tion of peace work of the Evangelical Lutheran churches brought
together at Chavanod in France (near Geneva) more than fifty par-
ticipants from 16 different countries. In October 1981, a prepara-
tory committee made up of members from different nations agreed
upon the subject of contention which was then taken up at the con-
sultation of church representatives with particular experience in
the field. A well-known specialist on social ethics from Munich
has said that the peace discussion is no more nor less than a dis-
cussion of justice and the necessity for Christian worldwide re-
sponsibility, which had to make itself felt in the political
field. In his presentation on the "principles and prospects of
peace ethics today," he stated: "We have learned how to think at a
high level about basic rights and human rights - higher than our
Lutheran forefathers did. In this respect also, there exists some-
thing like a vicarious responsibility, a consciousness of what we
must bring into a political order of peace and what we must repre-
sent in it."

> ...My peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, give I
> unto you. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be
> afraid", said Jesus (John XIV,27).

What is the connection between this very different peace of God
and the contributions of Christians to peace? According to a New
Testament specialist from Rostock (GDR), the peace of God has an
"external" and an "internal" dimension. The external dimension en-
ables Christians to pass on God's peace in an effective way and
share it with others. It encourages and enables Christians to co-
operate also in the political shaping of peace where, as far as
humans can determine, there is no hope. The inner dimension of
God's peace is the work of God's own hand, the source of human
ability to have faith. The central thought in his presentation was
that the latter remains inaccessible to man. He also states: "As

Paul has said: this peace occurs sola gratia, not from man's works."

An American researcher in the field of social psychology has described the roles of instinct, authority and ideology in the development of armed conflicts. As an example of such an ideology the Marxist-Leninist teaching on peace and war was presented. This ideology describes capitalistic imperialism as the sole source of war. The authentic exposition of this doctrine by a diplomat from a country of the Warsaw Pact, namely Dr. Evzen Zapotocky, the Deputy Chargé d'Affaires of Czechoslovakia at the United Nations Office in Geneva, represented a special opportunity for the consultation, inasmuch as this doctrine determines the political and ideological context for a number of LWF member churches. For example, this doctrine predominates in the political-military specialized literature of the National Peoples Army of the GDR and also, although in a more subtle way, in the propaganda literature of the "World Peace Council" (Helsinki), of the "International Peace Institute" (Vienna) as well as many publications of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Christian Peace Conference (Prague).

Unfortunately, Dr. Zapotocky has not released for publication the address which he gave at Chavanod. Such a procedure is not unique. For example, two GDR authors, Gottfried Kiessling and Wolfgang Scheler, not long ago refused to allow publication in a West German review of their article "The Struggle for Peace and the Political- Moral Evaluation of War" which had been published in the GDR, nor were they able to accept an invitation to write a similar article for the West German publication. Such practices tend to arouse the suspicion that in the geographical area of the Warsaw Pact it is desired to hide their own Marxist-Leninist doctrine of "just wars" from the broad pacifist movement in the NATO countries. If this impression is correct, one wonders why. An answer to this has been given by Professor Michael Voslensky, former Secretary of the Disarmament Commission of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow in his contribution "The Peace Concept in the Political Philosophy and Ethics of the Soviet State," which we are printing in this volume instead of the Zapotocky text: "The Communist governments reject pacifism in their power sphere and accept it where it is of use to them in order to destabilize the enemy," Voslensky states. This author is in possession of an unusual amount of specialized knowledge. He worked as Secretary for disarmament questions at the Moscow Academy of Sciences until the day when he failed to return to the USSR from a trip to the Federal Republic of Germany.

An Austrian conflict researcher who spoke to the participants concerning the state of armaments and disarmament efforts called for structural arms controls for the purpose of creating stability in Europe, instead of emotional criticism of armaments and mechanical disarmament concepts.

In the opinion of a Swedish expert, there is a pronounced assymetry between the two socio-political systems in the areas covered by the Final Act of the Helsinki Agreements with regard to freedom of information and organization. Furthermore, peace initiatives of "basis" groups and church circles have considerably

better possibilities of development and of influencing the defence policies of the various governments in the NATO countries than they do in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Excessive asymmetrical pressure from the bottom in the regions mentioned - for example in the NATO countries - can have a destabilizing effect and thus even increase the probability of war, contrary to the desired objective.

"A certain manipulation" of the peace movement in Western Europe "by powers representing the interests of the communist power bloc" should "not be overlooked." Take, for example, the Krefeld Appeal. However, the term "Eastern manipulation" is certainly not enough to explain away the peace movement...the peace movement has been called a "movement of fear" in the dual sense of fear of life and the more concrete "fear of nuclear destruction." The contribution from West Berlin from which these excerpts are taken tries to make a very detailed analysis of the many-sided phenomenon represented by the peace movement. In one respect, however, it makes a very direct judgment. The peace movement is unable to even propose a workable political alternative to the peace policy based on dissuasion, much less to carry one out.

An Egyptian conflict research specialist discussed the disadvantages which could arise from the East-West conflict as far as the defense interests and development of Third World countries were concerned. On the other hand he gave a moving and dynamic description, showing that the involvement of the superpowers in the Middle East has not had just harmful effects. It has contributed to independence and development in that region and given more freedom of movement to otherwise weak states. These were his surprising conclusions.

To what extent do Eastern and Western defense experts take into account the security needs of the opposite side? What are justified security needs? Is it possible to define for both sides acceptable and binding criteria for the legitimacy of defense interests? These questions were to be taken up within the framework of a platform discussion between two military experts from the East and West, with the discussion being led by a Swiss Chief of Staff. It turned out to be impossible for the organizer to obtain the participation of a military expert from a Warsaw Pact country. However, he was able in the spring 1982 to obtain the consent of a member of the Soviet mission in Geneva to participate in a platform discussion on 9 July 1982. On 8 July it was learned through a telephone call to the Soviet mission that this member was not in Geneva at all and that furthermore, no representative had been appointed to take over his task at Chavanod. General Lothar Domroese, a retired General from Bonn, who, as a military expert, was to have represented the Western side on the podium together with the Swiss Chief of Staff, Dr. Gustav Däniker (who had been designated to lead the discussion), were available to the consultation participants to answer questions and engage in discussions. The introduction to the talk that had been prepared by Dr. Däniker, as well as his critical questions to both sides, East and West, are so basic to the question of legitimacy of security needs that they have been included in this publication.

The results of the group discussions

The results of the group discussions included a number of stimu-
lating proposals which, in the interests of a just peace, one
would like to see given intensive examination by the churches. It
is proposed that the present system of dissuasion be replaced by a
just world peace order; however, a number of dangers are encoun-
tered along the way; for example, that of a world dictatorship
based on an international nuclear power monopoly. At the same time
the churches are encouraged to follow this path and cooperate in
the development of security measures against perversions of world
authority of this sort. Unlike certain circles, which are today
attempting by means of publicity campaigns to outlaw the first
strike with nuclear weapons, the report of a working group at
Chavanod seeks to outlaw the first strike with weapons of any
kind. The demand for a "freeze" on nuclear weapons in East and
West at their present levels was expressed but did not obtain
unanimous support. If this proposal is worth supporting at all, it
is only on condition that there be created and put into effect a
system for reciprocal controls over all existing and potential
military forces and arms.

Appendix

The bibliography contained in the appendix is necessarily limited
to one particular effect of conflict research, namely the question
of the underlying causes of armed conflict. It was made available
to the participants prior to the commencement of the consulta-
tion.

In addition, the appendix contains the text of a sermon delivered
in Chavanod, the Heidelberg Theses of 1959 which played an impor-
tant role in the conclusions of the working groups, and the peace
declaration of the LWF Executive Committee at Turku in 1981.

On behalf of the Commission on Studies
of the Lutheran World Federation

Eckehart Lorenz

Notes

(1) See Michael Voslensky, Nomenklatura, The Soviet Ruling Class.
    Doubleday, New York; Bodley Head, London 1984.

(2) See for example Wolfgang Scheler, Gottfried Kiessling: Just
    and Unjust Wars in our Time. Military Publishing House of the
    GDR, Berlin 1981;

    Ivan Andreievitch Selesnyow, War and Ideological Struggle.
    Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1977.

(3) Egbert Jahn, "A Critique of the Soviet Marxist Doctrine of a
    Just War," Reiner Steinweg (ed.): The Just War: Christianity,
    Islam, Marxism. Suhrkamp, 1017 Frankfurt 1980, p. 183, note 2.

WORK FOR PEACE BY CHRISTIANS AND THE CHURCH:
BIBLICAL AND THEOLOGICAL BASES

Hans Friedrich Weiss

1. Introductory comments on the question

What we are enquiring into are the "biblical and theological bases;" more specifically, it is a question of the "specific contribution of the church (more precisely, of the churches of the Reformed=Lutheran tradition) to the establishment of peace" (see Study report, p. 8) and this, indeed, at a time when Christians and the churches have to a large extent recognized the need for them to be engaged in attempts to establish and maintain peace in the world.

> Typical of this, for example, is a comparable statement from the German Democratic Republic: W. Scheidacker, 'Peace on Earth?', in German in Zeichen der Zeit 36, 1982, p. 94 f., here esp. p. 95: 'Responsibility for peace is an indispensable form of witness to Jesus Christ today.' In other words, 'the witness to Jesus Christ today, in face of the serious threat to world peace, must necessarily take the concrete form of active responsibility for peace. What is ultimately at stake in the acceptance of this responsibility is the existence of the Christian as Christian.' (1)

The basic question to be answered as clearly as possible in what follows, therefore, is this: What is the nature of the "specific contribution" of the church, the distinctive character of its commitment for peace in the present situation? Indeed, the question can be put more pointedly still: Can we speak at all of a "specific contribution" necessarily derived as such from the distinctive and specific content of the Christian faith? From the standpoint of one particular (and also specifically Lutheran) tradition, a direct affirmative answer to this question is certainly not self=evident. If we start from the assumption that "the specific transformation of the world proclaimed by the New Testament... is not a sociological but an eschatological one" (2) we shall at once conclude in this connection that the gospel, which in itself is not a "social message," nevertheless has the effect of a "social imperative" (3) and that, in this sense, we would have to speak of a specifically Christian motivation, of certain Christian constraints and impulses, but not of a specifically Christian concept of peace including a definite strategy making it possible to identify the concrete ways and means in which we have to assume responsibility for peace. The responsibility for working out an appropriate strategy for the specific situation would therefore have to be left to "secular intelligence."

Certainly an answer of this (or a similar) kind to the basic question posed above accords with one specific interpretation of the Lutheran tradition, the so-called "Two Kingdoms Doctrine" in particular. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that at present (not least in the Lutheran churches, too) critical voices are on the increase in this respect, "critical" in the sense that, because of a particular (mis)understanding of this "Two Kingdoms Doctrine," the Lutheran churches have traditionally inculcated far too reserved a position on questions of social ethics (including the question of peace) and proved incapable of really and effectively doing justice to the challenges of the present situation in respect of the threat to world peace.

An illustration of this is the view of Dr. J. Hempel, the leading bishop of the VELK in the GDR, in his report to the General Synod of the VELK in the GDR in June 1982, in Freiberg/Saxony:

> Consciously or unconsciously, Lutheran churches have for a long time been taught by the 'Two Kingdoms Doctrine' to keep aloof from the social, i.e. political tasks of the church. Biblical reflection within the context of our own theological tradition is therefore essential...

The official synod decision then adopted is accordingly as follows:

> That the Lutheran churches cannot refuse to make an independent contribution to this question on the grounds that they have much lost ground to be made up in coming to terms with their own tradition.

What that means concretely in relation to our specific question is that there is lost ground to be made up by way of a proper study of the biblical tradition on the theme of peace in order that the basic direction of this biblical witness may serve as a corrective to the reserve and even abstinence of the Lutheran churches in questions of social ethics. Today at any rate, the need is clearly recognized. There must be reflection on the relevant biblical and theological bases for the problems of the participation of Christians and the church in the whole question of peace.

2. Biblical and theological principles

Anyone asking the fundamental question of the biblical witness to peace today, in a situation when there is a serious threat to world peace, will inevitably be conscious of one truth in particular, namely, that none of us approach this question without presuppositions, but always against the background of our contextually determined and conditioned approach to the question. We ask this question in a situation in which there can certainly be no unanimous answer to the question of how the peace of God which, as such, "passes all understanding" (Phil 4:7) and thus cannot be reckoned with a priori in our human efforts for peace, is related to, and relevant for the peace of this world, i.e. peace in this world. Indeed, if it is clear a priori from the biblical witness

that "the form of this world is passing away" (1 Cor 7:31) and that all efforts for peace in this world are subject to the "eschatological reservation," what has this peace of God really to do with this worldly peace?

Since this eschatological emphasis is found mainly in the New Testament, some people today, when questioning the biblical witness from their contextually conditioned standpoints, are quite understandably tempted to make certain a priori emphases in the biblical witness itself; in particular, they are tempted to assign the Old Testament witness to shalom a greater, i.e. in reality a more fundamental, value than the corresponding New Testament witness to peace and to interpret the latter, therefore, wholly along the lines of its Old Testament presuppositions (4).

The basis for such an emphasis is clearly the shalom tradition of the Old Testament (and Judaism!). This tradition entered the horizon of an eschatological view of the world and history in the historical and religious circumstances of the world of late antiquity and combined this view of the world and history with certain "dualistic" tendencies of the history of religion in late antiquity as a whole (including Judaism - cf. for example the "apocalyptic" groundswell in Judaism in the first century A.D.). There was therefore in primitive Christianity a clear a priori tendency either to deny that the peace established by God in Jesus Christ had any relevance at all for "secular matters" or at least to restrict that relevance to the domestic life of the church. In principle, nothing else could be expected in view of the lowly place of the primitive Christian groups and communities in the history of their day (5).

In contrast to this, the Old Testament witness to peace presents a very different picture. Although various ideas of peace (varying according to their different historical contexts) are handed down to us in the Old Testament, so that the concrete meaning of shalom is determined by the concrete situation, and although there were noticeable shifts of emphasis in detail in this respect in the course of the history of the people of Israel (as for example, the increasing emphasis on the theological and eschatological dimensions of shalom when Israel was confronted with a crisis of shalom in the later period), nevertheless the one relatively constant main feature of the Old Testament view of shalom still remains clear in every case: the place of shalom is the world, it includes as a matter of course human "wholeness" and totality within the community in the widest sense, the well-being of humanity in this world. Even (and especially!) when peace is prayed for as a gift from God (as in Psalm 85, for example), the profound worldliness remains determinative for the basic understanding of shalom, and can still be deduced not least from the fact that "peace," "justice" and "righteousness" belong inseparably together (Ps 85:11; Isa 9:6) God's peace and peace among human beings go together and in this sense they certainly signify both human "salvation" and human "well-being." In this comprehensive sense, shalom is nevertheless at the same time a quite distinctive and intrinsic condition and reality, and in no sense, therefore, merely the opposite of war. Above all, matching the this-worldliness

of the Old Testament view of peace is the character of peace as a
process. In the Old Testament, peace is never a condition achieved
once or even once and for all but always a pathway opened up by
God, offering constantly fresh opportunities and possibilities of
achieving peace in concrete forms. Even the characteristic tenden-
cy, in face of the crisis of shalom in the later period, to empha-
size the "eschatological" dimension of peace (peace as the escha-
tological gift of salvation expected in the future!) still accords
with the original and basic view of shalom in the Old Testament,
even though in connection with this growing tendency in the fur-
ther history of Judaism, there is an increasing note of profound
scepticism as to whether this eschatological shalom would ever be
attainable on earth.

The New Testament - more specifically, Jesus and primitive Chris-
tianity - obviously continue the Old Testament shalom tradition
(also the tradition of Judaism) and this can be seen in detail
both in the corresponding definitions of God - "the God of peace"
- and in the corresponding gospel formulas of greeting and bless-
ing (Jn 20:19) and in those of the New Testament letters (Rom
15:33 and frequently). Basically, the New Testament also is at one
with the Old Testament in the plurality of its conceptions of
peace, also determined by the various contexts in question.

There are models of peace which differ completely in detail, as
e.g. in the catechetical formulation (dependent on Mt 5:9):
"Strive for peace with all men" (Heb 12:14, cf. Rom 12:18; 14:19,
James 3:18), which in itself accords with a distinctive Old Testa-
ment and Jewish idea of peace (Ps 34:15; Mishna Aboth I 12); but
also, in contrast, the "closed model" of the gospel of John (based
probably on the antagonism or dualism between church and world in
the historical circumstances of the Johannine community): the
peace which Jesus gives to his disciples is not "of this world"
(Jn 14:27; 16:33); and then, different again, there is also the
Lukan approach to an integration of the idea of peace in its so-
cial and political dimensions into the Jesus tradition: the "pax
Christi" over against the "pax Romana" (Lk 1:78f.; 2:14). These
different models can no more be systematized into a single "New
Testament concept of peace" than is possible in the case of the
diverse Old Testament models. The temporal character and
(correspondingly!) the plurality of the New Testament witness to
peace is, on the contrary, symptomatic of the fact - applicable
equally to the Old Testament - that different situations produce
different emphases, otherwise the peace meant in each case would
remain simply an abstract and unreal idea...

What did, of course, come to have a special influence on the New
Testament through the Old Testament (and Judaism) was that tenden-
cy to "theologize" and "eschatologize" the understanding of peace
which had already begun to operate in the later history of Israel
and in early Judaism. If "God" and "peace" constituted an indivis-
ible unity, if "peace" (precisely as also the peace of God) always
has an earthly worldly dimension, then, in a time and situation in
which people have become increasingly clearly aware of their pow-
erlessness to establish and maintain peace, peace in the real and
ultimate sense can only be understood and looked for as an escha-

tological gift of the grace of God Himself. Peace is therefore a
gift of God's mercy in face of the absence of peace in our real
human world, a gift which at the same time brings this world with
its lack of peace to a definitive end...

It is this basic theological and at the same time eschatological
idea of peace which then emerged in a christological conception of
peace. For, seen in the light of the basic religious experience
which gave birth to primitive Christianity, God's purpose of peace
(transcending and at the same time "fulfilling" all previous forms
of peace) has been realized in a final way in His work in and
through Jesus Christ - and nowhere else.

It also includes from now on, in the eschatological perspective in
this sense, God's solemn undertaking and promise of peace for all
time to come. At any rate, the name "Jesus Christ" defines the
truly basic context of the primitive Christian and New Testament
idea of peace, and, at the same time, its distinctiveness from the
Old Testament and Jewish idea of peace. In primitive Christianity,
the shalom tradition of the Old Testament and Judaism is seen in
an eschatological horizon which itself is inseparable from God's
action in and through Jesus. And "God's peace" in its final defi-
nitive sense is now defined - irrevocably! - in terms of this fun-
damental datum of Christian faith, namely, the realization of sha-
lom in the history and destiny of Jesus. Basically, it is only on
this foundation that a "specifically Christian" action for peace
can claim legitimacy (6). "Since we are justified by faith, we
have (henceforth) peace with God" (Rom 5:1) or again "through whom
we have now received our reconciliation" (Rom 5:11), and "For he
himself is our peace" (Eph 2:14, cf. Col 1:20) - these NT state-
ments represent the climax of the "christologization" of the Old
Testament shalom tradition. So too, of course, and above all, the
declaratory "message of peace" recorded in the story of the birth
of Jesus (Lk 2:14) where, in true OT style, the peace here estab-
lished is called "peace on earth." In this sense, peace can now be
a complete description of the new reality of salvation: with
"death" on the one side, and "life and peace" on the other (Rom
8:6), on the presupposition that, by God's action and therefore in
the last analysis "sola gratia," the ancient enmity between God
and humanity has come to an end and that peace in the ultimate
sense, therefore, has its place where God showed Himself to be
"God for us" (Rom 8:31).

Peace in the ultimate sense! But we all (including the first
Christians in their day) still live in the "penultimate" realm! In
what quite concrete, earthly and worldly sense is this peace a re-
ality which can be experienced? Is it not possible that the first
Christians who bequeathed to us this "gospel of peace" (Eph 6:15)
were only fanatics and enthusiasts who, carried away by an
overpowering religious experience, lost sight of the realities of
this world, of their world? And in face of the very real down-to-
earth problems of our own time, would we not be better employed,
in the end, learning what peace really means by skipping the New
Testament and listening to the Old?

In other words, digging into the biblical and theological bases for our work for peace? Rediscovering from the Old Testament that original and comprehensive dimension of shalom which includes our concrete human life in this world but a dimension which was more or less lost sight of in a long history which already began, how- ever, in the New Testament itself? But this is precisely where we are also confronted with the critical question whether the "christologization" of the shalom tradition of the Old Testament in the New is not itself to be equated with the process of "individualization" and "spiritualization," of "privatization" and "depoliticization." And at the same time the obvious question whether, in the end, the Johannine model of the witness to peace in the New Testament does not represent the "distinctive Christian" model? In other words, to the degree that here the con- centration on the christological theme which is characteristic of primitive Christianity as a whole reaches its absolute climax, not least also in respect of our present theme. Specifically, too, be- cause here the peace which Jesus gives to his disciples remains distinct from the "peace of the world" and becomes effective real- ity only within the community of Jesus. But not only in John. In Paul, too, we find peace defined as "fruit of the Spirit" (Gal 5:22) and the reference to the "peace, justice and joy in the Holy Spirit" (Rom 14:17) - where else can this peace have its primary context but in the "entry point" of the "kingship of God," and therefore within the Christian community in which we "pursue what makes for peace and the mutual upbuilding" of the church (Rom 14:19)?

Certainly the passages just cited show how impossible it is to ac- cuse the New Testament of a "spiritualization" or "individualization" of the idea of peace in the sense that it re- fers ultimately only to the relation of "God and the individual," of speaking of God's peace as if it meant only peace between God and the individual human being. On the contrary, even in the New Testament, it is "still" (from the Old Testament standpoint) the case that the peace of God, the reconciliation achieved by God Himself, is accompanied and matched by peaceful and peacemaking behavior among human beings themselves. This is especially clear in Eph 2:14, one of the classic New Testament affirmations of the New Testament's christological definition of peace. The concrete setting of this affirmation in the passage Eph 2:1ff. is in actual fact a group conflict between gentile and Jewish Christians. The christological affirmation "He is our peace" includes as such, at the same time, the exhortation to the recipients of the letter to break down and to render transparent the barriers and fences (defenses) between the two groups, because "He Himself has broken down the dividing wall" between them and thereby proclaimed peace to the distant and the near (Eph 2:27). In other words, even when (as in the primitive Christian community) it was believed that "the form of this world is passing away" (1 Cor 7:31), it was also recognized at the same time that where injustice and unpeace pre- vail we have no right to speak of the effective presence of the peace established by God but that precisely where this situation exists it is vital to reestablish the reality and efficacy of this peace of God. At any rate, the boundary of Christian action for peace on the basis of this view of the "gospel of peace" is clear:

here, in the New Testament, in primitive Christianity, the step
from the church to the world was not taken, at least not in the
form of a program. Confronted with the world, the church repre-
sented God's eschatological peace, but, in this sense, not in the
world, by for example, a committed effort to humanize a divided
and conflict-ridden world.

What is new and distinctive in the New Testament witness to peace
in comparison with that of the Old Testament thus emerges with
particular clarity - in the first place - in two respects:

(1) The "interior dimension" of peace, i.e. peace in the sense of
the peace (re)established by God between Himself and humanity, has
absolute priority over the question of the concrete form of the
Christian's action for peace.

(2) Even although the New Testament witness is consequently con-
cerned primarily with "the peace of God which surpasses all our
understanding" (Phil 4:7) and in this sense extends further and
points beyond all (!) intelligent human actions for peace, escha-
tology and action for peace nevertheless remain indivisibly relat-
ed, above all, because of the promise made by God for all future
time in Jesus Christ.

These two basic aspects of the New Testament witness to peace have
quite clear implications. Any identification of the peace of God
with the peace of the world (and in the world) is ruled out alto-
gether. The main distinction (but certainly not divorce!) between
them is that the peace of God is not within our human capacity to
plan and achieve but remains outside our control. In Pauline
terms, this peace comes "sola gratia," not "from (human) works."
In this sense, of course, all human action for peace in this world
(even within the interior life of the church!) is subject to the
"eschatological reservation": what happens as a consequence of this
action is never something final and ultimate but always simply
something penultimate and provisional in an ongoing process whose
end and goal are beyond human control. And this is also the place
where we have to speak of the critical role of the combination of
"eschatology and action for peace;" "critical" vis-à-vis all con-
ceptions of peace which claim to achieve human peace and salvation
in an ultimate sense.

Another question to be asked here would be how far the "Two King-
doms Doctrine" of the Reformation Lutheran tradition (as a "model
of interpretation of the New Testament in the contemporary debate
about the proper obedience of the Christian"!) (7) - has in its
way exercised this critical role of New Testament eschatology with
the aim of excluding from the outset, in view of our permanent hu-
man dependency (our need of redemption!), all fanatical equation
of "salvation" and "well-being?" (8)

3. Conclusions

These two aspects of the New Testament witness to peace just men-
tioned - the concentration on the "interior dimension" of peace,
and the inseparable connection between "eschatology and action for
peace" - do not, of course, seem very encouraging at first sight
for such action for peace on the part of Christians and the
church; for, in the actual conditions of our world situation to-
day, such action is directed to reducing "distress, violence and
unfreedom" to a minimum (as "dimensions of peace")(9). Following
this line, the critical and corrective role of the biblical view
of peace seems to take priority over its role as positive guide.
At the same time, we have still to ask whether the distinctive
character of the peace commitment of Christians and the church is
not to be derived precisely from these two emphases, and, with it,
at the same time the role of the biblical witness to peace as
"positive guide," and, in the end, perhaps, also at least some
specific guidance as to the concrete form this Christian peace
commitment should take.

At least one thing has been made very clear by the prior question
as to the biblical and theological bases in the context of our
question, namely, the limits of this prior question. "Limits" in
the sense that, because of the contextualty of all the biblical
conceptions of peace, especially in view of the differences in
situations in which we find ourselves today vis-à-vis these concep-
tions, it seems impossible to expect any direct guidance from the
biblical witness to peace. The fact is that "no biblical project"
can or should "be made, simply and directly, the basis of a pro-
jected church action for practical peace work" (10). But certainly
the biblical witness to peace can be relevant both for our ques-
tions and for the decisions we have to make today by reminding us
of the basic direction in which this biblical witness points. But
these two aspects (named above) are of fundamental significance
for this basic direction:

To begin first again with the "interior dimension" of the bibli-
cal, and especially of the New Testament, witness to peace; we
have already demonstrated that this witness does not in its own
view imply any systematic abstention from all concrete action for
peace on the part of Christians. Quite the contrary! The reality
of peace, which the New Testament speaks of as a divinely estab-
lished reality, always has at the same time an "outward
dimension," because God, in His action for peace, always has in
view the human being in this world. The action of God for peace is
matched by, because responded to by, the corresponding action of
the person who has found "peace with God" (Rom 5:1), and therefore
by the action of this person for peace in human society (i.e., at
the particular place of primitive Christianity in history, action
for peace within the interior life of the church). Peace in this
sense can be tantamount to the keynote of the "new life," in which
we are to walk (Rom 6:4 and Gal 5:22; Rom 8:6). In other words,
the peace of God which "passes all understanding" (Phil 4:7) cer-
tainly does not exclude "intelligent" Christian action in the
world, i.e. in each individual's particular place, but, as the se-
quence of Phil 4:7 and 4:8 shows, actually includes such action:

"Finally, brothers and sisters, whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just... think about these things" (sc. in reference to your conduct!)(Phil 4:8). The peace of God, therefore, which cannot be commanded or controlled by human action however intelligent, sets us free to use our human intelligence appropriately in the various problems confronting us at various times, in favor of human action suited to the immediate context. Romans 12:2 (in Ernst Käsemann's rendering): "Do not let yourselves be conformed to this age but rather let yourselves be transformed by the renewing of your mind so that you may prove what is the will of God, (therefore) what is good and well-pleasing and perfect" (12:2) - this exhortation must, in this sense, always be one of the essential and basic guiding maxims for the action of Christians and the church. And, since Paul speaks of God's mercy in the immediately preceding verse, in Rom 12:1, we have good theological grounds for affirming that the basic biblical message of "reconciliation" not only points to the "interior dimension" of the biblical witness to peace but, at the same time, can also become a keynote of the Christian and the church's work for peace (cf. again, the model of Eph 2:11ff.).

We come finally to the other aspect of the biblical witness to peace: the (according to the NT, indissoluble) interconnection between eschatology and peace. This aspect not only has a critical and corrective function in relation to all fanatical equating of the peace of God with the peace of the world but also a meaning and function as a positive guide, even for the question of the concrete form which the commitment of Christians and the church to peace should take. In the context of the basic relationship between eschaton and history, the relationship between eschatology and peace is certainly not to be defined only in negative terms (11). It is precisely the eschatological horizon of all Christian and church action for peace, indeed, which establishes the dynamic and process character of this action, over against all tendencies to freeze the status quo. It is this eschatological horizon, therefore, which also enables Christians and the church to contribute to the process of action for peace all which, out of the interior dimension and depths of their commitment to the cause of humankind, equips them for the process of peacemaking. To contribute the readiness and capacity to cross over seemingly insuperable barriers or at least to relativize them (Eph 2:11ff.), the readiness and capacity to solve conflicts rationally and to cooperate intelligently with people who think differently; in addition, certainly, the readiness and capacity to forgo the assertion and triumph of their own positions and, in this connection - in view of the fact that He who is Himself our peace is the Crucified - last but by no means least, also the readiness and capacity to practise solidarity with those who suffer and indeed to accept suffering themselves. But this also means that it is this eschatological horizon of all Christian and church action for peace which enables us to see a symbolic form of that "plus," that "more" of Mt 5:20 ("Unless your righteousness exceeds ..."): the refusal to be resigned to, the refusal to be satisfied with the already achieved forms of peace. Rather: "It is precisely this unconditional dimension of the church's message which helps to prevent us from prematurely allowing prospects of cohumanity to become frozen and

enables us rather to keep new possibilities of a greater justice open in every situation" (Jan Milic Lochman at the WCC Geneva "Church and Society" Conference in 1966).

If it were not already clear before, it certainly is clear now that the interior dimension and depth of the biblical witness to peace implies not only the summons to responsible human action appropriate to the particular situation, in general terms and in principle, but also a pointer as to the direction which appropriate concrete action should take in respect of the particular situation. But another point that also becomes clear here, if not before, is that, above all in view of the imperative need in our time for Christian and church action for peace, "orthopraxy" and "orthodoxy" are indissolubly one. For the Christian as Christian, there is no "right conduct," appropriate to a given situation, which could simply ignore the "right faith" of the Christian. And what is certainly not involved here - in the sense of a superficial view of "orthodoxy" and "right faith" - is the assertion of one's own "orthodox" position at all costs, but rather this unity of "orthodoxy" and "orthopraxy" means keeping steadily in view here the direction indicated to us by the biblical witness, the "direction indicated" in the sense of an action on behalf of peace pointing beyond all existing approximations to peace, but the "direction indicated" also in the sense of the well-spring of our action for peace. And this "well-spring", this source, has only been given there where God Himself, prior to all our action, "sola gratia," therefore, sets us free for "right conduct" in our particular context, and does not let us become discouraged even when again and again we come up against the limits of our own action and when - if need be - the command of the hour for us may be the renunciation of our own position and its victory. In the end, our experience again and again will be that the peace of God, which transcends all our rational action for peace, cannot be mistaken for one particular stage of our effort for peace once attained, not even in presumably the ideal case when this peace of God constantly leads us further along the way.

Finally, what will count most in the end, in any case, is that we learn afresh, in face of the challenges of our situation and time, to spell out clearly the significance of the faith that "He himself - the Crucified and Risen Lord - is our peace" (Eph 2:14) for our work for peace. In the end, everything will depend on our remembering that all our action for peace is given its keynote by God's action for peace on our behalf. We have constantly to learn the imperative implicit in the fact that the gospel of God's peace action in Jesus Christ is always at the same time a "gospel of peace" (Eph 6:15) in a restless and divided world - not just for others, but above all for us as Christians (in face of our self-assertive tendencies!). And all of us have surely learned this, that on the pathway cleared for us by God's peace offensive, we are given no guarantee that things will always go "smoothly and comfortably" (Mt 10:34). Jesus' own way of peace is the best illustration of this. Along his way "peace in the individual soul" is certainly not the first thing to be spoken of; we have to speak rather and far more about the unrest and dynamic movement in which the biblical witness of peace sets us - an unrest and movement, of

course, which always finds its point of rest there where God Himself has established the foundation and the standard for our own action, namely, in His action for peace in Jesus Christ.

Our starting point was the question: What is the "specific contribution" of the church for peace, its specific form of commitment to peace? In the contemporary situation, of course. After all we have learned about the biblical witness to peace, our answer to this question, in conclusion, would have to be something like this:

The church makes its "specific contribution" to peace when it is able to make clear in its message nothing other that this foundation and this standard of our action for peace and when it is able to represent this foundation and this standard in its existence in the world.

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Translated from the German by the
LWF Department of Studies.

Notes

1. W. Schmauch, cited by W. Bredendieck in Theol. Lexikon, 2nd ed., Berlin 1981, p. 188.

2. M. Dibelius, "The Social Theme in the New Testament," in German in Botschaft und Geschichte I, Tübingen 1953, pp. 178-203, here p. 180.

3. M. Dibelius, op.cit., p. 181

4. Cf. in this sense e.g. G. Jacob, Verkündigung und Zukunft (Proclamation and Future), Berlin 1972, p. 12f. and 14ff.

5. Cf. U. Lutz, in Eschatologie und Friedenshandeln (Eschatology and Action for Peace), Stuttgart 1981, p. 13: "apocalyptic and primitive Christian groups... experienced the world in the complete impotence and from the 'worm's eye view' of marginal groups," and this means, at the same time, that "the texts are primarily interested in the action of God and only secondarily in the action of human beings; they are more interested in eschatology than in action for peace in striking contrast to ourselves."

6. Cf. P. Hoffmann, in Eschatologie und Friedenshandeln, p. 117; U. Lutz, ibid., p. 109ff.

7. Cf. J. Rogge and H. Zeddies (ed.), Kirchengemeinschaft und politische Ethik (Church Unity and Political Ethics), Berlin 1980, p. 30.

8. ibid, p. 34.

9. U. Lutz, ibid, p. 8f.

10. U. Lutz, ibid, p. 212.

11. Cf. P. Hoffmann, op. cit, p. 117f.

PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE ETHICS OF PEACE TODAY

Trutz Rendtorff

"To maintain, promote and recreate peace is the imperative to be obeyed by all who have political responsibility." "In the Christian ethic, peace and not war is the only objective." These two statements from the Peace Memorandum of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) (1) may legitimately be labeled "essential principles." They also point out the direction in which Lutheran theologians must continue to develop their political ethic if they hope to contribute distinctively and helpfully to the contemporary peace debate. Everybody talks about peace, ourselves included. But we do not all talk of it in the same way. One of the church fathers, Augustine, in the first major Christian tract on political theology, felt impelled long ago to make this point: "Everyone wants peace but everyone wants it only in his own way." Peace is the unique and most important public issue because it is something no one can have individually but only in association with others. Proverbial wisdom sums this up neatly in the dictum that "not even the best of us can live in peace if this does not suit the ill-disposed neighbor." Peace, therefore, is a preeminently political concept and every declaration of the desire for peace, the objective of peace and thoughts must give an account of the political conditions and objectives which it is pursuing.

1. Prophetic talk of peace

This applies also and above all to the theological substance of the hope and longing for peace which is inherent in the ultimate horizon of the Christian ethic. A Dutch objection reproaches the Peace Memorandum to be, in a quite respectable way, a "calm, irenical and wise memorandum," - to be in the "wisdom" tradition and to lack the prophetic note. A prophetic proclamation, we are told, is one which "is no longer open to discussion" (2). There is a touch of that also in the question: "Must Christians be pacifists?" Yes or No - tertium non datur.

The most widespread contemporary concept of peace known to us today is stated in a prophetic passage which has been given symbolic form in the metal sculpture by a Russian artist which stands in front of the United Nations building in New York. The sculpture is inspired by "the word which Isaiah the son of Amoz saw concerning Judah and Jerusalem:"

> It shall come to pass in the latter days
> that the mountain of the house of the Lord
> shall be established as the highest of the mountains

and shall be raised above the hills;
and all the nations shall flow to it,
and many peoples shall come and say:
'Come, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord,
to the house of the God of Jacob;
that he may teach us his ways
and that we may walk in his paths.'
For out of Zion shall go forth the Law,
and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.
He shall judge between the nations,
and shall decide for many peoples;
and they shall beat their swords into plowshares
and their spears into pruning hooks;
nation shall not lift up sword against nation
neither shall they learn war any more.
O house of Jacob,
come, let us walk
in the light of the Lord (Isaiah 2:1-5).

Notice the sequence in this prophetic word, so astonishingly con-
temporary in its relevance: there is one mountain which is raised
above all the hills; there is one Lord, who leads all and whom all
follow; there is one judge who delivers judgment. And, united in
this way under one government, all the nations will lay down their
weapons. When the necessary conditions for this world government
are fulfilled, in the last days, the obstacles which up till then
stood in the way of world peace will also have been removed. What
Isaiah certainly does not say is this: "Beat your swords into
plowshares and your spears into pruning hooks, so as to prepare
the way, so that the one Lord may take His power and reign!" The
prophet's words are not a summons to unconditional pacifism, with
its readiness to endure oppression and its willingness to accept
all the consequences of complete defenselessness. In this situa-
tion, in which the people of Israel is oppressed, the prophetic
call is rather that of the prophet Joel:

Proclaim this among the nations:
Prepare war, stir up the mighty men.
Let all the men of war draw near, let them come up.
Beat your plowshares into swords, and your pruning hooks into
    spears.
Let the weak say, 'I am a warrior.'
Hasten and come, all you nations round about,
gather yourselves there.
Bring down thy warriors, O Lord.
Let the nations bestir themselves,
and come up to the valley of Jehoshaphat;
for there I will sit to judge all the nations round about
    (Joel 3:9-12).

This, then, is the way the prophets talked. Before the final peace there is always still one final liberation struggle to be endured, one final battle to be fought, before the just Ruler rules and the just cause triumphs. Prophets to the right, prophets to the left, with the ordinary person in between! Which prophets are we to heed?

2. The choice of peace: Between responsibility for the world, and unconditional pacifism

Despite all these prophetic voices, or possibly precisely because of them, peace in fact is and remains a question of responsibility for the world. The message of the prophets can illuminate the responsibility for peace, set it in a clear and revealing light. But not replace it, not be a substitute for it. Christianity has affirmed this responsibility for the world and for peace. Has this affirmation become optional today? The Peace Memorandum states this problem as follows: An unconditional and radical pacifism totally denies the governmental and political peace task. Somewhat akin to primitive Christian asceticism and its expectation of the end of the world, this pacifism is the deliberate abandonment of all responsibility in this world and for this world, a world which in any case is "passing away." Here in this respect, all arguments are behind, finished with. The credibility of unconditional pacifism depends entirely on its consistency. Not only no military service but no sort of office whatever in the state; not only no direct support for governmental authority but no taxes either. An analogous question was already put to Jesus by the Pharisees when they showed him a Roman coin and asked him if they should pay their taxes; in other words, support the state in its tasks. Jesus' answer points in a different direction from the very beginning: "Give Caesar what is Caesar's and God what is God's!"

Unconditional pacifism again and again finds itself, therefore, in an ambiguous position which logically leads Christians to confine themselves, so to speak, to the easier problems in the life of society: marriage and the family, individual virtues of purity of individual convictions, and to leave to others the problems arising from the contradictoriness of the world. On closer inspection. we also find that what is involved here is a selective pacifism, permitting an individual to serve the state but not its defense, to respect justice and obey the laws but not to cooperate in the establishment or defense of justice and law. In the last analysis, therefore, the fact that the church, in which Jesus Christ is worshipped as the Son of God, saw itself claimed by the Father of Jesus Christ even for responsibility for the world and did not leave this responsibility mainly to others, is not to be dismissed as shameful compliance but seen rather as clear theological and ethical insight.

I refer to these ramifications because current church discussion of the question of peace is once again concerned with the question of the legitimacy and inescapability of a Christian responsibility for the world. This means that it should also be seen primarily as

a discussion of the nature and mission of the political realm. This calls for fresh discussion in every generation, taking into account the constantly changing circumstances. By their very logic, contemporary secular forms of unconditional pacifism are consistently associated with the rejection of existing political structures. A statement such as that made by the mouthpiece of one such peace current, which is setting itself apart as a movement, points in this direction: "If the politicians don't take us seriously, we'll make the country ungovernable." The Public Affairs Commission responsible for the Peace Memorandum is very clear-sighted on this point, too: the discussion of peace is at the same time a discussion of the state. At the conclusion of the peace theme, therefore, it turns to the question of the state, its responsibilities, and the question of the inescapable responsibility of the church for politics. This, too, is a contribution to our present theme.

What determines whether, and in what form, an unconditional and consistent pacifism has any place in the structure of political responsibility, therefore, is not the willingness of pacifists or Christians to accept responsibility but whether responsibility is entrusted to them. For responsibility is not something we seek and take for ourselves but something committed to us by others, entrusted to us. But it is not we who decide whether a willingness to accept responsibility is trustworthy, but others.

Nor, therefore, can a pacifism which is unconditional in relation to history be allowed to claim to be an alternative to existing delegated responsibility. Conversely, however, the essential consistency of a good political constitution includes the recognition of the position of this unconditional pacifism and its protection among the rights of civic freedom.

3. Nuclear pacifism and political responsibility

Today, the arguments and attitudes of historical pacifism are associated with another movement for which the simplest label is "nuclear pacifism": i.e. not absolute pacifism but a pacifism geared to the present situation in modern arms technology, i.e. to nuclear weapons. This is the dominant issue in the present discussion of peace. The power politics and world strategy of the great powers are pursued with nuclear weapons as a major factor in their calculations. The nuclear pacifist position is that on the grounds of reason and Christian conscience not only the use but even the possession of nuclear weapons is to be rejected. The present situation itself with its dangers, the apocalyptic scenario of an exchange of nuclear attacks whose consequences can only be envisaged in terms of a worldwide human disaster, has sunk into the universal conscience and provides sufficient grounds for a vote of no confidence in a policy based on such weapons. In this situation the Netherlands Reformed Church has uttered its unconditional "No!". It is legitimate to describe this as "nuclear" pacifism because this "No!" specifically includes readiness to accept all the consequences of this renunciation of nuclear weapons in this situ-

ation; i.e. of defeat by a more powerful enemy, surrender of na-
tional sovereignty, peace without freedom if only it seems to
guarantee life in the sense of survival.

On closer inspection, of course, "nuclear pacifism" is not only
not a consistent pacifism in the sense that historical pacifism
has been, but it is not even pacifism in the sense of an unquali-
fied advocacy of defenselessness and all its consequences. The
following points make this clear:

(1) Nuclear pacifism gambles on a specific hypothesis: namely, on
its short or long term effect in the form of pressure brought to
bear on governments by the attitude of the citizens of a community
when the point is reached where a defense policy based on nuclear
weapons forfeits general public support. It gambles on a change
of policy as a result of this pressure. In this sense nuclear pac-
ifism aims at a change of policy, a change which is very well-
known in political terms as a policy of disarmament, which has of-
ten been tried but whose history is at the same time a record of
failure. In this sense, nuclear pacifism is a very extreme form of
the theory of "gradualism;" in other words, the promotion of a de-
fense policy by unilateral "faits accomplis" with the aim of
influencing the other side to take "steps towards disarmament." It
is, of course, possible to entertain the goal of abolishing nucle-
ar arms only if we have some idea how our own behavior influences
others. An attitude which gambles on, must gamble on, its effects
on others is, however, poles apart from a pacifist attitude of re-
nunciation come what may.

(2) The nuclear pacifist argument focuses solely and exclusively
on the nature of nuclear weapons, and indeed on the stage reached
in their development today. The "No!" to nuclear weapons is at the
same time a "Yes!" to weapons of a different sort, commonly known
now as "conventional weapons." This is more or less clearly stated
again and again today. The term "conventional weapons" or
"conventional defense" sounds relatively innocuous, though the re-
ality denoted is very far from being so. But the position adopted
by nuclear pacifism's "No!", seemingly so unambiguously moral, is
in fact extremely ambiguous precisely because it is almost exclu-
sively focused on weapons and their character. For the stage now
reached in the development of weapons technology is surely such
that the so-called "conventional" weapons are rapidly coming to
rival the so-called nuclear weapons in efficacy and, conversely,
nuclear weapons are becoming technologically so sophisticated as
to rival the so-called "conventional" weapons in the ease with
which they can be deployed. The time is rapidly approaching when
it will no longer make sense to gamble on building up conventional
arms potential out of fear for the consequences of nuclear war-
fare. The "No!" of nuclear pacifism, supposedly pointing out pro-
phetically the way ahead, could very soon be in need of revision.
Moreover, it is bound to be difficult for those who base their
judgment on ethical principles to understand why we should say
"Yes!" to these conventional weapons.

(3) Because, very naturally and therefore very understandably, nu-
clear pacifism focuses so exclusively on the question of weapons,

it is dependent on the refinement of weapons technology to such an extent that it lacks any really hopeful initiative other than the demand that we should renounce nuclear weapons as at present developed. A clear proof of this is the fact that the nuclear pacifists almost never explain how otherwise the conflicts, which are in the last analysis the root of the problem, are to be resolved. These, after all, are the main reason for the inclusion of such weapons in defense planning. Here as in other respects in the peace movement, the political dimension of the question of peace is almost completely effaced in favor of the discussion of weapons.

4. The theological and political position of the Memorandum

The theological and political position of the EKD's Memorandum must be discussed against this background. The Memorandum has been criticized for not dealing in sufficient detail with nuclear weapons and their peculiarities, and for not adopting a sufficiently firm position on the development of weapons technology and the military strategy associated with it. The truth is that the basis of the Memorandum is the quite fundamental position that the decisive long-term problems and hopeful perspectives are not to be found in the area of weapons technology but in the political realm. Although these two areas are closely interrelated, much depends on the basic standpoint from which the current state of the question of a contemporary peace policy is viewed. In the reception given to the Memorandum and in the ensuing discussion of it, it is my impression that insufficient attention has been paid to important corollaries of this basic decision. This is connected with the fact that the so-called peace movement in particular keeps focusing one-sidedly on questions of military strategy, and that those who are interested in a prophetic decision therefore actually only watched if and how the notable 8th Heidelberg Thesis had been evaluated by the Memorandum. It is impossible and it is not my intention here to enter into the whole gamut of current discussion. I shall confine my remarks to emphasizing five particular points which seem to me vital.

(1) The political dimension of securing peace

The fact that the main emphasis of the Memorandum's argument is on political measures to secure peace and that it urges a recovery of the political dimension in current world conflicts is to be interpreted in the first place as defining the Evangelical Church's attitude to political ethics. A specifically Protestant and certainly also a Lutheran tradition is taken up here and at the same time modified and re-defined. In speaking of the "office of political responsibility" as part of the "divine order of grace," the memorandum is borrowing traditional ideas. It thereby employs formulations which, in this or another context, have, since Martin Luther's day, been directed to emphasizing that the political office is that form of responsibility for the world which has its

own authority and laws, i.e. is not only derived from the church's service and mission. It includes echoes of the traditional theological view of the "political authority" ("Obrigkeit"). At the same time, however, and this is my main point, the understanding of this office of political responsibility is qualified in the Memorandum by the insistence that the purpose of politics is to "serve the imperative of peace," as already referred to in the initial citations in this paper:

"All political responsibilities are related to this imperative of peace." This amounts to a far-reaching and important correction of the tradition. In the Lutheran church, the constant tendency of the tradition has been to equate the political office primarily with the "sword" and to formulate its role above all in terms of defense against the wicked and the punishment of the lawbreaker. The Memorandum states explicitly that political responsibility derives its mission from the imperative of peace and that it is in terms of its mission in this sense that it must also be critically appraised. This positive criterion of political responsibility introduces a dynamic and hopeful direction to our understanding of political ethics. At the same time, it offers a criterion for political judgment which permits and obliges us to differentiate quite sharply between the contemporary attitude of the Evangelical Church and any form of submissiveness or political conformity. The decisive question here is how far the politicians today have abandoned their own most distinctive and creative responsibility for peace to the concern to develop weapons. Or, to be more specific, have actually become dependent on this development to the point that their own independence has become seriously endangered. The crucial point is this: The purpose for which the Memorandum ventures to criticize the arms race and the militarization of political conflicts is to reinforce, not to weaken political responsibility.

(2) The rejection of war as a political instrument

The key statements of the memorandum outstrip not only the tradition of Lutheran theology but also the position of nuclear pacifism. "The only criterion for the problem of violence and war is peace. War today can no longer be defined as the continuation of policy by other means. To put it trenchantly and without beating about the bush, war is the failure of policy. To threaten with war is an irresponsible political attitude. The task of politics is to defeat the threat of violence by a policy of peace." It is in this perspective that the Memorandum invites us to examine the problems in the current debate on peace. This sets a definite goal, unqualified by any particular stage in the development of weapons technology, and aiming at the utter defeat of the anachronistic institution of war. But, and this is precisely the point, the outlawing of war, its elimination as a traditional institution for the settlement of conflicts, can and must be achieved politically, because, as we have already said, peace is preeminently a political category.

(3) The growing divergence between political aims and military strategy

But this position, formulated in general terms and principles, of a pacifism which in view of its objectives can if you like be called a political pacifism, focuses today precisely on the point where the decisive arguments must be conducted because it is here where the decisions must be made. Let me explain: A critical point has been reached today in the development of the two great power blocs, a point where there is every reason to put the question: Can the actual military development today still promote at all the stated political aims repeatedly affirmed by the two sides? Let me develop this briefly in one or two points. The theory or doctrine of balanced deterrence owed its development as a strategic concept to the influence of nuclear weapons but also to experiences in the Second World War, from the concept of stabilizing or securing of peace. But it was not derived from a concept of offensive war. For reasons connected with weapons technology, both sides have mean-while acquired an unprecedented offensive capacity which, in a situation of inadequate stabilizing of the two sides, used preventively or in a surprise attack, would bring unprecedented strategic advantages (the so-called "preemptive strike"). But sta-bilization means denying the other side any such advantage, e.g. by the possession of sufficiently invulnerable weapons of retalia-tion in adequate numbers. Developments in weapons technology have now brought us to the point where a situation of reciprocal offen-sive capacity exists. For technical military reasons, offensive war has become part of the equation, even though neither side openly wants it. The inherent logic of armaments leads directly to an offensive capacity, i.e. a capacity to conduct war, which as such is diametrically opposed to responsible and avowed political objectives.

Here we have the vital political problem, i.e. the question: Are the conflicting parties in a position to define their conflict in other than military terms and to recover their political freedom of action over against their dependence on the development of weapons technology? These conditions of the present situation which we have just described briefly and soberly also explain why, in its analysis of the military and political problems in the sense in which I have described, the memorandum has refrained from introducing into its argument special political and ethical evalu-ations of the one side, the Western side for example, over against the other side, the Eastern bloc. The reason is simply that for this decisive line of argument, the political option for the one side or the other is secondary; for in both cases the problem is the same, that of the dependence of the political conflict on the development of military technology. I wanted to make this point clear just once because the Memorandum has again been criticized for not describing clearly enough the qualitative political and ethical difference between the "free" Western world and the "totalitarian" system of the East. Certainly the conflict which is expressed in such formulas remains. In my opinion, however, it is precisely not the sort of conflict which can, should or must inevitably lead to military confrontation. For this very reason, it is essential today to bring out into the open the sharp

divergence, the "scissors movement," between the political objec-
tives on the one hand, and the development of military technolo-
gy on the other. Certainly these are complicated matters but they
demonstrate very precisely and in detail how important it is to
strengthen political responsibility in the situation of conflict
which is mainly described today in military terms.

(4) Recovering the political dimension, or, the problem of alli-
ances

My fourth point stresses the Memorandum's very clear idea of the
ways to peace. This idea can roughly be defined by such labels as
"the capacity and readiness to make alliances," "the capacity to
communicate" and "the readiness to negotiate." In opposition to a
purely utopian approach, the Memorandum proposes that we should
look at the political tasks ahead in the light of already success-
ful attempts at conflict management and already achieved political
solutions. There is no such thing as one all-important act but on-
ly the way of developing steps which have proved their worth. Po-
litical alliances are the form in which a mutual reliance and in-
terdependence is created within which conflicts do not disappear
but can be endured without recourse to war. Our own experiences
with political neighbours who only yesterday were our military en-
emies can provide an encouraging pointer to guide us here, and
likewise many steps in East-West relations, documented in treaty
form, which have worked against military confrontation. The will
to peace and the readiness for peace, if we take the trouble to
translate them into political terms, can hardly expect to find any
alternative to this way of establishing alliances and strengthen-
ing the capacity for communication. It is always important also,
in this context, despite all negative experiences, not to despise
cynically the institution of the United Nations, but to seek rath-
er to cultivate it and to strive to strengthen it, despite its
considerable defects. This is why the Memorandum is also of the
opinion that the slogan "Living Without Armaments," understood in
this reformulated political sense, is not hopelessly utopian but a
viable way.

(5) "Yes" to our own political position

But the affirmation of our own political position in the interna-
tional field of conflict also has its place in this context. The
readiness for peace and the willingness to make alliances do not
exclude the recognition of profound differences and taking them
seriously. Indeed, a peace not based on truth and sincerity, a
peace which lacks political conviction, is doomed from the outset
to be an empty and fragile peace. We Germans, who owe our enjoy-
ment of freedoms and basic rights not to our own strength but were
set free for them by others, have every reason to take very seri-
ously our political responsibility for the continuation of this
democracy domestically and externally. In my view, it is a disser-
vice to freedom in the political sense when people say that it is

ultimately of no consequence what political constitution the world in which peace is achieved will have. Inner and outer peace are indivisible in the political objective. We have learned to think highly of fundamental rights and human rights, more highly than our Lutheran predecessors did. In this respect, too, there is something in the nature of a vicarious responsibility, an awareness of what we have to contribute to a political order of peace and what we have to champion in it.

The answer I gave to the question of our conference at the outset of my paper is qualified, therefore, by these five emphases on the Memorandum's theological, ethical and political position.

5. Responsibility for peace in the light of the Sermon on the Mount

As always happens in times when the question of the distinctive Christian contribution to political action is vigorously disputed, interest is focused on the Sermon on the Mount. Then comes a division into two camps: there are those who say: "The Sermon on the Mount describes the peacemakers as blessed and commands us to love our enemies, therefore let us lay down our arms!" and others who insist: "The world cannot be governed by the principles of the Sermon on the Mount which apply only to individuals."

On this point, too, I want to say something which is in line with the Memorandum when it says that the teaching of Jesus points us in a definite direction, It must be noted, of course, that it is inadmissible and certainly a delusion when someone claims to be simply obeying the Sermon on the Mount in what he or she does or intends to do, and therefore has a superior claim to others. We must be warned against any such direct and exclusive appeal to the Sermon on the Mount whereby some sort of moral and spiritual superiority is claimed over others. For it is not we ourselves who can decide the nature and value of what we do. This also means, however, that the direction in which we are pointed by the Sermon on the Mount is not solely and exclusively that of individual conduct.

At the end of Matthew 5, in the middle of the Sermon on the Mount, we find the saying: "You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mt 5:48). In this saying, not only the Beatitudes, to which the saying about the peaceful of the peacemakers belongs, but also the command to love our enemies are given their theological and therefore essential and far-reaching justification. It will be helpful, therefore, in the renewed discussion of the Sermon on the Mount today, to ask what constitutes this divine perfection, in view of the fact that we ourselves obviously so easily stumble into error and make so little progress. If what the Sermon on the Mount says is not just to frighten us off but to encourage and help us to advance, not only to show up our human failure but also enlighten and renew us, this is most likely to happen because of its theological basis. For the divine perfection does not exclude but rather includes and embraces our human imperfection. The answer to the question of the nature of

God's perfection has been given in Jesus' sermon immediately fol-
lowing his exegesis of the command to love our enemies. This exe-
gesis reaches its climax in the words: "so that you may be chil-
dren of your Father who is in heaven." Then come the words to which
special attention must be paid here: " For God makes His sun rise
on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and the
unjust" (Mt 5:45). It is on this statement that we must linger if
we are to begin to understand the function of the Sermon on the
Mount as a guide to our conduct. This, says Jesus, is how God gov-
erns the world. The government from above, God's government, is
depicted as a heavenly government, i.e. one which is not deter-
mined by our standards - those of selectivity and dogmatism, with
everyone wanting to have his or her own God - but by His stan-
dards. The standards and perspectives of a divine government of
the world are those of His universal presence. "He makes his sun
rise on the evil and on the good and sends rain on the just and
the unjust." This saying, moreover, can be extended as follows:
What on earth would happen if we human beings were to accede to
this power of government, the power to distribute the blessings of
heaven and to determine on whom the sun should rise and on whom it
should not rise? This saying of Jesus, be it noted, is immediately
preceded by the command to love our enemies: "Love your enemies!
Bless those who curse you! Do good to those who hate you! Pray for
those who despitefully use you and persecute you!" For this is
what the heavenly Father does. This divine government is the pre-
supposition, the basis, from which the command to love our enemies
is derived. This is the theological significance of the command to
love our enemies. The questions which immediately arise must be
discussed in this light: Is this also something we can do? Is this
what we are really supposed to do? Is this an exceptional impera-
tive or can it be generalized? And all the other questions... When
loving our enemies is understood in the light of this theological
basis, it means: From heaven, God Himself includes in His govern-
ment the evil and the good, the just and the unjust. This is cer-
tainly not to say that God is indifferent to the evil and the
good, the just and the unjust. Perfection means - it may certainly
be so understood - that God does not allow the law of His own ac-
tion, His government, to be determined by human goodness or wick-
edness. On the contrary, He makes Himself independent of it.

This, it seems to me, is a most important and even an indispensable
perspective for all who are the victims of hatred or who
themselves persist in hostility. Love, i.e. blessing instead of
cursing, doing good instead of hating, praying instead of getting
even with, means not making ourselves dependent on those who hate
us or cause us pain. Of God, at any rate, it must be held to be
true that He does not allow the standard of His action and govern-
ment to be taken out of His own hands. But this is precisely what
happens when the principle of revenge is applied. For in this
principle it is the other party who dictates the law of action
whereby his evil deed is avenged.

Another important question, it seems to me, is whether this per-
fection of love is not made possible, in the last analysis, by in-
difference, by insensitivity to enmity and evil, i.e. by a stoic
serenity which, in the last analysis, ignores everything. But the

message of Matthew 5 should be read in the light of another message of love which provides a commentary on Matthew 5. I refer to the narrative of Genesis, chapters 6 to 8. The essence of this prehistorical narrative has found its way into the Sermon on the Mount. Let me briefly explain. In the myth of the flood in Genesis 6 we read:

> The Lord saw that the wickedness of humanity was great on the earth and that every imagination of the thoughts of the human heart was only evil continually. And the Lord was sorry that he had made humankind on the earth, and it grieved him to His heart. So the Lord said: "I will blot out the human beings whom I have created from the face of the ground... for I am sorry that I have made them!"

The creator regrets His work. He would prefer to have nothing more to do with it. His reaction to what He finds in His human creation is anger and disappointment. In world terms, this reaction produces the great world crisis, the great flood, which destroys everything. And at the end of this myth we find the new covenant, symbolically expressed in the form of the rainbow. God solemnly vows: "While the earth remains, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night, shall not cease" (Gen 8:21). This is precisely the tone of the Sermon on the Mount: For God makes His sun rise and sends rain on the good and on the evil. For the new covenant is not being established by God because humankind has now become good, because there are no enemies any more, no sin and no destruction. "I will never again curse the ground because of man, for the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth" (Gen 20). Although human beings resist God, are constantly at war with one another, hurt one another, God reestablishes His covenant with the world. God, the heavenly Governor, chooses to be independent of revenge, independent of enmity, injustice and wickedness. For only in this way can He remain what He is, the Lord. And this message is repeated and reinforced in the Sermon on the Mount. Because God does not order His good government in accordance with our human behavior, but rather causes His goodness to rule, we are enabled to live.

How often we hear it said today that it is impossible to govern the world by the Sermon on the Mount. In support of this view, the crown witness is supposed to be the existence of enemies and enmity. The assertion would be true if it meant that otherwise we would have to behave as if there were no longer any enemies, as if their existence was only a misunderstanding, as if there were no evil but only love and friendship and piety among human beings. In the perspective of God, however, we have to say rather that the Sermon on the Mount is the only possible way the world can be governed. For the only reason why we are able to live is because we, our human world, are measured by a different standard than the one we have deserved. For the only reason why the world continues to exist and to manage is because God has made Himself independent of the behavior, the thanklessness, of humankind. If evil, enmity, ruthless self-interest, selfishness and aggression alone ruled and were reacted against, the world would perish.

This does not mean, cannot mean, that evil is to prevail in order that there may be peace on earth, that the enemy is to rule so that conflict may cease, that submission is the only proper way of acting in order that conflict may be eliminated from the world.

On the contrary, love summons up all its efforts to prevent the enemy from governing. Specifically, this means that love does not allow the enemy to dictate to it its law of conduct, but rather looks beyond the present conditions of conflict to that which is serviceable to the existence of the whole common life and of the world. We are permitted to interpret in this way the liberating perspective of the perfection of God which Jesus introduced as the foundation at the very heart of the Sermon on the Mount.

But this is also precisely the position of the EKD Memorandum on this question. It states, "The command to love our enemies does not require us to submit or even grovel; it requires us to accept even the enemy as a sinful human being - like ourselves - moved by hopes, fears and aggressions. As Christians, we know that the command to love the enemy is not to be regarded as a law only for others, in which we decide what they should do or whereby we condemn them. It lays on Christians the obligation to overcome the spirit of hostility and to seek ways whereby enmity may be replaced by new forms of common life and cooperation in all spheres of life, including the political realm." "The very last thing the church intends to teach by its appeal to the words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount is the renunciation of responsible action." On the contrary, it teaches Christians the direction in which the will of God points us for the exercise of our responsibility. This is how we are to understand Paul when, in his own context and with an astonishing approximation to certain statements on the Sermon on the Mount, he says in Rom. 12:14f.: "Do not be overcome by evil but overcome evil with good." In accordance with the main thrust of Paul's previous words here, this summons depends, however, not on the kindness and perfection of human beings as Christians. It is not the consequence or the expression of the Christian's own distinctive capacity and goodness but the fruit of the recognition of the form and manner of God's government of the world, for which human beings must let themselves be claimed in their own conduct.

The question whether this applies only to "individual behavior" or also to all the structures of our human life is a completely false alternative. Indeed, I would go further and say that we have no reason whatever to assert that the demands of the Sermon on the Mount could fairly easily be met in the behavior of the individual and only present difficulties in the realm of public affairs and in the structures of social action. On the contrary, in all aspects of the practical conduct of life, there are indeed very impressive equivalents for the symbols of a love of God which is all-inclusive and anticipatory: constitutions which protect and respect every individual, a social structure which bridges oppositions, a political culture which allows room for the interaction of freedom and responsibility. To be sure, none of these or similar equivalents is in itself completely equivalent to the direction we have in view here and which we have good reasons to follow. But neither is there any reason to interpret the concept of

perfection in the Sermon on the Mount in such a way that all else vanishes before it into a grey undifferentiated mass.

In conclusion, therefore, I would want to translate our main question, "Must Christians be pacifists?", which seems to me to smack so intensely of a special élitist ethic, into the different question: "Must Christians seek the way of peace, to strengthen and develop it?" For what really matters is not what distinguishes Christians from others but the cause to which they devote strength and time, courage and intelligence, determination and responsibility. "Faith that God always rules and governs strengthens beyond all the possibilities of political calculation the imperative that peace alone and not war is the criterion of human action" (3). This faith can appeal to the words of the prophet. "I will make your overseers peace and your taskmasters righteousness" (Isaiah 60:17).

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Translated from the German by the
LWF Department of Studies.

Notes

1. The Preservation, Promotion and Renewal of Peace - A Memorandum of the Evangelical Church in Germany. In: EDK Bulletin (special issue), Frankfurt/M. October 1981.

2. H. Berkhof, Evang. Kommentare No 5, 1982, p. 242.

3. The Preservation, Promotion and Renewal of Peace - A Memorandum of the Evangelical Church in Germany, op. cit., p. 55.

THE QUESTION OF PEACE: A UNITED MESSAGE FROM THE CHURCHES?

Armin Boyens

Since the end of the First World War the question of peace has been discussed in almost all the Christian churches. This discussion has intensified since the Second World War. Practically all of the major theologians of this century have made a contribution to the worldwide debate on this question in the churches. It is to the famous Swiss Protestant theologian Karl Barth, for example, that we owe the statement that the mistake of the churches in previous wars was "to have spoken so often in a naively nationalistic and militaristic way." It would be just as wrong, he added, if the churches, faced with a threat to world peace posed by a cynical ideology, were now "to keep quiet in a naively neutral and pacifistic way."

But what is the right message required of the churches on the question of war and peace? The answer given by Karl Barth in 1950 proposed as the criterion for Christian thought and action and as a basis for a peace ethic the conviction that "peace is the serious issue," the real emergency! The primary task of the churches, therefore, is not an ethic of war but an ethic of peace. If most of the churches could agree on a united message for the promotion of peace, this would in itself be a considerable force for world peace. There are increasing signs that the outlines of such an agreed ecumenical peace ethic are beginning to emerge.

The Christian churches have learned their lessons from the two world wars of this century. Three in particular have forced themselves on them. Firstly, church efforts for peace cannot be confined to the German, French, English or American areas alone. The time of a national peace ethic, of work for peace by a national church in "splendid isolation," is over. To be really convincing and credible, a peace ethic must be one with a worldwide perspective, i.e. an ecumenical peace ethic. Secondly, the discussion of peace in the churches today is conducted against the background of a dilemma over defense policy, a dilemma which can be defined by two observations: (1) Conventional ideas of defense have been called in question by total war, using modern nuclear, bacteriological and chemical means of mass destruction. The employment of modern weapons threatens the destruction of the very things one wants to defend. (2) Pacifistic ideals have been rendered impossible by the totalitarian system of a modern dictatorship which exercises complete control over its citizens by means of a secret police with its streamlined modern techniques of surveillance, torture and forced-labor camps. Within the field of tension indicated by these two observations, the task of Christianity in the establishment of peace in the world is to find a way between, on the one hand, the constant danger of a destructive nuclear war, and, on the other hand, the enforced renunciation of defense against the use of force by a world dictatorship; in other

words, to find a way which at one and the same time prevents both destruction and dehumanization. Thirdly, a church peace ethic concentrates its attention on confidence-building measures. One result of the dilemma just mentioned is the distrust which is the real root of the absence of peace, and of the tensions and arms race associated with it.

The insights just outlined represent a challenge to the ethical tradition of the Christian churches. One of the encouraging aspects of the history of the church since the Second World War is the fact that in almost all Christian churches serious efforts have been made to develop a new peace ethic, one which takes the realities of the 20th century into account. This study process, moreover, has already borne fruit. In what follows I shall point out briefly some of the more important examples of this. We must glance first, however, at the way the argument has developed in the non-Roman Christian churches since the Second World War.

The Discussion in the World Council of Churches

The World Council of Churches came into existence officially on August 23rd, 1948, in Amsterdam. At that time it had 147 member churches, drawn from all continents. At this memorable founding Assembly, Anglicans, Orthodox, Lutherans, Reformed, Methodists, Baptists and Presbyterians adopted an agreed statement on the question of war and peace. In it we find the affirmation that war is contrary to the will of God. This unanimous repudiation of war was a novum in church history. But unsolved problems still remained. In Amsterdam in 1948, the churches were unable to agree, for example, on how the fundamental bases of real and lasting peace, i.e. justice and freedom, were to be defended and, above all, how the protection of human rights was to be ensured in the modern world. Despite an intensive discussion of first principles, three different standpoints proved impossible to reconcile. One group took the view that, even though Christians are compelled in certain circumstances to take up arms, war with its destructive power could never be an act of justice in the nuclear age. A second view was that, since impartial courts did not yet exist at that time, it was still permissible to appeal to force as a last resort in the defense of justice. When no other possibility existed, the citizen had an obligation to defend justice by force of arms. A third group rejected all forms of military service in the conviction that God required them as Christians to adopt an unconditional position against war and for peace. In their view, the whole church should speak and act in the same way.

Although these differences of view among Christians were felt to be a burden, the member churches of the World Council nevertheless declared that the church had no right to refuse to recognize those adopting one or the other of these three positions as Christian brothers and sisters. One commentator described this difference of opinion in the basic questions of a peace ethic as a "tri-lemma." Would this "trilemma" handicap the churches in their work for peace?

The Ecumenical Peace Ethic and the Question of Disarmament

Despite different standpoints on fundamental questions of an ecu-
menical peace ethic, the discussion of peace continued in the
churches. The World Council of Churches even managed to achieve
advances in practical ecumenical action for peace. The body then
(as now) responsible for this practical work of the World Council
in matters of peace was the Commission of the Churches on Interna-
tional Affairs (CCIA). After nearly ten years of intensive consul-
tation and preparation, this body presented in 1957 a disarmament
program resting essentially on three principles: (1) War can no
longer be regarded today as a way of settling political conflicts.
It must therefore be outlawed in every form and banished from the
thinking of all nations as a possible political instrument. But
the ethical task of Christianity is not simply to condemn war.
Justice cannot be done to the deep concern of the Christian con-
science for the establishment of peace merely by remaining aloof
or apart from political conceptions, military strategy or weapons
technology, i.e. from historical factors, but only by wrestling
with them. The CCIA proposed, therefore, a second principle: (2) a
definite long-range strategy whereby small but practical steps to-
wards the establishment of world peace would be possible. These
steps included a moratorium on nuclear tests, a cutting back of
nuclear arms production, the reduction of existing armaments lev-
els linked with precautionary measures against surprise attack,
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the peaceful settlement of
international conflicts and peaceful accommodation to changed con-
ditions. Thirdly (3), the CCIA stressed the importance of
"confidence-building measures."

Should persistent efforts fail to achieve adequate agreements on
any of these interrelated points, binding partial treaties should
be seriously explored and those concerned should, if need be, ac-
cept reasonable risks for themselves in order to promote these in-
terrelated objectives.

The importance of the agreement reached on these three principles
is underscored by the endorsement of this strategy by two WCC As-
semblies: the Third Assembly in New Delhi in 1961 and the Fourth
Assembly in Uppsala in 1968. At New Delhi, the member churches of
the World Council, now 198 in number, declared in effect on the
issue of war and peace in a nuclear age that they rejected the use
of nuclear weapons but regarded their production to intimidate and
deter possible enemies as indispensable. The "trilemma" of
Amsterdam 1948 had become a dilemma: the frightful dilemma between
the summons to protect the life of humanity on this earth and the
summons to maintain justice and order in the world.

The statement of the Fifth Assembly - which was held in Nairobi in
1975 - is often quoted. In an "Appeal to the Churches" it was de-
clared that "the churches should emphasize their readiness to live
without the protection of armaments and take a significant initia-
tive in pressing for effective disarmament." Sometimes the first
part only of this appeal is quoted, reducing it to a one-sided
summons to "live without armaments." But the second half of the
appeal, calling for a significant initiative in pressing for ef-

fective disarmament, is not to be discarded in this way.

Working for an Order of World Peace

In an address in September 1981, Dr Philip Potter, the present
General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, pointed our
that significant initiatives of this kind had not been lacking. A
prerequisite for effective disarmament is an effective interna-
tional order of justice acknowledged by all nations, one which
provides nations with the means of settling their inevitable con-
flicts without resort to military force. The Second Assembly of
the World Council - meeting in Evanston, USA, in 1954 - had out-
lined in nine points the principles of this international order of
justice as a prerequisite for an order of world peace.

1. There is no power without responsibility and all nations are
   trustees of the power they possess, which is to be used for the
   general good.
2. All nations are subject to the moral law and should there-
   fore try to keep to the acknowledged principles of internation-
   al law with a view to developing this law and establishing it
   by joint action.
3. All nations should keep their word and observe the interna-
   tional treaties they have undertaken to uphold.
4. No nation has the right, in an international conflict, to be
   judge in its own cause or to resort to war in order to pursue
   its political goals; on the contrary, they should try to solve
   conflicts by direct negotiations or else submit them to arbi-
   tration and legal settlement.
5. All nations have a moral obligation to take responsibility
   for the security of all and to this end must support measures
   designed to deny victory to a notorious aggressor.
6. All nations should recognize and protect the innate dignity,
   worth and basic rights of the human person, without discrimina-
   tion on the grounds of race, sex, language or religion.
7. Every nation should respect the right of every other nation
   adhering to these criteria to live according to and to proclaim
   its political and social convictions, providing it does not at-
   tempt to impose these convictions on other nations by compul-
   sion, intimidation, infiltration or deception.
8. All nations should recognize the obligation to share their
   scientific and technical gifts with peoples of less developed
   areas and to help the victims of disasters in other countries.
9. All nations should strive to cultivate good-neighborly rela-
   tions with their neighbors, to promote a friendly cultural and
   economic exchange and to cooperate in creative international
   efforts for the well-being of humankind.

To limit attention solely to arms and armed forces is a deplorable
truncation and narrowing of the present debate on the ethic of
peace. One important task of the churches, on the contrary, is to
make persistent efforts to help all who are concerned for world
peace to see the wider contexts of a world order of peace and to
guard against onesidedness, narrowness and inflexibility of all
kinds which lead to an exclusive concentration on particular prob-
lems.

The Position of the Roman Catholic Church

An ecumenical peace ethic worthy of the name will need to include in its reflections the position of the worldwide Roman Church on the question of peace and war in an atomic era. Since the Second World War there have been significant developments in the Catholic peace ethic, too, leading up to the Second Vatican Council and its statements about the Christian service of peace in a nuclear age and on the issues of disarmament and a world order of peace.

A dominant feature of these developments in the peace ethic of the Catholic church has been the discussion of the traditional church doctrine of the "just war." The Catholic peace ethic was decisively influenced by the personality of Pope Pius XII, the supreme head of the Roman Catholic Church from 1939 to 1958. A remarkable consistency is to be observed in this Pope's thinking on the ethic of peace. Whereas the World Council of Churches rejected the doctrine of the just war at its founding Assembly in 1948, Pius XII began after 1945 to reinvigorate the doctrine of the just war. The background to this, of course, was the "cold war" between East and West and the severe persecution of the Catholic Church in Eastern-bloc countries which exercised a considerable influence on Catholic thinking.

To Pius XII, the lines of battle in the East-West conflict seemed perfectly clear. It was a straightforward question of humanity and the defense of the values of Christian civilization. In this situation it was impossible for the church to remain neutral. Pius XII insisted that there are values which the divine order of peace obliges us to respect and to establish unconditionally, and therefore to protect and defend.

He regarded an offensive war as a violation of inalienable human rights. A defensive war, on the contrary, was not only permitted but even the duty of those attacked. Given this moral right to self-defense, any claim to refuse military service in democratic states was rejected by Pius XII as reflecting an errant conscience. In one important point, however, he limited this duty of self-defense. Such defense is permissible, even a duty, when a reasonable prospect of success can be presupposed. It was just this prospect of success, however, which would soon become a problem with the arrival on the scene of nuclear weapons. In September 1949, four years after the USA, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb. In 1953, only a short interval after the invention of the hydrogen bomb by the USA, the Soviet Union was able to test its own hydrogen bomb. The whole concept of a defensive war and its possible success was thereby called in question. Pius XII now turned his attention more vigorously to dealing with the causes of war. He urged, firstly, the reinforcement of international institutions for the prevention of war; secondly, controlled disarmament; and, thirdly, solidarity among the peace-loving nations with a view to deterring potential disturbers of the peace.

After the death of Pius XII and with the opening of the Second
Vatican Council, the peace ethic of the Catholic Church entered a
new phase. The war ethic increasingly took a back seat and had to
make way for the development of an ethic of peace. In 1965, in the
pastoral constitution on "The Church in the Modern World," the
council fathers approved a section entitled "The Avoidance of
War." The conciliar debate was mainly over the question whether it
was still possible to speak of a "just war" in the nuclear age.
Opinions differed widely here. All were agreed, however, that the
promotion of peace claimed first place. The Second Vatican Council
sought to combine efforts for the long-term goal of an absolute
ban on war with necessary steps to defend peace today. The Council
thus confirmed the basic right to "morally permissible defense."
Soldiers who carry out their duty properly "are contributing to
the maintenance of peace." In the same section, alongside these
statements, there is a condemnation of total war and the use of
nuclear weapons: "Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate
destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants
is a crime against God and humanity, which merits firm and un-
equivocal condemnation." Nuclear weapons, however, are designed
not only for use in war but also for deterrence with the object of
preventing war. But, although the strategy of deterrence is de-
scribed, the assessment of this strategy still remains open in the
Catholic Church: "Whatever one may think of this form of deter-
rent..." The council distinguished, therefore, between the
incontestable right to self-defense, on the one hand, and the im-
plementation of this right in the strategy of deterrence, on the
other. The moral evaluation of this strategy depends, basically,
on its prospects of success. But it is not the business of the
Council to assess this prospect of success; it is the business of
the politicians with their secular expertize. The Christian,
therefore, can affirm the strategy of deterrence, but can also re-
ject it. The statements of the Second Vatican Council initiated a
development in Catholic discussion of the peace ethic, a develop-
ment still continuing today.

Most recently, the discussion has been advanced by the message of
the German Catholic Bishops' Conference on April 18th 1983, enti-
tled "Justice creates peace." This document, in which the German
Catholic bishops speak unanimously (a point that calls for special
emphasis) and on the basis of their mission as teachers and pas-
tors of the church, carries special weight and authority: it is
therefore important for an ecumenical peace ethic, for several
reasons.

The pastoral letter marks an advance in the matter of promoting
peace itself. In it the peace ethic of the Catholic Church is car-
ried further. This becomes especially clear at two particular
points. Firstly, in the position adopted by the German Catholic
bishops to the problem of deterrence in a nuclear age. This ques-
tion had not previously been dealt with in official pronouncements
of the Catholic Church. This question of deterrence had been left
to the military and political experts. Catholic Christians, there-
fore, could have quite different opinions in this matter. Now
there is a new declaration. The German Catholic bishops go a step
further by adopting a position stated by Pope John Paul II on the

question of deterrence in his message to the Second Special Assembly of the UN on Disarmament in May 1982. "In present conditions, a deterrence based on equilibrium can still be considered morally acceptable - not, of course, as an end in itself but as a stage on the way of progressive disarmament. In order to establish peace, however, it is essential that we should not be content with a minimum, which is always burdened with the real danger of an explosion." The same statement of the Pope was also adopted, moreover, by the Catholic bishops of the USA in their pastoral letter of May 1983. This only serves to underline the worldwide ecumenical consensus. When the Catholic documents say that a deterrence based on equilibrium "can still be considered morally acceptable," anyone familiar with the Protestant debate on the peace ethic catches at once the echo here of the 8th Heidelberg Thesis, officially endorsed by the EKD's Peace Memorandum of November 1981. That 8th Thesis states: The church must recognize that those who take part in the attempt to safeguard peace in freedom through the presence of nuclear arms are still today acting in a Christian way."The connotation of the little word "still" in the EKD's Peace Memorandum is the same as in the pastoral letters of the German and USA bishops. And both Protestant and Catholic churches and church leaders take the same view of this connotation.

Another important development in the Catholic peace ethic clearly occurs in the treatment of the doctrine of the "just war." After an appreciation of the original purpose of this doctrine, which was to limit war and not to justify it, the German Catholic bishops conclude that, while the doctrine of the "just war" and that of "legitimate defense" are certainly not cancelled, they can no longer provide the sole basis for the full peace ethic of the church. On the contrary, it is the "positive directives" for peace and the tackling of the causes of war which now move into the forefront in the Catholic Church's doctrinal statements on the question of the peace ethic. In their treatment of the doctrine of the "just war," the pastoral message of the USA bishops differs from that of the German bishops by its even franker treatment of the "just war" doctrine. Whereas, as a member of the World Council of Churches since Amsterdam in 1948, the Evangelical Church in Germany has long been critical of the "just war" doctrine as out of date, the German Catholic Bishops' Conference now draws similar conclusions from its studies and arrives at a similar disclaimer of this doctrine.

On behalf of the Evangelical Church in Germany, Dr Hartmut Löwe, president of the EKD Church Office in Hanover, has welcomed the large measure of agreement between the German bishops' pastoral message, "Justice creates peace," and the EKD Peace Memorandum, "Preserving, Promoting and Renewing Peace." His statement that the affirmations of the Catholic bishops' message correspond to Reformation theology carries particular weight in the Luther Year 1983. Dr Löwe sees these "affirmations" as including, firstly, the "careful biblical foundation, characterized by the insight, rich in tension, that in this world era the peace message of Jesus cannot be translated directly into contemporary political reality; secondly, however, the affirmation that "political conclusions are to be drawn from the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, which is

one of brotherly accommodation." For the development of an ecumenical peace ethic, it is important, too, that both the EKD and the Catholic Church in Germany share the common conviction that "in the prevailing political conditions, soldiers have an indispensable and ethically warranted service to perform for the prevention of war." For the sake of completeness, we should add here what the Catholic pastoral message has to say about "alternative noncombatant service." Both soldiers and conscientious objectors to military service "serve the cause of peace." For both, however, there is a built-in tension and dilemma in this service. "The soldier who serves the establishment of peace," say the Catholic bishops, "has to live with the tension that his purpose in equipping himself in the service of the state, in preparing himself for war and learning to do what he hopes he will never have to do, is the supreme and determined desire to preserve peace without the use of violence and to settle conflicts by the way of negotiation." The Catholic bishops go on to say: "The person who refuses military service on grounds of conscience also has to live with a different tension. Were all to follow his example, there would arise a power vacuum which could lead to vulnerability to political blackmail, which he certainly repudiates. Moreover, in certain circumstances, the services which a soldier performs but which the conscientious objector cannot himself perform permit precisely that peaceful settlement of conflicts for which he in freedom strives and perhaps even demonstrates." To leave no possible room for doubt, the pastoral letter adds: "As far as the service of the soldier is concerned, we recall the teaching of the Second Vatican Council: 'All those who enter the military service in loyalty to their country should look upon themselves as the custodians of the security and freedom of their countrymen; and when they carry out this duty properly they are contributing to the maintenance of peace'."

Providing security policy pursues morally permissible, indeed obligatory goals - the prevention of war, the defense of moral and political values and order against totalitarian threats, the possibility of disarmament - and, in doing so, employs morally acceptable methods and means, the service of the soldier is indispensable and ethically warranted. On this basis we recognize the mission and service of the soldiers in the Federal forces. The state, society, and even the church, rely on these soldiers' expert and courageous performance of their service. By being himself keenly aware of his moral responsibility, the soldier himself contributes to the service of peace." As for noncombatant service, the Catholic bishops say: "Those who, in face of the dilemma which arises over the establishment of peace, refuse military service on conscientious grounds and perform their alternative national service, also promote peace, especially when they are the source of creative impulses, as for example, by their service with disabled and marginalized social groups. We know the efficacy of these ministries and recognize their dedication and their contribution." The unity, or, as the EKD Heidelberg Theses put it, the "complementarity" of these two services, is formulated as follows by the German Catholic bishops: "Inasmuch as these individual services agree in having peace as their goal and in the struggle for the establishment and promotion of peace in the world, they may be

said to be, on their different roads to this goal, mutually condi-
tioned and complementary." The German Evangelical Kirchentag tried
to summarize this complementarity of these two services, that of
the soldier and that of the objector to military service who per-
forms his alternative service, by the simple slogan: "Armed and
unarmed service for peace." Under this slogan, Christians with
different political opinions can respect each other and live to-
gether in the one church. Certainly this slogan was a compromise,
yet it was a compromise for peace.

No special privileges for the church in its efforts for peace

The remarkable thing about the stage now reached in efforts to
work out an ecumenical peace ethic is the great measure of unanimi-
ty among almost all the churches of the World Council and the Ro-
man Catholic Church. A common feature of the official church pro-
nouncements to which we have referred is that in them opposing po-
sitions are held together side by side: the rejection of war as a
political means of settling conflicts in a nuclear age and, at the
same time, approval of the recourse to military force, if need be,
for the defense of a nation's rights and liberties; support for
conscientious objection to military service and, at the same time,
the recognition of military service as a contribution to peace;
the demand that weapons be abandoned and, at the same time, appro-
val of the production and deployment of nuclear weapons as
deterrents in a policy aimed at the maintenance of peace. This
combination makes us pause and reflect. Does it mean that the
peace ethic of the churches is condemned to irresolution? Have
they reached a theological stalemate? I fully understand these im-
patient questions in the mind of the reader who has followed this
survey of Christian efforts to achieve a peace ethic. In view,
however, of the complicated political, strategic, military, tech-
nological and scientific factors which have to be taken into ac-
count, for example, in disarmament negotiations, impatience is
surely a bad counselor. We need rather to heed something which
was said once by Frederick Nolde, a Christian and an expert who
worked in the field of disarmament discussions for nearly a quar-
ter of a century: "Disarmament is clearly a field in which the
criterion of Christian witness is patient obedience and not world-
ly success."

This call for patience is not to be regarded, of course, as an ex-
cuse for inaction on the part of the churches. It points, on the
contrary, to the sincere efforts made by the Christian churches in
their peace ethic to achieve a realistic picture of the historical
situation in which they find themselves and to assess soberly
their own strengths and opportunities without any pious claims to
superior knowledge in political matters.

If we try to summarize what the churches have learned from their
efforts to achieve a peace ethic, in order to be able to say some-
thing as Christians about the political issues of world peace, we
may say something like this:

Christians have no special theologically legitimized political so-
lutions to offer for the ordering of this world's affairs and fi-
nally establishing world peace. It is not sufficient to present
self-contained ethical formulas in an abstract and isolated form
and to argue from these to detailed political methods and objec-
tives. The judgment of conscience and rational considerations
must work in tandem. In its service of peace, Christians must take
the existing political structures, agencies, experiences and ways
of thinking into account. They require, therefore, a sound knowl-
edge and analysis of the world situation. They must always consid-
er at the same time ways and means whereby their counsels can be
implemented in practice. Since in questions concerning world peace
it is never simply a matter of special Christian decisions, Chris-
tians must arrive at and present their contributions to peace and
disarmament in such a way that even the general political
commonsense can see them as convincing and indispensable. The real
strength, therefore, of a Christian contribution to peace lies in
its independence of judgment and in the care with which it con-
siders and submits to the judgment of conscience all the ramifi-
cations and aspects of a concrete situation.

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Translated from the German by the
LWF Department of Studies

INSTINCT AND IDEOLOGY
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT

Roger A. Johnson

In the 1930s, Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein shared a public exchange of letters published under the title, Warum Krieg? Freud's provocative answer to the question of reason for war may be summarized by two questions from his 1932 essay:

> 1) According to our hypothesis human instincts are of only two kinds: those which seek to preserve and unite (libidinal)... and those which seek to destroy and kill and which we class together as the aggressive or destructive instinct.

> 2) It is a general principle, then, that conflicts of interest between men are settled by the use of violence. This is true of the whole animal kingdom, from which men have no business to exclude themselves.

In brief, there are wars because human beings, through evolution, belong to the animal kingdom, and like other animals, humans are endowed with an aggressive instinct, the counterpart of the libidinal instinct. It is this aggressive (or Thanatos) instinct which causes humans to kill or inflict damage on others. War, for Freud, was the external expression of an inner psychic drive, a drive that was as constant in its energy source as was the sexual drive.

Few social scientists today would accept Freud's view as an adequate diagnosis of the reasons for war. In the first place, the causes of war are too numerous and complex to be reduced to any single factor, be it an instinct, an ideology, or anything else; second, even at the point of the aggressive instinct , Freud's understanding would have to be corrected in light of more recent evidence. In addition, some might question how Freud's atheistic and pessimistic view of human nature could prove helpful to the purpose of a Christian concern with peace. Let me suggest some reasons for my selection of Freud as a point of departure.

First, Freud's theory of the aggressive instinct has played a formative role in shaping the popular understanding of human nature. Partially, this is because Freud's theory simply makes explicit our childhood experience of aggressive feelings as dangerous and threatening; feelings to be repressed at all costs. Partially, Freud's theory in general has exerted broad influence in western culture.

In any case, Freud's theory of aggression is itself a formidable ideology which needs to be confronted as a prologue to any serious

intellectual concern with peace. Therefore, I begin with Freud in order to criticize Freud. For so long as we humans feel ourselves driven to destroy others by an overwhelming instinctive force within us, we shall remain relatively helpless to deal responsibly with matters of war and peace. (By implication, my critique of Freud also applies to those versions of the Christian doctrine of sin which have a similar ideological impact, namely, they re-enforce human feelings of helplessness and impotence, and undermine our confidence in resolving peaceably issues of human conflict.)

Second, Christians concerned with peace need the help of Freud, or at least a chastened Freud, in order to guard against the temptation to simplify and idealize human nature, especially under the rubric of love. Freud was correct in noting that humans, like many other animal species, do often attack each other. Indeed, as many students of animal behaviour have observed, their capacity to love (in their scientific terminology: to form pair-bonds) is a capacity of only those species which are also aggressive. Whether displaced aggression is itself the cause of pair-ponding - as Konrad Lorenz has argued in the case of the geese triumph ceremony - or whether pair-bonding is only a correlate trait of an aggressive species is not clear; what is clear is that only members of those species which are aggressive towards each other are also able to form bonds with each other. By this focus on human aggression, a corrected Freud can help Christians be honest, realistic, and credible, especially for those outside the church who would share our concerns.

Third, Freud's discussion of aggression also raises a group of issues involving theological anthropolgy. Do human tendencies to behave aggressively with each other belong to an original creation, or are such tendencies only a result of the fall, or sin? Since the 1930s, many Christian theologians have sought to make explicit the original goodness of sexuality - in good part, in response to Freud's discussion of libido. There has not been a comparable discussion of aggression in theology - even though one could document a confusion concerning aggression in Christian theology that is just as profound and pervasive as in the case of sexuality. This paper, therefore, intends to clarify the theological status of aggression. The first two-thirds of the paper is devoted to a clarification of aggression under the doctrine of creation; the last third deals with aggression under the rubric of sin.

I will proceed in three stages: First, an account of the aggressive instinct in Freud, including his long-neglected sources in late nineteenth century Darwinism and Nietzsche; second, the confirmation and correction of Freud's instinct theory through observations of animal behaviour as reported by ethologists; third, a review of several elements which give human aggression its distinctive and characteristic quality of violence - namely, social authority, narcissism, and ideology.

I. Freud on aggression

Freud's discussion of an aggressive instinct appeared relatively late in his writings (1920), some twenty years after his discussion of the libidinal instinct. While he attributes the origins of the discovery of aggression to case studies in sadomasochism, there is today a growing consensus among historians and psychoanalysts that his sources were cultural, not clinical: specifically, popularized Darwinism and the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. Hence, it seems appropriate to examine Freud's theory of aggression as a case study in the cultural transmission of an idea, not the case history of a patient.

Darwin's evolutionary theory, or a simplified and distorted version of that theory, is the primary source for Freud's theory of aggression. While Darwin was transversing the globe on the Beagle, he gathered enough evidence of the mutability of species to demolish the established biological theory of his time. However, he did not have an explanation for the process of species mutation until he read Malthus, and there discovered the struggle for scarce resources as decisive for determining survival. Transposing Malthus' insight to his own data, Darwin formulated the law of natural selection, or survival of the fittest, as the agency of change in the evolutionary process.

For our purposes, the late 19th century appropriation of Darwin is far more important than the actual complexities of Darwin's theory. The struggle for scarce resources among differing species, as proposed by Darwin, was translated by the Social Darwinists into the struggle for resources among individual members of the same species; complexities of environmental adaptation were reduced to the relative competitive force of members within the same species; and Darwin's recognition of species' cooperation as a salient strength for survival of social animals was abandoned for the simplified struggle of each against all. (Needless to say, all of these changes made Darwinism more congenial with a laissez-faire capitalism.) As a result of cultural Darwinism, the face of nature changed dramatically in the late 19th century. To select one pair of examples, Wordsworth's romantic view of nature as an idyllic retreat was replaced by Tennyson's image of "nature red in tooth and claw." Teeth and claws are the weapons of the beasts of the jungle; they are bloody red because these savage beasts are locked in an unending cycle of violence with each other, from which the strongest emerges as victor and survivor to pass on such strengths to the next generation. Needless to say, humanity also inherits the same instinctive legacy as the beasts of the jungle. As products of evolution, we are also fated to repeat in our histories the same mutuality of violence as was enacted by jungle beasts.

In good Darwinist style, both Nietzsche and Freud devote considerable attention to the evolutionary origins of the human species, especially to that mythical moment of transition from the freedom of wild beasts to our new status as social or civilized animals. Nietzsche in particular loved to exalt human life prior to its confinement within the chains of civilization:

>He lived like a wild beast,... happily adapted to the wilder-
>ness, to war,... hostility, cruelty, the delight in persecu-
>tion, raids, excitement and destruction.

In this happy state of affairs, humanity's greatest pleasure was
not found in anything so tame and harmless as sexual activity, but
rather in cruelty:

>The collective delight in older mankind (for cruelty) was an
>ingredient of all their joys... and they considered disinter-
>ested malevolence a normal trait, something to which one's
>conscience could assent heartily.

Like others influenced by Darwinism, Nietzsche related humanity's
present sadistic tendencies back to our animal origins, specifi-
cally to the proverbial Darwinian monkey:

>To behold suffering brings pleasure, but to cause another to
>suffer affords even a greater pleasure. This severe statement
>expresses an old, powerful, human, all too human, sentiment -
>though the monkeys too might endorse it since it is reported
>that they preceded man in the devising of bizarre cruelties.

What Nietzsche learned from Darwin was obviously not a theory of
evolution in general nor the complexities of the law of natural
selection but rather a simplified and distorted version of that
law: namely, the survival of the fittest means always the survival
of the cruel and powerful in the midst of a sea of violence. Hence
when Nietzsche portrays human life before the advent of civiliza-
tion it is one of unchecked violence, the life of the happy
sadist.

Freud, in his account of the origins of human society, is no more
sanguine than Nietzsche. He begins with Darwin's theory of the
primal horde, and regards this as the proto-human form of social
organization.

According to the theory of the primal horde, a dominant male exer-
cised power over all other males in that group, and claimed exclu-
sive sexual rights over all the females of the horde for himself.
According to Freud's version of this theory, one day (and Freud
means literally "one day") the brothers of the primal horde banded
together and killed the dominant male, the father of them all. Af-
ter their murder, they devoured the body of their dead father and
instituted religion (totemism, in which a sacred animal takes the
place of the murdered father) and also a moral system (with the
two basic taboos directed against patricide and incest). For
Freud, human society emerged out of its proto-human antecedent by
means of the primal crime: the murder of the father. And with the
beginnings of society came also the origins of religion, ethics,
and social organization; all are rooted in the primal deed of vio-
lence, or the Oedipus desire of the young boy to kill his father.

Nietzsche and Freud also agreed in identifying aggressive in-
stincts as the present legacy of man's primordial origins. For
both Freud and Nietzsche, these aggressive instincts are always
directed to harm or kill another member of the same species. For

Nietzsche, aggression shows itself precisely in cruelty; for Freud, the murder of the primal father is the paradigm for aggression just as sexual intercourse is the characteristic expression of libido. And while both aggressive and libidinal instincts may be modified and sublimated in other forms, they never lose touch with their primal form of expression. Thus in discussing aggression, Freud depicts the human being as

> a savage beast to whom consideration to his own kind is something alien... Men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are on the contrary creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him. Homo homini lupus - "Man is a wolf to man."

Humanity has this characteristic propensity to cause harm and death to others, not because we deviated from a plan of God as the story of Adam would suggest, but rather because of the biological inheritance of the evolutionary process. For one of the two primary instincts of human nature is aggression: "an inborn human inclination to 'badness'... and destructiveness, and so to cruelty as well." Without becoming unduly involved in the complexities of Freudian theory at this point, I simply want to emphasize the fact that Freud always links aggression with death or violence. It is an instinct with a specific aim, and that aim is to cause harm to another.

Within the confines of civilization, people are not free to indulge their aggressive instincts by causing harm to others at will, and so the role of aggression becomes more complex. The apparent docility of civilized humans does not mean that these older aggressive instincts have disappeared. In Nietzsche's dictum, "All instincts not allowed free play turn inward." When society prohibits people from acting out their aggression toward others, it does not abolish the aggressive instinct, but simply turns the same instinct toward a new object: namely, back against its source, back against the ego. In Nietzsche's words, man then begins "rending, persecuting, terrifying himself, like a wild beast hurling itself against the bars of its cage." Freud expresses the same idea, but in more precise language. Civilization tames man's destructive instincts by forming the psychological processes of the superego which utilize the same aggressive instincts against the ego itself. All the cruelty, harshness and suffering which people would inflict upon others is now directed back upon themselves. And for both Freud and Nietzsche, the symptom of this internalized, interiorized aggression is the same: the guilt of the bad conscience. Both Nietzsche and Freud postulate a new object for aggressive instincts: the ego or the self who is the bearer of this aggression. The new object does not effect any change in the character of aggression itself; it is still an agency of destruction, causing pain and suffering. The only difference is that for

civilized people, the pain suffered is their own, while for primitive ancestors, the pain caused falls upon others. Freud clearly sees no way out of this unhappy dilemma. Indeed, he postulates the guilt of conscience as the price which all must pay for the benefit of civilization, a bill which no one and no civilization can ever evade.

From the point of view of Freud's understanding of aggressive instinct, violence is no longer regarded as a perversion of the human spirit, something rooted in the primal distortion of our moral-spiritual being; rather, violence is more simply a natural endowment of our biological heritage, as likely an expression of our nature as the color of our skin or any other genetic attribute. One might restrain expressions of violence in physical actions, but to hope for more than that would only lead to pathology; its only result could be an unnecessarily intense burden of guilt and the debilitation of the species itself. Human beings are not "a little lower than the angels;" we are not even "a little higher than the animals." We are one with the animal kingdom from which we have descended and in contrast with the Kingdom of God, the popular Darwinian version of the animal kingdom was characterized above all by the violent struggle of each against all. To be human is to participate in those same cruel sources that have shaped the evolution of our species up to this moment in time and continue to find expression in our present history.

II. Aggression as observed in animal behavior

Among ethologists and psychoanalysts, there is a fundamental agreement concerning the widespread frequency of aggressive behavior among humans and a large number of animal species. However, their agreement is limited to the recognition of the fact of aggressive behavior itself. Beyond that, observations of animals in their natural habitat have led to fundamental revisions in Freud's understanding of aggression. At two points, this changed understanding of aggression in animals has significant consequences for understanding human behavior.

First, among animals, intra-species aggression is observed as an attack by one member against another, but an attack that is devoid of the intent of harming or killing the other. Indeed, animals are equipped with a complex array of inhibitions, submissive gestures, unambiguous displays of threat, appeasement, and pacifying rituals which prevent an attack from leading to injury or death of the other.

For example, Konrad Lorenz has described the behavior of the brightly-colored tropical fish in their habitat of the coral reef. The reef is swarming with fish of all kinds, and there is no way that any species could claim such a territory exclusively for themselves. Nor is there any need for such a claim since the different species of fish depend upon different food supplies, and the species' particular eating habits are mutually complementary. What is vital for survival is that any particular fish excludes other members of the same species from a given territory, for that

fish would consume the same food.

Hence, the bright colors of these fish serve to clearly signal their arrival on the territory of another. Even though the whole coral reef is filled with a maze of other fishes, the resident brightly-colored fish will zoom out of his hiding place to attack the newcomer bearing the same bright colors, precisely because those bright colors clearly differentiate the interloper from all other species. The resident fish will then launch an attack in the form of a chase against the newcomer until the two of them reach a point where the newcomer is closer to home base than the resident, and at that point, the chase reverses itself. And so the two fishes chase each other back and forth until they finally establish a boundary line between their respective aquatic territories.

In this case, aggression serves the evolutionary purpose of species preservation by providing a means for distributing species members through a sufficiently broad space or territory to yield a sufficient food supply. The identification of aggression with the purpose of species destruction or death or thanatos, as Freud did, is, for both ethologists and biologists, a bit of evolutionary nonsense that needs to be eliminated from our culture. Evolution does not preserve species-destructive instincts. Aggressive behavior is species preserving, not species destructive, and what is true of the animal kingdom may be true in the human kingdom, in principle, if not in fact.

At the same time, we also need to recognize that the species preserving function of aggression can backfire and lead to the death of one member of the species by another. I have deliberately chosen Lorenz's example of the brightly-colored tropical fish because some of us may have had some experience with such fish in home aquariums. Because we have liked the colors of one brightly-colored fish so much, we went and brought home a second brightly-colored fish - only to discover that, during your absence, one of the two fish has been killed. And no matter how many new brightly-colored fish of the same sort we bring home, inevitably one of them will be dead. A home aquarium simply does not provide enough aquatic territory for two brightly-colored fish to live in peace with each other, and in the conditions of captivity, their attack does become fatal. In a similar manner, deer, rats, and selected other animals, when confined in crowded quarters in captivity, will also kill other members of the same species. However, this behavior appears as uncharacteristic of animals in their natural habitat.

At a fundamental level, ethology has redefined aggression to mean attack for species preservation, not destruction. And it is that definition that I shall presuppose in the remainder of my discussion, with the proviso that for both animals and humans, attack can spill over into destruction.

Secondly, ethologists have also called attention to the fact that animals are equipped with not only aggressive instincts, but also with instinctive mechanisms for nonviolent conflict resolution. Jane Goodall has described and filmed the aggressive antics of the socially organized chimpanzees she has studied. Here the trigger

for aggression is not the issue of territory but the struggle for dominance, especially among older males of the group. Often just the threat of display, in which a chimp asserts his claim to prominence by literally setting his hair on end in order to expand his visual size and beating branches fiercely and loudly on the ground, is all that is needed, without physical struggle to resolve the conflict. The loser chimp then presents his posterior to the victor for a conciliatory pat. Sometimes there may be several offers of submission needed before the pat is finally given, but given it is, and with this gesture of submission and conciliation, the peaceable order of the chimpanzee kingdom is restored. Even more dramatic is the submissive gesture of wolves. Because wolves are a social animal and because they are endowed with such fierce weapons, that is both teeth and claws, they also possess the most elaborate set of submissive reactions, which culminate in the weaker of the two contestants throwing itself on its back to expose all vulnerable parts of the body defenseless to the superior. This gesture of submission is sufficient to halt the attack of the stronger. We should recall here that Freud used the wolf as the proverbial symbol of human cruelty and destructiveness in the motto, "man is a wolf to his fellows." In fact, humans should all be considerably more gentle with each other, especially those who win with those who lose, if we did behave towards each other as wolves did. The sad part of our story is that we do not.

The killing of members of the same species with some frequency thus appears to be a behavior distinctive of humans, not animals in general. Among the proverbial "wild beasts of the jungle," aggressive instincts tend to serve limited life-preserving functions - defending territory, food supply, young, or social dominance - and these instincts are balanced by complex inhibitions and pacifying rituals which shape the behavior of both parties engaged in the struggle. In conflict among animals of the same species, there are victors, but most often no victims.

How then can we account for the distorted view of animal behavior that became so prominent in the late 19th century and in Freud? First, many of the spokespersons who depicted "nature red in tooth and claw" were not themselves students of animal behavior. They borrowed certain themes, in a simplified and distorted form, from animal studies of their time and used them for their own purposes. Second, it was only in the 20th century that we began to acquire field studies of animal behavior in their natural habitat. Prior to this time, our knowledge of animals depended either upon armchair theorists or studies of animals in captivity, and neither of these sources provided reliable knowledge.

Third, and probably more important than these technical considerations, is the tendency of people to project qualities which they find disagreeable or disturbing within themselves onto some other beings outside of themselves. The myths of the Greeks portray incredible cruelty and horrors in the lives of the gods, much as the Darwinists, Nietzsche and Freud depicted the sadism of our primitive ancestors and the violence that permeated the whole of the animal kingdom. In our own time, it is no longer necessary to take these 19th century views of animal life any more seriously than we would take the Greek stories about the behavior of their gods. In

either case, we are dealing with humans who project the violence
which they feel within themselves or the violence which they see
enacted in their own society onto the gods above or the animals
below, but the violence itself remains essentially a human phenom-
enon.

III. Human aggression and violence

It would be tempting to conclude this paper on the optimis-
tic note of the peaceful animal kingdom just described. For then I
could suggest that our concern with human aggression was only a
product of Darwinist confusion about animals and the Freudian
folly of a death instinct. Once we cleared away that bit of cul-
tural debris, we could return to our homes and work confident in
the adequacy of species-preserving instincts to balance aggressive
drives. But alas, while such a scenario is pleasant, it finds lit-
tle support in our past experience or our anticipation of the fu-
ture. We do behave differently, when aggressive, than other ani-
mals. More frequently, we are violent, causing harm or death to
others. And in this section, we will explore some of the factors
that contribute to the distinctive human phenomenon of violence:
1) social authority and inhibitions to species-destructive behav-
ior; 2) narcissistic injuries and disorders; 3) ideology as
legitimation and exacerbation of conflict.

In relation to inhibitions to destructive behavior, Konrad Lorenz
has suggested that evolution played a bad trick on humans. Because
our bodies lacked powerful weapons for destroying each other, we
did not seem to require, and so were not endowed, with any set of
effective inhibitions to species-destructive behavior. As previ-
ously noted, wolves are well-endowed with an array of pacifying
rituals, of which they are in great need because of the ease with
which wolves could kill each other. However, humans have neither
the claws nor the teeth of wolves, and so in our bodies we are
less dangerous to each other. And evolution could not anticipate
the inventive capacity of our minds.

Without disputing Lorenz's observation concerning the relative in-
adequacy of human inhibitions, I do think it important to recog-
nize that inhibitions against species destruction do play a role
in human behavior. This is apparent through an examination of the
ways in which social authority can overcome such inhibitions. Two
social-psychological studies are germane to this issue. The first
is the famous Milgram experiments conducted at Yale University in
the 1960s. A group of volunteer subjects were commanded to give
increasingly strong doses of electric shock to an apparent victim,
whose expressions of pain in response to these shocks escalated
from a low moan to a desperate pounding on the wall to a stoney
silence suggesting a condition incapable of response. Because over
60 % of the volunteer subjects were obedient to the commands to
inflict the maximum level of shock, the popular press reported
these experiments as proof of human cruelty and the lack of feel-
ing for fellow creatures.

In actual fact, the Milgram experiments disclosed both the

subjects' inhibition to cause pain and the power of a legitimate authority figure (in this case, the person running the experiment) to override those inhibitions. Thus, when the authority figure of the experimentor left the room, two-thirds of the subjects who had been willing to obey the command (in the presence of the authority figure) refused to obey. Many lied concerning their behavior. They reported to the authority figure through a telephone that they were giving a shock level as commanded, but in fact, they only gave a shock level which they judged as tolerable for the victim. The Milgram evidence does not suggest that humans lack inhibitions against causing pain to fellow creatures, but only that such inhibitions may not be resistant to social factors, like obedience to a perceived authority.

A second study reports similar results in the behavior of American soldiers in combat during World War II. In training recruits for conventional warfare, the military needed to break down resistance to killing, at least in so far as such killings still involved some perception of the person to be killed, and while military training efforts were thoroughly conceived and executed, they appear to have been of limited effectiveness. Post-combat interviews and observations of troops in action during World War II suggest that only 15 to 25 % of soldiers in a given company were engaged in firing their weapons even vaguely in the direction of the enemy. About 80 % of the number could have been active, judged in terms of their location, but they were not. Even if a battle persisted for several days, it turned out that the same 15 to 25 % of the soldiers were actively engaged in firing their weapons. As in the case of the Milgram experiment, the presence of an authority figure - in this case an officer - could increase that percentage, but only so long as his presence was clear and intent upon watching the performance of the soldiers.

On the issue of inhibitions to violence, we need to give our species credit where credit is due. It is not so much that we lack inhibitions to kill, but rather that we have developed such powerful authority systems as to make our inhibitions inadequate. Surely one task of the church is to support inhibitions to violence over against those established authorities which would exploit human obedience for destructive purposes.

A second factor contributing to aggression and violence is narcissism. Narcissism appears to be a human characteristic not shared with other animal species and one which makes human aggression more frequent, more unpredictable, and more lethal. This Freudian concept of narcissism is derived from the story of Narcissus, the beautiful Greek youth who was beloved by many but who was himself not able to love any other. Then, one day, he stopped over a spring for a drink of water, and gazing at the image reflected in the water, suddenly discovered the object of his own true love: himself. For the psychoanalytic tradition, narcissism refers to that excessive and unrealistic love of self which is both the dominant characteristic of a newborn infant and remains the perennial core of the adult self. In the healthy adult, a realistic sense of self-esteem, rooted both in love bonds and recognized contributions, gradually gains some degree of dominance over infantile narcissism. But for psychoanalysts, this

realistic self-esteem is a fragile construct likely to be disrupted by any blow to our sense of self worth. And it is these injuries to our sense of self - not threats to our physical security, but to our psychic well-being - that trigger off human aggression. In contemporary Freudian studies, aggression is therefore understood not as a constant energy source seeking discharge, as in the case of sexuality, but as a variable drive mobilized in response to psychic threats.

I suspect that many of us navigate the vicissitudes of interpersonal relations in daily life with an intuitive understanding of the connection between injuries to a person's sense of self and hostile behavior. We may apologize for a friend, spouse, or coworker who suddenly has become easily angry and irritable because we know the loss or hurt they have recently suffered. Or we may warn others to stay out of the way of so-and-so because they have just suffered a disappointment on the job, with a friend, in a love relation, or any one of a multitude of other injuries to their own sense of self. Humans may attack each other more frequently than animals do because we fight not only for realistic self-interests, like territory or dominance, but also for our psychological well-being.

I would remind you that the biblical account of the origin of human violence is psychologically very astute. Cain and Able both present to God their offerings: Cain, the first of his crops in the field, and Abel, the first of his newborn from the flock. God accepts Abel and his offerings, the Bible tells us, while rejecting Cain and his offerings. Not surprisingly, Cain's experience of God's rejection causes him to become angry and his face to sadden. Hence, about four verses later, Cain goes into the field and murders his brother Abel. This story is as clear an example of narcissistic injury and aggression displaced to an innocent party as any we could hope to find. It comes immediately after the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the mythical paradise of Eden, and introduces the saga of human history. Cain, vulnerable to injuries like rejection, had to be human; we do not know animals that kill their own kind because of rejection, loss, disappointment, or hurts - but people do.

This concept of narcissistic injury or narcissistic disorder also illumines the behavior of the political assassin and terrorist, at least those assassins that seem to flourish in American society. (I have the impression that European terrorists, while equally violent, are acting in behalf of some ideological cause and are involved in a conspiracy with others to realize some political goal.) In America, in contrast, we specialize in producing apolitical and non-ideological assassins who provide case studies in narcissistic pathology, but not much more. They tend to be consistently loners, acting out some gradiose fantasy from a radically impoverished self, with the sole hope of winning through their desperate deed of political assassination the love and recognition that they have not found in their own real life. Thus, John Hinckley, who attempted to kill President Reagan, asked a question immediately after his arrest that suggested something of the depth and scope of his political interest and ideological sophistication: namely, he wished to know if the TV cameras had

caught his shooting and if he would be on the evening news. Such aggressive psychopaths lack strong emotional ties with persons of either sex; they also lack any work-related sense of satisfaction. All threats of punishment are wholly ineffective in deterring them from violence, for one moment of glory seems far more attractive than the continuation of a life they experience as so empty and hopeless.

The recognition of narcissism also leads us to question the limits of any theory of deterrence, whether it applies to individuals or to nation-states. Individuals and collectivities do not always act according to their realistic and rational self-interest; theories of deterrence assume they do. Instead, individuals will attempt an assassination with no hope of escape, and they will also take their own life in suicide. One moment of glory or death itself seems more desirable than a continuing life devoid of any sense of worth. Is it possible that nation-states, caught in a situation of internal breakdown, may initiate action against external foes that is equally heedless of the consequences? For a strategy of deterrences the weakness of an opponent may prove far more dangerous than their strength.

Third, in turning to the subject of ideology, I will focus only on its role in relation to issues of conflict. By ideology, I mean a set of beliefs, more or less systematically articulated, that purport to present both an adequate description of the world as it is and a definitive prescription of the world as it ought to be. Ideologies combine a simplified quasi-scientific world view with an unambiguous set of values and historical role for the individual and people as a whole. Ideologies thus give order to the complex, often contradictory, and sometimes chaotic flow of human experience; they also provide meaning and normative values to direct human behavior.

With Erik Erikson, I regard ideologies as, first, a psychological necessity for human development; adolescence, especially, is a developmental stage in which ideology plays a vital role in identity formation. But ideologies cannot be limited to adolescence. For ideologies, in the second place, provide the basis for socially shared definitions of reality. Third, as Marx observed, ideologies have direct implications for political actions, whether those be hidden or overt, "false consciousness," as in Marx's view of religion, or true. In the following comments, I focus not on the subject of ideology in general but on two specific issues: 1) the role of ideology in legitimizing conflicts and 2) the role of enemy-oriented ideologies in exacerbating conflict, and in segmenting one human species into a series of pseudo-species.

The most obvious role of ideology in relation to the subject of war is to elevate mundane conflicts into a higher realm of principle and meaning. For example, in the 1982 Falkland/Malvinas Islands war, Argentina and Britain did not present themselves as fighting for a piece of territory in the South Atlantic, as two fish might have done. Instead, Britain was fighting for the "democratic right" of "free citizens" to "self-determination" and protecting them from the "invasion of an aggressor." Argentina, in turn, was "liberating" territory which she had long claimed as

and conflict, I should like to suggest that much of the biblical materials also express an enemy-oriented ideology. I refer not only to the war imagery, so prominent in the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament, but also to the apocalyptic themes in both Old and New Testaments. For the center of apocalyptic ideology is the cosmic struggle of God with Satan, as well as with those powers of this world that carry out the work of the Evil One. Believers in this ideology are encouraged to be on their guard against the Evil One and to be on the lookout for the presence of the cosmic enemy in the social movements of their own society or in the actions of other nations. In contrast, prophetic ideology invites people to look for the enemy within their own hearts and common life, and in so doing, it differs considerably from the externalization of the enemy in apocalyptic ideology.

I offer this distinction between apocalyptic and prophetic ideology not as a key for reading the Bible - I recognize it as far too simplified for that purpose - but to call attention to a theological temptation present in Christian sources: namely, the temptation to identify any particular social-religious or military-political rival with the status of God's enemy. Church history reminds us how frequently biblical enemy and conflict themes have been used to exacerbate conflict among groups; from the church's attack against the Jews in the first centuries after Constantine through the Crusades and the two World Wars of this century. And in my own country, the same biblical rhetoric still fuels the hostility of many against an "atheistic materialistic Communism," God's enemy of today.

Erik Erikson reminds us vividly how an enemy-oriented ideology functions within the individual and spills over to affect the political life of a society. Within the individual subject, a variety of traits cluster together to form a negative identity, those qualities condemned by society, its individual members and its ultimate moral norms. This negative identity, which individuals may sense vaguely within themselves or which they have been warned about by others, does not disappear, but reappears in the face of the stranger, the outsider, those who are not a member of our tribe, our class, our nation, or our religion. Thus humanity ceases to be one species and becomes what Erikson calls a set of "pseudo-species," bound together by mortal fears and murderous hatred of each other.

From the earliest records of human history, we find tribes referring to themselves quite simply as "the people," and to those outside the tribe only as "others." Greece and China agreed in their view that all peoples beyond their borders were "barbarians," and the Chinese consistently regarded their own state as the Middle Kingdom, the center of the world. Jews, I would remind you, were not the first "chosen people," only the first to convert their collective narcissism into an ethical task. Ideology, not biology, has thus served to define the human species and its limits. As a result, the human species has not been one, but many. All the inhibitions against intra-species violence can be, and have been, overcome by the power or ideology to define "our group" as the bearers of essential humanity and "our enemy" as something less than human.

legitimately her own, though presently occupied by an
"imperialist" and "colonial power." Some people might raise ques-
tions about fighting a territorial war in which the dead and
wounded casualties exceed the total population of the territory in
question, but as Ronald Reagan reminded the British parliament,
this war was not being fought simply for "a piece of real estate
in the South Atlantic," but for higher principles. In human con-
flicts, both the leaders and the people need to justify violent
actions on the basis of a shared ideology which gives meaning and
value to the human sacrifices involved; otherwise, the dead will
have died in vain.

Ideologies not only legitimize wars already begun for other caus-
es, but they may also be a cause of war, they may dispose a na-
tion, both its leaders and its people, to wars. As noted earlier,
ideologies provide a view of the world, as it is and as it ought
to be, and in order to account for the discrepancy between
"isness" and "oughtness," some ideologies rely heavily on the con-
cept of an "enemy." Enemies have a quite different status than op-
ponents, and enemy-oriented ideologies have a distinctive contri-
bution to make to conflicts. One respects an opponent as an equal
in a struggle and attributes to that opponent a mix of strengths
and weaknesses similar to one's own nation. Hence, one can build
bonds of exchange - cultural and commercial trade - with an oppo-
nent even in the midst of a struggle. Or one can articulate common
values which join one's own country and that of the opponent. But
enemies have a quite different role. Enemies are not to be re-
spected, nor can they be trusted to behave as decently as "real"
human beings, that is people like ourselves. One breaks off bonds
with enemies, attempts to isolate them from the community of na-
tions; one lives in fear of what the enemy might do since the ene-
my is bound by no scruples, and one lives in hatred of such an en-
emy.

Enemy-oriented ideologies thus tend to activate the latent para-
noia in any people and so dispose people to explain all of their
social difficulties as caused by the enemy. In America, Communists
have frequently played the role of the enemy, and in Communist so-
cieties Capitalists have played a similar role. Kenneth Boulding
has pointed out that Marxism has been an enemy-dependent ideology
from its origins. Boulding sees Marxist ideology as a product both
of Marx's individual psychology as well as the social-historical
necessity for young revolutionary movements to organize themselves
around an enemy. (I would add that I see Marx's borrowings from
biblical apocalyptic motifs to be a further source for his preoc-
cupation with the enemy.) Hence, Marxist societies have expended
much effort in identifying enemies, both internal and external.
Boulding goes on to note that nation-states whose boundaries are
all on land, rather than sea, may understandably be more paranoid
in relation to bordering states because of a long history of con-
flict. If one adds an enemy-oriented ideology to the geographical
situation of a nation surrounded by past or anticipated conflicts
in the future, ideology and geography only serve to reinforce each
other.

In addition to Boulding's suggestion concerning the enemy-orient-
ed status of Marxist ideology, with its prominence of struggles

In summary, instincts appear to be far less dangerous than ideologies. All evidence from recent animal studies suggest that aggressive instincts, linked firmly with inhibitions and rituals of mutual regulation, promote the purposes of species survival with minimum destructive consequences. From an evolutionary point of view, there is no reason why aggression as a human instinct should not be equally benign. Stated theologically, aggression also belongs to the goodness of God's creation.

In the conflicts of human history, however, we do not witness the action of uncorrupted and benign animal instincts, but rather instinctual energies already informed by powers that are distinctively human, like ideology, narcissism, and group authority. Stated theologically, human aggression belongs not only to the goodness of created nature but also to our status as fallen creatures, living under the powers of sin. To quote Ephesians,

> We are not contending against flesh and blood, but against
> the principalities, against the powers, against the world
> rulers of this present darkness, against the spiritual powers
> of wickedness in the heavenly places (RSV Eph. 6:12).

To paraphrase Ephesians in the language of this paper, our struggle is not primarily with a biological legacy which we share with other animals, but with a narcissism unique to our human species, the ideologies which convert that narcissism into a pseudo-species group identity, and political authority of such groups able to elicit our compliance in violating both other persons and our own inhibitions against violence.

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THE CONCEPT OF PEACE IN THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
AND ETHICS OF THE SOVIET STATE

Michael Voslensky

There is an inexorable power in the East, in the Soviet Union, which will only tolerate a church as long as it serves the policy of that power. Who controls this power? We say the state. But what is it? The state is simply an instrument of the actual social power. Here I should like to quote the Marxist definition of the state: "The state is the machinery of the ruling class." This is the case in the Soviet Union and throughout the Socialist bloc. The ruling class is the ruling party bureaucracy, headed by the Politburo. The name by which the ruling class describes itself is a Latin word - the Nomenclatura - which has a comic sound in Russian. How does the Nomenklatura view the question of peace and war?

Every Soviet citizen is taught that we are living in an era of a worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism and communism. This change-over is historically inevitable, according to a law of world history discovered by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The history of the world is a process of development in which one form of society (or "socio-economic structure" in Marxist terminology) follows another. The first was the original, classless society or primitive communism; the second, the slave-owning society; the third, the feudal society; the fourth, the capitalist society. All the forms were initially revolutionary and progressive, then became aged and were fated to die like any other organism. Marxist ideology stresses the fact that capitalism was initially progressive and revolutionary. It recalls the great French Revolution of the 18th century, the English revolution of the 17th century, the revolution in the Netherlands in the 16th century, and the revolutions in 1848. Capitalism has become old and will inevitably die throughout the world, being superseded by the new socio-economic structure of socialism and communism.

The change-over is described as a "worldwide revolutionary process." One after another, every country and every state will advance from capitalism to socialism through a socialist revolution. The "worldwide revolutionary process" may occur in two forms: by peaceful or non-peaceful means. The non-peaceful mode is by way of revolution, civil war, armed uprising, revolutionary war. The peaceful mode is through parliament and the ballot paper. The decisive factor is not the method but the result, i.e. the assumption of power by a new class.

The new class is of course the "proletariat." However, the whole proletariat cannot in the nature of things be involved in the dictatorship of the proletariat, but only the "vanguard of the proletariat" which is the current Communist Party. Thus, the

socialist revolution is the assumption of power by the Communist Party. In view of this, it is the duty of countries and states that have already become socialist to use all means at their disposal to assist the communist parties of other countries to carry out this revolution.

Does this mean that they must wage war? Not necessarily. War is only one of the possible means. In the context of the "worldwide revolutionary process," however, whatever means are likely to be successful in the given case may be employed.

In this conceptual framework the value attached to peace is only relative. In the first place there is the permanent class struggle. On the international level this struggle may be won without violence, using political or economic means, or with violence, i.e. using military means. The means to be used is a question of judgment. The Soviet Russian citizen should be ready at all times for the just war against the capitalist class enemy. This is the spirit in which the population of the USSR is brought up. For success in this struggle the Nomenklatura expects a good deal from the principle of "peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems." In the West, this concept is interpreted as meaning peace and collaboration. The Soviet interpretation is a different one. Peaceful coexistence is defined in the USSR as "a specific form of the class struggle in the international arena." It represents a continuation of the political struggle between the two systems in a non-war form. It is true that this is a somewhat less open confrontation than the "cold war," but the difference is not very great. Moreover, in the Soviet view, there are three areas not included in any peaceful coexistence plan, namely ideology and the national and social liberation struggles. Hence, peaceful coexistence rests on a shaky and changeable foundation. The Soviet expression is: "The relative strength is the basis of peaceful coexistence."

Genuine peace can only come when the worldwide revolutionary process has been completed throughout the globe or when capitalism has become so weak that it is no longer able to resist a takeover by the communist parties. Hence, it is always said that the problem of relative strength is the key question in international politics.

Where does morality fit into this ideology? Lenin has defined it very clearly. In an address to the young people at the 3rd Congress of the Russian Young Communist League in Moscow in 1920, he said that anything which contributes to the world victory of socialism and communism is moral; anything obstructing that victory is immoral. The Party does not accept any morality of the clergy, the exploiting classes, the bourgeoisie or the aristocracy. This is the proletarian socialist morality.

In the West with its Christian culture, the Sermon on the Mount is taken as the standard for human moral behavior. The atheistic ideology of Marxism-Leninism has nothing but scorn for the Sermon on the Mount and anything to do with religion. The works of Lenin, the father of the Nomenklatura, are the communist "gospel." Every sentence in these works is treated in the Soviet Union as ultimate

truth and must never be questioned. The six decades since Lenin's death have seen as little change in this respect as the nineteen centuries since the writing of the books of the New Testament.

What is the Nomenklatura's attitude to war? The children in the Soviet Union are taught "Lenin's doctrine on war" when they are in school, namely that there are two categories of wars: just wars and unjust wars.

There are three types of just war: a) the revolutionary war; b) the national war of liberation; c) the defensive war against the imperialist aggressor. There are also three types of unjust war: a) the counterrevolutionary war; b) the colonial war; c) the war waged by imperialist aggressors.

The unjust wars must be denounced and opposed by using all means. Just wars must be fought and won. This is what is taught as "Lenin's doctrine of war." What does Lenin himself say on the matter? I shall here quote his words: "Wars are possible between one country in which socialism has become victorious and other, bourgeois or reactionary, countries. (2) According to Lenin: "The victory of socialism in one country does not at one stroke eliminate all war in general. On the contrary, it presupposes wars." (3) He also makes it clear that the notion of "defense" in such a case is to be interpreted broadly: "To accept 'defense of the fatherland' in the present war is no more than to accept it as a just war, a war in the interests of the proletariat, - no more nor less, we repeat, because invasions may occur in any war." (4)

Thus an invasion can be regarded as defensive war if it is carried out by a socialist state.

What is Lenin's view and that in the Soviet Union on disarmament? I will again quote Lenin's words: "The Kautskyite advocacy of 'disarmament' which is addressed to the present governments of the imperialist Great Powers is the most vulgar opportunism, it is bourgeois pacifism, which actually - in spite of the 'good intentions' of the sentimental Kautskyites - serves to distract the workers from the revolutionary struggle." (5)

Their principal argument, i.e. that the disarmament demand is the most consistent expression of the struggle against all war, is in Lenin's view "the disarmament advocates' principal error." He counters this argument by declaring: "Socialists cannot be opposed to all war in general without ceasing to be socialists." (6) To accept disarmament (he says angrily) "is tantamount to making the general declaration that we are against the use of weapons. There is as little Marxism in this as there would be if we were to say: "We are opposed to violence." (7)

Yet Lenin was not against all disarmament: he was wholly in favor of disarmament by the other side. It was only in the country of communism, in the communist camp, that he regarded disarmament as out of place: "Our slogan must be (that of) arming the proletariat to defeat, expropriate and disarm the bourgeoisie. These are the only tactics possible for the revolutionary class." (8) He writes: "The 'social' persons and opportunists are always ready to build

dreams of future peaceful socialism." (9)

Lenin had no such dreams. He is thinking of a different socialism
- one of a military coalition of socialist nations. He writes:
"...From the present-day labor movement, disorganized more by the
opportunists than by the action of governments, there will un-
doubtedly arise, sooner or later but with absolute certainty, an
international league of the 'terrible nations' of the revolution-
ary proletariat." (10) "If the present war arouses among the reac-
tionary Christian socialists, among the whimpering petty
bourgeoisie, only horror and fright, only aversion to the use of
arms, to bloodshed, death, etc., then we must say: Capitalist so-
ciety is and always has been horror without end. If this war is
now preparing for that society an end in horror, we have no reason
to fall into despair." (11) He continues: "Only after we have ov-
erthrown, finally vanquished and expropriated the bourgeoisie of
the whole world and not merely of one country will wars become im-
possible. From a scientific point of view it would be utterly
unrevolutionary for us to evade or gloss over the most important
thing: crushing the resistance of the bourgeoisie, the most diffi-
cult and one demanding the greatest amount of fighting in the
transition to socialism." (12) Other quotations could be given.

What is the attitude of the USSR to pacifism? How is the Soviet
citizen informed about pacifism? Let us consult a Soviet diction-
ary (for those who read German, the GDR dictionaries give identi-
cal definitions). The latest edition of the Soviet Encyclopedia
contains the following under "Pacifism": "Pacifists condemn all
war, thus denying the legitimacy of just wars of liberation. They
believe in the possibility of preventing war merely by means of
persuasion and peaceful demonstrations without eliminating the
socio-economic and political conditions which give rise to war."

Lenin considered that pacifist advocacy of peace in the abstract
without any connection with the struggle against capitalism was a
way of "stupefying the working class."

This quotation of Lenin is incidentally a compulsory part of every
definition of pacifism in the Soviet dictionaries, and they have
reason to cite him. He wrote: "We are not pacifists." (13) "Our
party has rejected both the Tolstoy doctrine and pacifism." (14)
He warns against "lying pacifist phrases, regardless of socialist
trimmings." (15) He is particularly contemptuous in his criticism
of social-democratic pacifism. He speaks of "the utter falseness
of the views of social democracy" (16) and says that "socialist
pacifism is simply a copy of bourgeois pacifism." (17) He writes
that the social pacifists are "objectively the servants of imperi-
alism." (18)

Lenin has no sympathy with religious pacifism either. "Dreams of
pacifism" are said to be merely "priestly comfort." (19) Lenin
inveighs against "the platform of empty pacifist declamations."
(20) "All bourgeois-pacifist and social-pacifist phrases against
militarism and war...are illusions and lies..." (21) Accordingly,
he issues a call for the "unmasking of pacifism." (21) He prophe-

sies a "collapse of pacifism," (22) and demands that "these
pacifist illusions be dispelled completely." (23)

So far we have been speaking about Lenin's view of pacifism. How
comes it that the Soviets and the communist parties take sides
with the present pacifist movement? The explanation is to be found
in an exchange of letters between Lenin and Chicherin, which was
kept secret for 43 years and then only published for specific rea-
son (Khrushchev had been criticized for spreading pacifist ideas).
Early in 1922 the Soviet government was invited to an interna-
tional conference for the first time after the years of blockade,
intervention and civil war. This was the World Economic Conference
in Genoa. Lenin had drafted the directives for the Soviet delega-
tion to the conference in a highly personal manner and sent them
to the head of the delegation, Chicherin, the People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs. The directives were unexpected: The pursuit
of communist aims was to be mentioned only "in a subordinate
clause"; apart from that, "a comprehensive pacifist program" was
to be put forward. This shocked Chicherin, who wrote the following
letter to the Politburo on 15 February 1922:

"All my life I have fought against petty bourgeois illusions and
now the Politburo forces me in my old age to invent petty bour-
geois illusions. No one here knows how to invent anything of this
kind. We do not even know what sources of information we should
make use of. Can't you give us more specific indications?" The
specific indications came by return of post. The day after receiv-
ing Chicherin's letter Lenin wrote on 16 February 1922: "Dear Com-
rade, you are over-anxious...You have fought against pacifism as a
program for the party of the revolutionary proletariat in the same
way as I have. That is certain. But when, where and by whom has
there been objection to exploitation of pacifism by this party
when it is useful for subverting the bourgeois enemy? Yours,
Lenin." (24) The expression "useful half-wits" attributed to Lenin
appears from time to time in the press. While it is certainly con-
sistent with Lenin's mentality, I have been unable to find it in
his works. The expression "useful pacifists" does, however, occur
in the correspondence that I have quoted between Lenin and
Chicherin. Moscow is on the lookout for useful pacifists. This
category certainly includes those who say that we should not re-
main fixed in "worst case thinking" *) but should proceed on the
assumption that the Soviet Union desires peace and disarmament as
much as we do and that its policy is a defensive one. Quite a few
members of the clergy and committed Christians hold this view and
plead for disarmament by the West in the hope that the USSR will
follow this example. But what if it does not follow it and takes
advantage of the unilateral disarmament of the West? Are we re-
quired to lead the gentlemen in the Kremlin into temptation by en-
abling them to achieve their openly proclaimed aims at one blow?

*) In English in the original

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Translated from the German by the LWF Department of Studies.
Quotes from Lenin's writings also translated by the LWF.

Notes

(1) See Michael Voslensky, Nomenklatura, The Soviet Ruling Class. Doubleday, New York; Bodley Head, London 1984.

(2) Lenin, Werke, Vol. 23, p. 92 (Since an English edition of Lenin's works was not available, the references given here refer to the German version).

(3) Ibid., p. 74.

(4) Ibid., p. 75.

(5) Ibid., p. 93.

(6) Ibid., p. 72.

(7) Ibid., p. 92.

(8) Ibid., p. 76.

(9) Ibid., p. 74.

(10) Ibid., p. 77.

(11) Ibid., p. 76.

(12) Ibid., p. 74.

(13) Op.cit., Vol. 24, p. 226.

(14) Op.cit., Vol. 23, p. 203.

(15) Ibid., p. 238.

(16) Op.cit., Vol. 22, p. 193.

(17) Ibid., p. 238.

(18) Op.cit., Vol. 23, p. 278.

(19) Op.cit., Vol. 36, p. 307.

(20) Op.cit., Vol. 23, p. 195.

(21) Ibid., p. 150.

(22) Ibid., p. 239.

(23) Op.cit., Vol. 33, pp. 113 ff.

(24) Lenin-Briefe, Vol. 9, p. 175 and p. 481.

ARMS DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL:
THE MILITARY FACTORS IN THE PEACE DEBATE

Heinz Vetschera

I. The subject matter for the discussion of armaments

The arguments commonly used in the ongoing peace discussions would give the impression that the main concerns are related to armament. The equation armament = war, disarmament = peace, seems to be the common basic trait in such a discussion.

But the term "armament" is often restrictively and exclusively applied to weapons systems, and in particular to specific weapons systems. Often it is not discussed in its broader meaning when in fact the term should be more inclusive in discussing a subject of the importance of "war and peace" with its far-reaching implications.

In opposition to armament conceived as arms control, my approach to the subject will be broader. The original meaning of arms control is itself a contradiction deriving from the objective of "controlling the arms race." (1) This objective, conceived primarily as political and only in the second place as technological, was expressly intended to cover the military sector as a whole and not merely individual weapons systems. (2) As compared with this very broad concept, the common conception of armament as weapons and weapons systems is an obvious restriction which, even if it is compatible with the aim of disarmament in the sense of the abolition of weapons (3), frequently obscures essential points or causes them to be overlooked altogether.

If one restricts oneself to this selective interpretation one can of course evaluate certain technological parameters, but one cannot assess the interrelations within a global system such as the military sector. It leads on to restricting comparisons of technologically homogeneous factors regardless of their interplay with other factors. This selective conception of armament tends, moreover, to emotionalize armament issues because this frequently seems to be the only way of expressing a view on such isolated factors when the necessary supplementary information has not become available.

In contrast, the broader concept of armament makes it possible to consider both the correlations within the system and the trends which may be apparent in the development of the armed forces. (4)

Hence, this approach contains two major areas of armament, namely:

a) the technological area proper covering not only weapons systems

but also developments as related to mobility and the hardware and software of command-control-communication-intelligence (C3I);

b) the structural area concerning the non-material aspect of the armed forces, i.e. organization, maneuvers, mobilization, but equally political factors, such as motivation, pre-military train-ing, etc.

The scope can also be extended to the question of whether specific armament developments affect the issue of war and peace: if the attention is no longer restricted to particular weapons systems but takes into account the whole gamut, it is also possible to say whether military stability (and therefore the avoidance of war) is or is not being maintained, bearing in mind that military balance is only a sub-area of stability and one which is open to differing interpretations depending on the methods of calculation and the number of sectors covered in the calculation. (5)

II. The developments

If nevertheless technological developments are introduced first, it is because developments in this field have actually taken place which have also affected the structural area accordingly. In this respect the influence of technological development on the struc-ture of the armed forces does not differ in any way from its in-fluence on the structure of human society as a whole.

The development of nuclear weapons is generally held responsible for the crucial changes in the area of armament. This may be true as far as it goes, but the great destructive potential of this category of weapons must not distract our attention from all those changes whose impact is equally significant but which have at-tracted little attention, mainly because they have occurred less dramatically. Thus, it is likely that the ultimate effect of the development of electronics will prove to be more decisive than the development of nuclear explosives. The whole problem area of stra-tegic weapons has been conditioned by the fact that ballistic mis-siles could not be made accurate enough to be usable as carriers for nuclear weapons until more precise electronic computer and control devices had been developed. If this had not occurred, nu-clear weapons would still be limited to bombs transported by air-craft, and without modern electronics air navigation would still be at the stage reached in World War II.

Moreover, the "creeping revolution" in electronics - which is equally evident in the civilian sphere - has also led to major changes in conventional armament. Here one can speak, and rightly so, of "a new military technology" (6) resulting in far-reaching if not spectacular changes with repercussions also in the area of military structure. (7)

The new military technology was very much in evidence in the 1973 war in the Near East, for example, when the Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal protected by a heavy screen of anti-tank and anti-aircraft rockets mainly dependent on recently developed

electronics. These are representative of a whole range of new pre-
cision-guided missiles that can reach their target partly guided
from outside and partly self-guided. This precision ultimately en-
ables restricting the use of military power to its first purpose:
Putting enemy forces out of action without simultaneously causing
damage in the nonmilitary sector. (8) While the course of techno-
logical development led first to an increase in the destructive
potential of the means used so as to achieve - at least statisti-
cally - the aim of destroying the enemy's means of coercion, in-
creased precision should logically lead to a reduction in destruc-
tiveness, as can already be seen in the current reduction in the
size of warheads on nuclear weapons. (9)

Military sources of information also have been improved by devel-
opments in electronics: i.e. by radar and sensors for infra-red
and other components of the electro-magnetic radiation spectrum.
Improved shock-recording techniques now also make it possible to
obtain (e.g. by using satellites) a full picture of the battle
area in a short time. (10) With increasing cheapness of electronic
equipment it has become possible to provide aids such as night-
viewing devices down to the lowest level in practically the whole
military sector. The development of electronics has also been a
major factor in improvements in the field of command-control-com-
munication-intelligence (C3I), i.e. in the capability of conveying
information upwards and downwards through the chain of command,
processing it at the appropriate level and thus providing the ba-
sis for rapid and informed action. At the same time this field is
becoming a conflict area where, as a result of jamming and
counterjamming action, the defense of communications and the pene-
tration of such defense are shifting the "battlefield" away from
the direct use of force to the level of "electronic warfare." (11)

These technological developments have inevitably affected the
structure of the armed forces. For example, the development of nu-
clear weapons and carrier systems by the major powers has led to
the creation of rocket units, either as a separate arm (USSR) or
as units of the army, navy and air force (USA). Less spectacular
but no less significant have been the implications for the field
of conventional arms: the development of precision-guided weapons
has led to the introduction of increasingly sophisticated arms,
especially against tanks and aircraft and also of means to pene-
trate anti-tank and anti-aircraft defenses. (12) The increasing
role of" electronic warfare" has in some cases led to the conver-
sion of combat units to units specialized in the conduct of elec-
tronic warfare.

To these factors that are generally regarded as the result of
technological development in "armament," others in Europe must be
added pertaining to the structural field. Here the forces of the
respective power groups face each other, and this permanent con-
frontation might for two reasons be regarded as a typical case for
an arms race: firstly, each alliance provides its forces with the
most up-to-date armament and, secondly, these must be kept in a
state of constant combat readiness. For reasons of military strat-
egy this is more comprehensible in the case of the units of the
West in view of their numerical inferiority (29 divisions in West
Germany and the Benelux countries as against 26 Soviet divisions

stationed in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia plus 31 divi-
sions of the national armies of these three countries. (13) While
the combat readiness of the Eastern forces may be expected to
have, in the first place, a disciplinary function at the level of
domestic politics, it produces, as a side-effect, a permanent
readiness to fight nations outside, which in turn demands on the
part of Western military forces a high degree of alertness
(readiness to act without lengthy preparations) on account of
their numerical inferiority. This situation must as a whole be
more of a threat to military stability in Europe than the intro-
duction of any weapons system, since in periods of crisis it could
quite easily develop into a real military confrontation, whether
through the force of events or owing to a miscalculation. In the
criticism of armament this factor is hardly dealt with as compared
with the attacks made on particular weapons systems.

III. Rejection, limitation or control of armaments?

Hence, in any debate on armaments the critique cannot be directed
selectively at isolated elements. This applies especially to the
kind of criticism directed at particular weapons systems without
considering the totality of the system and where over-simplifica-
tion and moral indignation often outweigh objective analysis. In
such cases arguments of different kinds put forward in support of
the same line of reasoning not infrequently turn out to point in
different direction. For example, nuclear weapons are criticized
primarily on the ground that they have an enormous destructive po-
tential and, besides their effect in combating military enemy
units, would lead to uncontrollable destruction in the civilian
sphere. The logical implication based on this objection, i.e. to
reduce the damage in the civilian sphere while maintaining nuclear
effectiveness against armored troops is then criticized as
"destroying life and leaving property unharmed." (14)

The controversy is similar in the field of what is known as
"eurostrategic weapons." It is a fact that the Soviet Union al-
ready has intermediate range missiles aimed at Europe and that
Western aircraft stationed in Europe would be able to reach the
Western part of the USSR with nuclear weapons. Their task would be
to prevent the latter from bringing up additional Soviet units
from the interior since with these units the superiority of the
Warsaw Pact forces could be increased to a level where a conven-
tional attack would seem likely to succeed. If these units were
summoned up over a longer period, this would give NATO sufficient
time to bring up reinforcements from the USA, thereby reducing the
prospects of a successful attack. But in order not to lose the el-
ement of surprise and nevertheless to become effective at the
right moment, the reinforcements would have to arrive almost si-
multaneously with the attack. (15) The plan was to hold up this
advance by using aircraft as carriers for nuclear weapons to en-
sure a quick reaction which would incidentally have a stabilizing
effect. Now, however, this mission can no longer be assigned to
aircraft since over the past decade the air defenses of the Warsaw
Pact countries have increased both in quantity and quality, making
it practically impossible to use aircraft for the purpose. The

logical next step was therefore to change over to carrier systems
less vulnerable to air defenses. The change implies a qualitative
increase, but the renewal of the Soviet intermediate-range system
also implies a qualitative increase - and also a quantitative one
by equipping the SS-20 with three warheads each. (16) The critics
of this operation disregard the attendant circumstances mentioned
and also the fact that the introduction of the new Western system
involves at the same time the elimination of the same number of
older nuclear weapons and that a further 1,000 nuclear warheads
would be withdrawn as soon as possible: In the light of these fig-
ures the decision concerning restoration of the arms balance crit-
icized as a process of "rearmament" would appear more like
"disarmament." (17)

In saying this I am in no way arguing that security can only be
increased by an unrestricted growth in armament. On the contrary,
what is needed is that every change in the military field should
be viewed from the angle of its effects on military stability. It
is precisely this requirement of a scientific approach to arms
control that has at last been met in the NATO decision (as opposed
to the decision of the USSR to rearm the SS-20). This makes it all
the more regrettable that the critics should pick out fragments of
the decision and refuse to consider it as a whole. Arguments
against "armament" without factual foundation and ill-considered
demands for "disarmament" are, moreover, not enough to be ap-
praised as a genuine concern for peace. The critic's conception of
disarmament overlooks the fact that arms development is insepara-
bly bound up both with technical and societal developments and
cannot be arbitrarily disconnected. Total disarmament in the area
of nuclear weapons, for example, could not solve the problem that
the knowledge needed to make them can no longer be eliminated, and
could be drawn upon at any time. If anyone in a nuclear-free world
had even two or three nuclear weapons, however primitive, the
world could be held to ransom. (18) If you will permit me to make
a biblical parallel, I would say that we have to live with the
consequences of having eaten the apple of (technological) knowl-
edge. Neither would nuclear disarmament solve yet another problem:
Conventional warfare would still be possible; and even renuncia-
tion of World War II technology would still leave that of World
War I, and so on. Finally the problem would remain that, even with
complete disarmament, everyday objects (civil aircraft, tracked
construction vehicles, sporting rifles, flails, etc. could be con-
verted and permit rearmament that nothing could prevent.

Hence, disarmament as a program cannot provide a satisfactory so-
lution to the problem of war and peace. Even the more sophistica-
ted approach attempted at the League of Nations Disarmament Con-
ference from 1932 onwards, which made a distinction between offen-
sive and defensive weapons systems, fails to meet the problem be-
cause the distinction cannot be generalized. At first sight, tanks
and aircraft would be classified as mainly offensive, anti-tank
and anti-aircraft weapons as mainly defensive; systems for count-
ering intercontinental rockets with nuclear warheads would have to
be treated as examples of defensive weapons. Nevertheless, anti-
tank and anti-aircraft rockets enabled the Egyptian army to cross
the Suez Canal, an operation that can only be described as offen-
sive. Moreover, anti-rocket weapons are expressly ruled out in the

SALT I agreement because in the concrete case they would have represented a destabilizing factor in the nuclear strategical position between the USA and the USSR.

Hence, disarmament and arms limitations as regards the technological components of armament do not meet the needs in this problem area. They cannot cover the whole field of armaments, nor make a durable contribution to stability and hence to the prevention of war. On the other hand, control measures that relate to the structural element in the field of armament do appear useful. This of course presupposes a willingness to comprehend the problem of armament in its totality so as to be able to reach adequate conclusions regarding its limitation.

Therefore the main efforts toward arms control would have to aim not just at obtaining illusory successes on specific items of disarmament, but rather at maintaining a military stability that would make an involvement of armed forces a truly hopeless undertaking. When it becomes apparent that there can be no successful war, then it will cease to serve as "a continuation of political intercourse with other means." (19) Numerical parity may be a factor in the maintenance of stability but it is not essential: a straight comparison of numbers tells us nothing about the actual capabilities of the armed forces since a nominal equality as regards particular weapons systems provides little indication on the actual ability for military interaction. For example, it is often argued with a certain amount of justification that the numerical inferiority of NATO in tanks as compared with the Warsaw Pact is offset by the fact that the former has better guided anti- tank weapons. This argument would of course have to be amplified by pointing out that the Warsaw alliance has increased its ability to deal with these anti-tank weapons by considerably strengthening its artillery, etc.

Numerical parity cannot therefore provide the yardstick in all cases. It may be a sound measure in a case where stability depends on relatively undifferentiated factors - as in the field of strategic nuclear weapons. In such a complex domain as military stability in Europe, however, such a mechanical approach is to be proscribed. (20) Here the position is complicated by the mixture of conventional and nuclear weapons (each with objectives that are open to different interpretation) and by the multinationality of the alliances. In addition, the armed forces of the Eastern system of alliances obviously have the task of maintaining discipline within member countries and the bloc besides their purely military functions.

All these factors require a broad spectrum of measures to safeguard the stability in Europe, and it would be appropriate to insist first on non-mechanistic measures affecting the structural area; above all measures for a more transparent information flow. This had been provided for within a small area in the final acts of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, under the heading "confidence-building measures." (21) Similar steps under the title of "associated measures" are under discussion at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces.

The main aim of measures that increase the availability of information should be to prevent misjudgments of the military position which undermine stability. Experience has shown that it is easier to prevent escalation than to reverse escalation that has already occurred. The availability of information, possibilities of legally acquiring information, the possibility of improved communication via a "hot line" and similar facilities designed for consultation can lead to rapid clarification of misinformation which would otherwise have an escalatory and destabilizing effect.

Further measures might result in structural modifications making it possible to reduce escalatory troop movements or degrees of high combat readiness. It would, however, be a mistake to think in terms of demilitarization in this connection. Demilitarized zones are an extremely unstable arrangement since they can be occupied in the event of conflict and rapidly presented as a fait accompli. Hence, care would have to be taken that any such test areas are so constituted that their occupation would be a very time-consuming task. (22)

All measures for structural armament control would inevitably require arrangements for verification, since this is the only way in which confidence in the reliability of the other side can be ensured. If there were sufficient confidence between East and West for verification to become unnecessary, the question of effective arms control would probably be superfluous.

IV. Prospects

The question remains as to whether such steps are feasible. As the example of confidence-building measures shows, agreement is, in principle, possible. It is true that on the Soviet side there is a basic scepticism regarding measures to provide for greater availability of information - measures which initially were denounced as "legalized espionage." (23) Here we note a traditional inclination towards secrecy, though this may not be a permanent trait since in the course of arms control negotiations there have been signs of a move towards flexibility even in relation to the supply of data and access to information. However, the political repercussions - at the domestic level and that of the alliance - prompted by measures such as reducing combat readiness and confidence-building (reducing the propensity to set up enemy stereotypes), cannot be assessed. In fact, the idea of the class enemy always threatening to attack serves the discipline of domestic politics, even though the threat does not seem to have been very successful recently. A destabilization of internal and alliance policies in the East as a result of the dismantling of traditional images of the "enemy" might, on the other hand, lead to uncontrollable changes with a destabilizing effect for the whole of Europe. The instruments for structural arms control should therefore be used warily but with perseverance in the interest of European stability. In this context, they should be able to offer better prospects of success in the long run than emotional criticism of armament or mechanistic schemes for disarmament.

Translated from the German by LWF Department of Studies.

Notes

(1) Cf. in general: Hedley Bull, To Control the Arms Race, London, 1961.

(2) loc. cit., p. 30.

(3) On the distinction between arms control and disarmament: Bull, loc. cit., p. 30.

(4) See Jorma K. Miettinen, "Die neue militärische Technologie", in Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 1/1981, pp. 19 ff.

(5) Cf. for example the differing interpretations in the US publication on Soviet armament (German edition, Die Sowjetische Rüstung, Munich, 1981), and in the Soviet publication "Von wo geht die Gefahr für den Frieden aus?" in answer to the American publication.

(6) See Miettinen, op. cit.

(7) See also Stefan Mayer, "Das Gefechtsfeld von morgen" in Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 2/1979, pp. 99 ff.; also New Conventional Weapons and East-West Security, Parts I and II, Adelphi Papers Nos. 144 and 145, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1975.

(8) As stated in the preamble to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 3 December, 1868: "The only lawful aim that a state can set itself in wartime is the weakening of the enemy's armed forces."

(9) Which of course increases the risk that nuclear weapons might be introduced not merely as a deterrent but also for actual use in war; see also Horst Afheldt, "Kernwaffenkrieg - begrenzt auf Europa? Die russischen Mittelstreckenraketen SS-20 as an indication of the military instrumentalization of nuclear weapons." in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 5/1979, pp. 141 ff.

(10) See SIPRI: Outer Space - Battlefield of the Future, London, 1978.

(11) See Miettinen, op. cit. and Mayer, op. cit.

(12) Cf. New Conventional Weapons (note 7) and James F. Digby,

Precision-Guided Weapons, Adelphi Paper No. 118, London, 1978.

(13) The most recent source is Hans Rapold, Frieden wagen - Frieden sichern?, Berne, 1982, including the figures and maps given.

(14) "Enhanced radiation - reduced blast" also described in press articles as the "neutron bomb."

(15) On the distribution of forces see Rapold, op. cit.

(16) On this whole complex of issues: Gregory Treverton, Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Adelphi Paper No. 168, London, 1981.

(17) Text in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 December 1979, p. 4.

(18) The poor participation in the current nonproliferation treaty is in itself an indication that in many cases there is still an inclination to keep nuclear options open.

(19) The original wording of von Clausewitz.

(20) The aim of the negotiations for a reduction of forces was consistently expanded to include "associated measures."

(21) See also Heinz Vetschera, "Vertrauensbildende Massnahmen - ein sicherheitspolitisches Instrument" in Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 1/1977, pp. 23 ff.

(22) A case in point would be the deployment of UN units in disengagement areas in the Near East conflict, though this has proved insufficiently effective in preventing break-throughs.

(23) Cf. correspondence between the Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin and the American Presidential Adviser Mc Cloy, dated 20 September 1961.

SUPERPOWERS AND THE ARAB WORLD:
ATTEMPTING TO SQUARE THE CIRCLES OF SECURITY

Mohammed Anis Salem

I

The history of superpower involvement in the Arab world is intricate and entangled. Deliberate strategy is mixed with action-reaction cycles, bureaucratic inertia, and the influence of pressure groups and personality traits. To add to the complexity, superpower competition is superimposed on a set of changes that have their own momentum, albeit they are susceptible to outside influence at the same time. One of these changes is the reshaping of the relationship between the politics of the area and the European powers that dominated it in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (i.e. decolonization). Another is the search for a regional system that would include the states of the area in various forms of cooperation and reduce or resolve conflicts between them (e.g. the Arab League, the Egyptian-Syrian Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council). There is, more important, the struggle over the Palestine issue which mobilized much of the energies of the states in the area. A third process is the indigenous attempts at economic and political development and the parallel questions of identity and pace of change (in other words, the question of revolution or evolution).

The interaction between these four levels (superpower, European, regional and internal) has taken the shape of a number of projects, institutions, mechanisms and ideas over the last three to four decades. Examples are the Western plans for regional defense, Russian treaties for friendship and cooperation, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the attempts to convene a Geneva conference on the Middle East question, etc.

This paper intends to (1) review the process of superpower involvement in the Arab world, (2) look at some of the products and by-products of this involvment, and (3) present a number of models that reflect it. However, the thesis presented here is fundamentally critical of both, the inherited practice and the possible futures; futures that will be realized unless human will is employed to produce alternatives. Thus "alternative security measures" will be the subject of the fourth and final section of this paper.

Historical

The post-war history of the Arab world has witnessed persistent attempts by both superpowers to gain entry, consolidate footholds,

and counter each other's influence in the area.

The Second World War had highlighted the importance of the strategic position of the area extending from Morocco to Iran, but it also contributed to the ferment of nationalist ideas that witnessed the weakness of the European colonial powers and placed high hopes on the Atlantic Charter and the lofty principles of the United Nations. However, these ideas and hopes were faced by the strong resistance of the victors to parting with their old possessions. Added to this, the growing cold war between the East and the West placed new demands and constraints on the indigenous nationalist dream.

The British forces continued to hold their positions on the Suez Canal while Egypt's quest for UN intervention was frustrated; evacuation became conditional on some form of acquiescence in a Western defense pact. Further East, in Palestine, the country was partitioned against the will of the majority of its inhabitants. In Iran, the USSR resisted withdrawing from its Northern parts and attempted to set up puppet regimes there (1946-47). Moscow aspired to the trusteeship of Libya, the former colony of defeated Italy.

Gradually the US increased its involvment in the Arab world while the old colonial powers were withdrawing. The US had just experienced the confrontation with communist forces in the Northern Tier (Turkey, Greece and Iran), which had produced the Truman Doctrine. Now this experience was projected onto its handling of the Arab world; except that it was oblivious of the fact that the main problem in that region was not communism. This conceptual blindness, the inability to see the people on the turf, continues to plague US policy to this day. Thus Dulles, even when realizing the need to do something about the Arab-Israeli conflict, saw this as a mere prelude to the formation of a pro-Western pact in the area. The more obvious contradiction in this way of thinking was the fact that Arab-Israeli peace required controlling the arms supplies to both sides, but creating a regional defense organization meant increasing these supplies. The Tripartite Declaration of 1950 (US, UK and France) attempted to resolve this question by voicing opposition to an Arab-Israeli arms race and guaranteeing boundaries and armistice lines. However, this declaration, outside the framework of the UN, without the agreement of the participants in the conflict, and devoid of any effort to resolve that conflict, was doomed from the start. It belonged to the static world of colonialism, since most of the area it addressed remained dominated. In addition, the declaration did not take into consideration the Soviet Union as an interested power.

These contradictions came to roost in the following turbulent years. First, there was the experience of the Baghdad Pact (1955). This became the focal point for the attack of Arab nationalist forces, particularly Egypt. The Egyptian thesis, at that time, was that the primary threats to the area were the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict and poverty; in comparison the USSR remained remote and unreal. Indigenous communist movements had been peripheral, and could only become important if the Western powers continued to attempt to reinstate the colonial order. At the same time the ideas of nonalignment were germinating. The Bandung Conference had

given these ideas a new impetus; a third option was becoming more
and more powerful as a political stance. But Dulles talked about
the immorality of neutralism, while similar opinions were voiced
in Moscow by Molotov.

Second, came the exposure of the contradictions alluded to before,
with the Egyptian-Soviet arms agreement of 1955. This was conclud-
ed because of Cairo's perception of Israel as the main threat. It
resulted in a Russian leapfrog over the Northern Tier. And it
meant that from then onwards the issues of Middle-East politics,
arms supplies, and possibilities for peace became even more linked
with the East-West competition.

Third, this last conclusion was to become evident with the experi-
ence of the High Dam. Egypt had perceived of this project as the
key to a new future with extensive agriculture, industrialization
and electricity for the primitive countryside. Such a dream was
appealing to American thinking. But now that a cold-war taboo was
broken by the arms deal with Moscow, retribution became necessary.
The US offer to finance the Dam was withdrawn. Nasser,
personifying Egyptian defiance, nationalized the Suez Canal.

Fourth, the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 brought
together all the forces Nasser had challenged in the previous
years. It also exposed the fragility of the 1950 Declaration with
two of its signatories participating in the attack. Although there
is evidence that Dulles was not against overthrowing Nasser, the
US and the USSR objected to the aggression and the results were
rapid. This example remains a testimony to how the rule of law can
be enforced when both superpowers work in parallel, despite their
disagreements.

In retrospect, an opportunity for a new order in the Arab world
came in the wake of the 1956 attack: solving the Arab-Israeli
problem, decolonization, developing the region, and removing it
from the cold-war competition. But to do so at that time would
have required superhuman qualities to overcome inertia. The US
switched back to the policy of containment by formulating the
Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) which stated that the "United States is
prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such
nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any
country controlled by international communism." As one source not-
ed:

> Phrases such as "power vacuum," "traditional Soviet interests
> in the Middle East," "outflanking NATO," and "the strategic
> crossroads of three continents" promoted an image of the im-
> portance of the Middle East and of the threat to US interests
> there that inevitably led to thoughts of military responses
> and alliances to deal with the political problems of the
> area. (1)

Under these circumstances the growing Arab nationalist movement,
inspired by Nasser, was perceived as part of the communist threat
to Western, particularly US, interests. Nationalist forces in
Jordan were viewed with suspicion until ousted by the King. In
Syria, the alarm was raised about an imminent communist takeover,

and Turkey and Iraq were encouraged to threaten Damascus on behalf of the West. The Soviet Union answered by maneuvers on the Turkish borders. Responding to Syrian demands, Nasser was pushed towards a hasty union with Syria in February 1958, thus defusing the situation. (2)

The collapse of the royal regime in Baghdad a few months later under nationalist banners, triggered US-British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. But soon these episodes were left behind, while a confrontation between Moscow and Cairo ensued.

Khrushchev was sympathetic towards the new regime in Baghdad because of its tolerant policy towards the local communists. He also feared that the Pan-Arab movement would stymie the possibilities for the indigenous communists, particularly at a time when China was critical of Moscow's dealings with nationalist regimes that were anti-communist (Khalid Bagdesh, the exiled Syrian communist leader, was in Peking at the time). Just as Moscow's perception of the advantages of a Zionist labor movement had clouded its understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it now had difficulty in comprehending the indigenous experience of Arab nationalism. Bitter duels between Nasser and Khrushchev were fought over this question.

Then a new phase came with better possibilities for reducing tensions within the area and between the superpowers. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) made the idea of containment partially redundant, removing a source of tension as the US no longer needed bases in the area. The French had departed from North Africa, and the US recognized the new revolutionary government in Yemen (1962). Nasser and Kennedy exchanged letters on the Arab-Israeli question.

However, these developments were insufficient to keep cold-war politics from the region. As the Yemen war escalated with Egypt confronting Saudi Arabia, the US moved to back the Saudi regime as an alternative rallying point in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Riyadh presented the idea of an Islamic Pact which Nasser saw as a disguised attempt to rebuild the defunct Baghdad Pact. While Moscow underwrote the Egyptian military effort to back the new regime in Yemen, the US and Britain (which was holding on to its position in South Yemen) backed the Saudis. In 1963 a squadron of USAF planes was sent to Saudi Arabia to demonstrate that support.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union increased its help to the Baathist rulers of Damascus, particularly after their leaning towards the left. As Arab-Israeli tensions heightened there was much confusion about the degree to which Moscow would support Syria in case of an Israeli challenge. In 1966-67 the cycle of Palestinian attacks on Israelis and massive retaliation in response escalated into a crisis involving Egypt, Syria and Jordan with Israel.

The Johnson Administration in Washington was occupied with Vietnam, but it engaged Moscow in an effort to defuse the situation. Both parties approached the participants with cautionary notes. Unlike 1956, however, this effort failed. However, there are serious questions about the sincerity of that approach, and there is

enough evidence to suggest that the US perceived of the Six-Day
war as beneficial to its interests.

The USSR had been dealt a deadly blow; Egypt's revolutionary drive
had been halted; Syria cut down to size; the Suez Canal, more im-
portant for the Russians than the Americans, had been closed. Nev-
ertheless, the superpowers attempted to work together, whether
through bilateral talks (Glasborough, summer 1967), by presenting
a joint draft resolution at the UN (the US withdrew from this
project), or by participation in the Big-Four talks of 1969. How-
ever, none of these efforts succeeded.

By this time Kissinger was more interested in expelling the USSR
from the Middle East than in resolving the Arab-Israeli situation.
But parallel to that he wanted to usher in a new formula of super-
power relations, namely, détente; cooperation where possible with
the opponent, otherwise competition governed by restraint. The So-
viet Union was also interested in developing the era of détente,
particularly with the Chinese menace transforming the strategic
situation, the Indo-Pakistani war, and the dangers of the Vietnam-
ese conflict still at hand. Under these circumstances, the Arabs
were angered by the 1972 US-Soviet agreement over "military
relaxation" in the Middle East. Sadat saw this as equalizing the
position of the occupier with that of the occupied; the scene was
set for expelling the Russians from Egypt.

Yet another phase opened with the Arab side forcing the deadlock
in the 1973 war and oil embargo. This time a Soviet-American con-
frontation occurred, but the US soon took over the diplomatic
process, despite the brief interlude of the Geneva peace confer-
ence where the Russians were present. Thus, three disengagements
were signed between Egypt and Syria on the one hand and Israel on
the other. The Soviet Union, finding itself on the sidelines, at-
tacked these efforts and downgraded its military support for
Egypt.

The Carter Administration attempted to return to the concept of a
global settlement by bringing in the USSR at a reconvened Geneva
conference. A joint US-Soviet declaration on the Middle East was
issued in October 1973 without consulting the other concerned par-
ties. Israeli pressure, however, reversed the US position on this
declaration after a meeting between Dayan and Carter. Meanwhile,
President Sadat decided to break through this impasse by launching
his peace initiative.

Immediately, the USSR took an antagonistic position towards this
departure and supported the mounting Arab opposition to it. Mean-
while, the US returned to monopolizing the peace efforts, leading
to the Camp David Agreements of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli
Peace Treaty of 1979. A deep schism was opened within the Arab
world between Egypt on the one hand and most Arab countries on the
other. This suited the purposes of Russian diplomacy since it iso-
lated US peace efforts, and weakened Sadat's influence in the
area. Moscow threatened to veto UN participation in the Sinai
peace-keeping force, thus leaving no alternative except a Western
multinational force that was formed outside the UN. This Moscow
proceeded to attack as a projection of NATO forces in the area.

At this junction the Arab-Israeli conflict was competing for at-
tention with a number of other developments in the area. The
Peacock Throne was toppled in Iran, and US hostages were taken by
the new regime. Russia invaded Afghanistan on a flimsy pretext, as
if to confirm to Arabs and Moslems the validity of American warn-
ings about Soviet intentions. Meanwhile, a revolutionary wave of
Islam showed its influence in the region, whether in Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, or Syria. At the same time, the Iran-Iraq war exploded.

The US formulated a series of military-oriented doctrines in re-
sponse to these events. The collapse of the Shah had made the
Nixon Doctrine (1973) redundant (this depended on strengthening
regional powers to enable them to defend their area). Then the
Carter Doctrine declared America's intention to intervene directly
in case of Russian aggression in the Gulf. President Reagan took
this one step further by asserting that his country would not al-
low Saudi Arabia to go the way Iran did. A Rapid Deployment Force
(RDF) was formed, "facilities" were negotiated in North, North-
East, and East Africa, and joint maneuvers were undertaken with
Egypt, Sudan and Oman.

Strong criticism has been directed to these moves. The Western re-
sponse to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan seemed more inter-
ested in whipping up Moslem antagonism than in reversing that
tragic event. As the Saudi Foreign Minister declared at that time,
"we heard a lot of talk about a Western grain embargo, but it did
not materialize. In the area of relations between the Soviets and
the West generally, and with the US in particular, no significant
change has occured."

As for the RDF, Arab critics argue that a Soviet attack on the
Gulf, if it materializes, would mean a global conflagration. In
such a case a small Western force would be of little value. On the
other hand, a higher Western military profile in the Gulf would
merely stimulate Russian counter moves in a vicious circle of
superpower competition. The oil producers also remember the
threats of occupying the oil wells following the 1973 oil embargo,
and suspect that the RDF could be used for a similar purpose if
necessary.

Once again, a fundamental conceptual problem plagues US-Arab rela-
tions. The Reagan Administration has approached the area in cold-
war terms, reminiscent of the experience of the 1950s. It has
sought to establish a "strategic consensus" between governments in
the area that are friendly to the US, on the assumption that the
main threat facing the area is that of the Soviet Union. Mean-
while, Israeli actions, particularly the invasion of Lebanon, are
viewed as an opportunity to "roll back" Russian influence by
striking at Syria and the PLO. In these circumstances, the efforts
to move towards a solution of the Palestinian question have
stalled while the human costs of lost opportunities escalate to
horrific dimensions.

II

Looking back at the cumulative experiences of the last four decades in the Arab world, it must be said that superpower competition has not been exclusively harmful. It contributed to the process of independence and development in the area, and allowed otherwise weak states to acquire more room for maneuver. The emergence of a third group of "nonaligned" countries contributed towards reducing the rigidity of the East-West divide. Also, in spite of this divide, when both superpowers worked together, or in parallel, they have managed to contain conflicts (1956, 1973) although this is usually difficult to arrange. Two examples of conflicts that the superpowers resisted to polarize were the Horn of Africa (1976) and the Iran-Iraq war (1980-82).

However, the overwhelming evidence of superpower involvement reveals a much more depressing picture:

1) The polarization of the Arab-Israeli conflict along cold-war lines complicated the possibilities for resolving it and pushed it towards escalation after escalation. US support for Israel has been countered by Arab moves to seek Russian involvement on their side to redress the balance. This, however, has tended to solidify the status quo.

2) Both superpowers have perceived the status quo (no peace, no war) as beneficial. The US sought to demonstrate to the Arabs that it held the key to peace, while the USSR felt that the American position opened numerous opportunities to extend its influence without need for costly risks.

3) The superpowers attempted to decouple the Middle East from other problem areas (strategic arms talks, European security, economic relations). They also attempted, albeit half-heartedly, to work together on the Middle East, to control the possibilities for escalation or confrontation. But these efforts remained cynical and limited. In the end the US did not want the USSR to be part of a settlement lest that recognize its involvement in the area, while Moscow was determined to spoil all US-sponsored peace moves.

4) In the absence of a move towards a settlement, arms supplies by both East and West continued to pour into the area irrespective of the impact these would have. US support to Israel was maintained on the assumption that this would make it strong enough to accept a solution; then when Israel balked, it was said that its military superiority made it intransigent. The USSR had meanwhile aroused suspicions that it was willing to supply enough arms to maintain its links with friendly regimes, but not enough to disturb the status quo. When Moscow made suggestions for limiting arms shipments to the area (1956, 1957, 1967) these angered the Arabs who felt this was an attempt to reach a deal over their heads and at their expense. Here the question of offering arms as an inducement for peace (Camp David), or withholding arms without achieving a solution raises important aspects of strategy, diplomacy, and morality.

5) Economic aid was given and withheld under the influence of com-

peting for positions of power. The High Dam is the classic example of this, but there are other cases. In 1965 US wheat shipments to Egypt were withheld as Nasser attacked American policy in the area. Another example is the Euphrates Dam built in Syria with Russian help without ensuring Iraqi agreement; both countries quarrel about water-sharing till this day.

III

The range of models that express the superpower relationship in the Middle East may be seen along a continuum from cold war to dé-tente. These two extremes are mutually exclusive, although a de-gree of competition exists within the détente alternative. Both these extremes may be open or closed, in the sense that other par-ticipants may be allowed to enter the process or, on the contrary, be excluded from it.

1) The cold war model: this model of superpower relations has plagued the Arab world, particularly in the 1950s. Lately, there are many symptoms of its return once again. The previous experi-ence involved the West European powers on the side of the US. In contrast, the EEC has attempted to be more distant and has even advocated a Russian participation in the peace process (its logic was that if Moscow has the ability to play a "spoiler" role, then it should be included). Two possible outcomes of the cold war mod-el are conceivable. The first would see a continued contest for positions of power between the Big Two. Each loss of position by one of them would represent a gain for the other (zero-sum game). Tensions would be high, and possibilities of confrontation would exist. The regional powers would find that their moves on the lo-cal scene would be constrained by the influence of opposing super-powers, although they may also be able to extract more support from whichever superpower backs them because that superpower would be afraid of losing its position in these states. The second pos-sibility would depend on a division of areas of influence between the superpowers (i.e. importing the Yalta arrangement) whereby strict zones of supremacy are established with severe sanctions, and direct superpower intervention, to maintain the status quo.

2) The détente model: This arrangement would attempt to impose a condominium between the two superpowers. It implies a down-scaling of the bitterness of the confrontation of the cold-war model, but realized that an entente would be impossible. Since dé-tente is based on selective and restrained competition in some areas, and agreement over other areas, two Middle East possibili-ties exist within its framework. The first is competitive, i.e., the area would be seen as open to restrained superpower competi-tion over influence. The second is cooperative, that is, agree-ments would exist to work together, or in parallel, towards cer-tain goals, or to place rules that govern the competition ("military relaxation" in 1972). These two alternatives, competi-tion and cooperation, are not mutually exclusive and may coexist in certain forms.

This model of détente has its admirers. In a recent article, André

Fontaine regretted that "the condominium seems very dead." "Humankind is unfortunately so constituted," he asserted, "that no order, and therefore no peace, is conceivable anywhere without a dominant power, whether underwritten by democratic consensus or by force... The counterpart of the shared rapaciousness and hypocrisy of empire is the peace and security it guarantees its protégés." (3)

The cold war model also has its admirers outside the Big Two: people who say that the competition between the East and the West opens opportunities for Third World countries, allows the nonaligned movement to flourish, and guarantees outside interest in the poorest and smallest states of the world.

But if we look at the Middle East, we shall find that these views bear little relevance to the reality of suffering and turmoil in the area.

a) Thus the attempt to build a Pax Americana has had limited success, perhaps because it was linked to cold war concepts. The USSR was left out as a spoiler, to assist other parties that felt left out of the settlement.

b) Attempts at enforcing aspects of the superpower condominium also failed. These attempts did not realize the leverage that the states of the area can exercise (expelling Soviet experts, launching the 1973 war, and the oil embargo). Also the idea of condominium carries the concept of an enforced peace, not a peace that grows from within the areas as a result of resolving its main problems.

c) Whatever the model, cold war or détente, the superpower involvement in the area by political interference or direct intervention remained very high. This tended to escalate local tensions and involved the states of the Middle East in the competition between Moscow and Washington.

d) The opportunity costs of these policies were very high. Huge resources were spent on arms while chances for producing peaceful settlements were wasted. Politically, the high tensions in the area contributed to internal upheavals and the curtailment of freedoms. Emotionally, the long years of conflict have caused a drain on ideals and planted extremism and hate. Peace was often perceived as a dirty word because it involved a degree of forgiveness of the wounds inflicted by the enemy.

e) Explosions with vast costs in human and economic terms continued to occur. Wars, civil wars, occupation and terrorism have become part of the scene in the Middle East. Now a new cycle is starting with superpower invasion, direct intervention, and much "political engineering" (attempts to change the political map by force). Thus superpower competition did not act as a palliative.

In these circumstances it is not enough to be content with the fact that Third World conflict has not spilled over into direct confrontation between the East and the West. (4) To do so would be to take the North-South divide to its sad conclusion, the

"quarantine solution," i.e., sealing off the problems of the poor because they are insoluble and getting on with the process of developing East-West relations. (Thus the European Security Conference resisted Malta's attempt to include the Middle East issue in its deliberations because that would be too divisive.)

The record of the past, and the momentum of the present, indicate that "realpolitik" considerations will dictate competition between the superpowers, or a division of zones of influence between them. However, the states and peoples of the area subject to this competition or division, and the multiplicity of other forces in operation in the world, do not necessarily have to agree to these models. Indeed it is in their interest to think of alternatives.

IV

Alternative models to cold war and détente may emerge whether through the exercise of human will or because of the combined force of events. Some components of these alternative models would be:

1) A problem-solving approach. The negativeness of dividing spheres of influence or enforcing a condominium has limited impact in terms of contributing to genuine peace. The superpowers should face the alternative challenge of how to "cooperate in a pattern which does not allow either of them a unilateral occupation of any part of the Middle East (and going) even further to a positive role of how the power and responsibility of the superpowers, together with the permanent members of the Security Council, should encourage, underwrite and reward the peace process." (5)

2) Ending occupations. The Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan is producing a militaristic mechanism in the West, particularly in the USA, with the establishment of RDF, bases, and facilities. Also, the Israeli occupation of Arab land appears more and more as an American occupation in disguise. The per capita share of aid from the US to Israel is about 1,000 dollars per annum. Israel's military arsenal is dependent on US supplies. And US officials talk of Israel as a "strategic ally." The impact this has is a countermove for an Arab strategic alliance with the USSR. (6) It also radicalizes the politics of the region. Both these occupations, Soviet and Israeli, must end.

3) Revitalizing the UN. The international organizations must be brought back into the center of peacemaking and peacebuilding. A dichotomy has developed with the UN representing an "advertising operation" while the real "business" goes on elsewhere. Even peacekeeping is slipping out of its hand (the MFO in Sinai, Israeli suggestion for a similar arrangement in Lebanon, British thinking about a force on the Falklands, OAU failure in Chad). The UN represents the minimum of an international legal system for resolution of conflict. To operate outside it is to allow more sway for power politics which further expose the weak, the poor, the unprotected, and the defeated.

Several steps could be taken to reinforce the role of the UN in the Middle East. The peace process could be redirected towards the UN. The Sinai force should be changed into what it was intended to be. More aid should be channeled to the area through the UN and away from bilateral arrangements. The UN apparatus should be geared towards action and not paper resolutions, and the veto powers should be reexamined carefully.

At a more general level, the role of the Secretary General could be encouraged, rather than the present situation where one of the requirements of the job is a degree of passivity. The idea of the permanent members also needs rethinking. Article 47 of the Charter, which calls for a Joint Military Committee, could be implemented. An improved capability for predicting conflicts and employing preventive diplomacy would be added.

4) Reactivating nonalignment. The nonaligned movement is stalling because of reasons within and without it. Its principles could be resurrected and a new look needs to be taken at its original opposition to bases so as to deal with the growth of "facilities." Perhaps at this stage a strengthened Secretariat would be useful to the movement, particularly in encouraging the flow of ideas within it. A larger degree of economic cooperation within this group could underwrite its political strength.

5) Promoting regional security arrangements. Ideas like nuclear-free zones, demilitarized areas, zones of peace need to be re-examined to bridge the gap between those who regard them as unrealistic and those who present them mostly as slogans. Perhaps by relating these concepts to specific areas like the Red Sea or the Gulf, and developing a series of gradual steps to promote such ideas, an "alternative security" approach will eventually come to prevail. At the same time, it is possible to think of a series of steps to defuse superpower tensions in an area like the Mediterranean, without resort to more global concepts (limiting maneuvers, banning the use of fleets for gunboat diplomacy, limiting deployment in peacetime, etc.).

6) Encouraging dialogues. Ideas have a major role to play as a driving force for change. But ideas require nourishment to flourish. Here perhaps it would be useful to strengthen UNESCO efforts to encourage peace research in the Third World, promote cross-religious dialogues to increase understanding, and study specific peace projects and their short-comings (notably, the Egyptian peace experiment, and the effort to settle the Arab-Israeli issue that started in the late 60s and continues to date).

But, in the end, understanding the Arab world depends on recognizing its own identity. This is difficult because development and struggle recast this identity all the time. Nevertheless, understanding requires dropping the stereotypes, the projections of the values of the Western or Eastern preferences on those of the indigenous people. For many years the West has looked towards the Third World through the lessons of the modernization model. Rostow's economics, Lipset's sociology, Lerner's political theory and Schraum's communications have all spelled it out. "The automobile, the TV, were the new manifesto of our time." The Soviet

Union, for its part, viewed national liberation in the Third World as a transitory stage on the path towards socialism. Somehow, in the back of Moscow's mind, Eastern Europe was the ideal model. Both the Western and the Eastern approaches are limited. What is forgotten, and most needed, is an appreciation of the uniqueness, authenticity, and otherness of the areas outside the West or the East. (7)

A sense of resignation could also be helpful. The two superpowers, like football players who have resisted retirement, continue to try to exert themselves. They refuse to recognize that their control over events in the Third World is more limited than before, that both of the Big Two may, and often do, lose at the same time. They try to replay old roles, but fail miserably.

A greening of the Arab world, a process of self-discovery, renewal, and fulfilment, is long overdue. To further delay it by repeating history would be a sad waste.

Notes

(1) William Quandt: "United States Policy in the Middle East: Constraints and Choices," in Paul Y. Hammond and Sidney Alexander, Political Dynamics in the Middle East, American Elsevier, 1972, New York, p. 502.

(2) Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1959, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1965.

(3) André Fontaine: "La fin du condominium," Le Monde, May 26, 1982, pp. 1, 2.

(4) For example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1981-82, London, 1982.

(5) Tahseen Basheer, "An Imaginative Project for the Middle East," Third World Media, 1981.

(6) Statement by the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Al-sharq al-awsat, June 1982, p. 1.

(7) I am indebted here to Irving Louis Horowitz, "Military Origins of Third World Dictatorship and Democracy," Third World Quarterly, January 1981, pp. 37-47.

A THEOLOGIAN'S ASSESSMENT OF THE
WEST GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT

Walter Schmidthals

The organizer of the present consultation has asked me to assess the peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany from a theological point of view, as a complement to Mr Weiss's paper.

I am somewhat embarrassed by this request because the peace movement as such has no theological pretensions. Within the movement, there are groups with committed Christians who are theologically motivated, but the movement defines itself as a secular social and/or political movement without any binding religious, anthropological or ideological foundation. Therefore, the peace movement as such has no pretension to being judged according to specific theological criteria.

However, such a self-understanding does not preclude a theological assessment of the peace movement but it does presuppose that theology contains relevant socio-political criteria. According to my own theological understanding of this controversial issue, there are no such criteria. Certainly, Christians are called to live in peace with all people and to do all they can to safeguard peace amongst them. But this does not make of universal peace a theological issue. Peace is a problem of general public responsibility; thus specific theological arguments and lines of conduct linked to one's faith would rather be an obstacle to an adequate perception of such responsibility. Prophetic or christological involvement in peace work has no binding elements. The only justifiable approach for securing peace is political action. Peace is a joint task for humankind, a task for Christians and atheists, Muslims and Buddhists, in East and West. Thus I feel unable to make a theological assessment of the peace movement in the strict theological sense.

It is precisely because of the theological quality of my reflections on the peace movement that there will be no reference to specifically theological criteria for judging political phenomena. My only competence derives from the fact that I am a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany; that, as everyone of us, I am deeply concerned about the problem of peace, that I read newspapers, and that I have children who talk about their experiences in the peace movement.

1. The peace movement is a non-political movement

The peace movement, of course, defines itself as a political movement. Accordingly, its rallies are attended by numerous political

groups and nearly all political positions are represented. A very active part is played by communist groups who are oriented towards Moscow or East Berlin, and for whom the victory of the armed socialist world revolution and permanent peace coincide. Many different types of pacifist groups (the traditional peace movements) also take part; occasionally they may call for unilateral disarmament. People like Eppler and Bastian, on the contrary, adhere to the deterrence strategy and only press for mutual arms reduction or for so-called confidence-building measures. Maoist groups see Moscow as the enemy No. 1 of peace; alternative groups recommend various forms of alternative defense systems, etc. There is no consensus within the peace movement on the question of who or what threatens peace and on how to safeguard it. Therefore church or church-related institutions, considered to be politically quite impartial, are the ideal initiators of peace rallies. At such gatherings the general slogans and impassioned rhetoric that address the common longing for peace and the peace appeals directed to the political authority, meet with much more response than political analyses or initiatives. The most favored slogan is also the least political: "Imagine there is war and nobody participates!"

What holds the peace movement together politically is the rejection of the present deterrence strategy and the prevailing peace policy, and especially the rejection of the NATO "matching decision" (the size of NATO armament is increased in order to match that of the Eastern bloc, so as to restore the balance of arms) which has largely contributed to the creation of the present peace movement.

This common rejection, however, does not make the peace movement a political movement, i.e. a movement in which the maintenance of peace is understood as a political task. When it comes to concrete peace policies, the movement is at odds within itself, i.e. the controversial issues are not even allowed to become a matter of open dispute. It therefore has no concrete alternative to propose for the present peace policy of nuclear deterrence, and those groups within the movement which propose peace policy initiatives do so as a rule within or on the fringe of the established political parties; some of them adopt the communist peace ideology.

That the peace movement is a non-political movement (a fact that the churches in the German Democratic Republic understandably emphasize again and again in respect to their own peace movement), does not mean that it has no political impact (see below). What it means is that this impact does not directly concern the maintenance of peace - that is undoubtedly a political task and in our times of conflict between the superpowers it is certainly the primary political task. After all a war between the nuclear powers would not mean that politics would be continued with new means but rather that it would be the end of any political action. What Paul Gerhardt wrote about peace in the context of the Thirty Years' War is more than ever relevant today:

              In you God has anchored
              all our well-being and bliss
              whoever grieves, afflicts you
              drives the arrow of sorrow
              into his own heart
              and out of foolishness
              extinguishes the golden candle of joy
              with his own hand.

This insight which is universally shared today also sustains the
peace movement.

But precisely because of this, all intentions and emotions, expec-
tations and demands of the peace movement are marked by a contra-
diction. The movement demonstrates, in the name of peace, against
those powers in the West and, partly, in the East that endeavor to
maintain peace politically and have secured a generation of peace
in Europe from the Ural to the Atlantic. The peace movement is
unable to propose, let alone implement, a realistic political al-
ternative to the peace policy by deterrence.

"Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's." When Jesus said
these words, he had in mind the pax romana. The emperor's task,
the task of the state is primarily to safeguard and maintain
peace, and those who commit themselves to safeguard and maintain
peace within the realm of their responsibilities must do so at the
political level, i.e. by proposing a concrete and realistic peace
policy and by endeavoring to implement it politically. In a par-
liamentary democracy this means obtaining a majority and if neces-
sary changing the prevailing opinions. In this specific political
sense, the peace movement is not a political force. It wants to be
a movement for peace - see its name - and as such prefers to have
neither a political organization nor a political program.

This contradiction between a clear political objective of the
peace movement and its lack of any concrete peace policy makes it
doubtful whether the keyword "peace" adequately describes its
characteristics. Certainly any reasonable human being, in the
East as in the West, concerned about peace would give priority in
his or her political options to the issue of peace. Therefore the
peace movement is present everywhere and we have to investigate
the specificity of the so-called peace movement today.

2.   In so far as the peace movement was triggered by the NATO
"matching decision" it cannot be denied that the movement is in-
fluenced to a certain extent by forces representing the communist
power bloc, (e.g. the "Krefeld Appeal"). But the movement can
certainly not be identified as "being directed from the East" and
it would be misleading to define it as such.

The peace movement has been called a "movement of fear," of gener-
al "existential fear" - "In this world you will have trouble..."
(John 16:33). Those who have read slogans on squatter houses in
Berlin, such as "We have nothing to lose but our fear," or (at the
peace demonstration of the Bonn Hofgarten) heard rallying cries

such as "Learn from your suffering" or similar ones, can no longer
underrate this fear. Many of those who participate in the peace
movement rallies live in this fear and some stir it up by calling
attention to the horror of a nuclear holocaust. But nowadays this
existential fear has become a general phenomenon, and the huge
rally on the right bank of the Rhine in Bonn looked more like a
summer festival than a display of vague fear. The posters "We are
afraid" rather resembled the message of a sect and did not dampen
the general cheerfulness.

The movement has also been called a movement of dread, concrete
dread of nuclear destruction. Many of the happenings in the
course of the peace weeks or similar rallies confront people with
the horror of nuclear destruction and try to bring them to reason
through fear. But then all of us living on this earth with their
eyes open live with this fear. Everybody is aware of the risks in-
herent in a deterrence strategy and more particularly those who un-
der the present circumstances, or in general, see no alternative to
the policy of securing peace by deterrence. But whoever is ca-
pable of challenging this justified fear with political alterna-
tives would be motivated by the insight that political action is
required to eliminate the source of fear. Precisely this is not
happening in the peace movement.

Abroad, newspapers apparently interpret the peace movement in Ger-
many as the emergence of a new nationalism. This is certainly mis-
leading, even though in the debates within the peace movement you
can hear some "pan-German" (gesamtdeutsch) voices that emanate
rather from leftist groups and throw into the discussion the
issue of the reunification of a neutral nuclear-free Germany.
But these are only side issues that find an echo in the peace
movement but cannot explain the movement as such.

I think that we come closer to the driving force of the peace
movement when we look at it from the perspective of an alternative
movement. The numerous groups supporting the peace movement are
generally opposed to the prevailing social structures. They cover
a broad spectrum ranging from the anarchist groups and the so-
called autonomous groups who refuse the state as such or our soci-
ety globally and threaten to make the country ungovernable ("Break
up what breaks you up") to the extra-parliamentary political
opposition groups, the alternative tendencies within the parties
and the trade unions, the women's initiatives, the alternative
artists' movements, the ecological associations, etc., with, at
the far end, the rather conservative groups of the "Greens," the
religious pacifists, or the Christian youth organizations.

If we add to this the fact that the peace rallies are almost ex-
clusively attended by young people - the average age of partici-
pants at the Bonn demonstration on the occasion of Reagan's visit
was estimated at 20 - one might quite correctly see and understand
the peace movement as being primarily and essentially a youth
movement.

Youth movements are always alternative or protest movements be-
cause they are part of the normal crisis of authority in the pas-
sage from youth to adult age; youth directs its aggressiveness

against the established authorities. This spirit of protest is the unifying force of the peace movement.

Youth movements always need models, their father and mother figures. If you look at the list of speakers at the peace movement rallies, you will again and again find the same mothers and fathers; frequently they are grandfathers and grandmothers.

Youth movements tend to produce enthusiasm, fellowship and emotions; these are also some of the characteristics of the peace movement, which are all the more manifest as the rallies become larger and politically less manageable.

Youth movements always need a topic that fits into an alternative framework and is at the same time generally convincing, i.e. an ethical topic which allows the complicated problems of a complex world to be concentrated in a single task, i.e. the war of liberation against Napoleon's rule, the democratic revolution against Restoration, the national enthusiasm against Balkanization, the "Wandervogel" concept, etc.

Peace being quite naturally the theme adopted by the current youth movements, they become peace movements, peace being the sine qua non condition for the survival of humankind in the nuclear age. And the fact that the young people engaged in the peace movement have had their vital needs fulfilled from childhood without having to work for them, explains that, in their view, peace is not the result of any political achievement but rather the immediate product of the will for peace. They are convinced that, if only sufficient pressure is brought to bear on those politicians who appear not to be in favor of peace, then peace can be achieved without the corollary of fear.

If what I have said is more or less true, then the peace movement must be understood primarily as a movement which, according to circumstances, can also take up other concerns. And if we look at it in this perspective, we see that in the past generation, its topics have changed quite frequently. In the 60s the movement welcomed the euphoria of reform, the (now forgotten) struggle about the Emergency Powers Act, as well as the anti-authoritarian student protests. It became committed to ecological issues and new religiosity as well as to the "Nuclear power? No thanks!" initiative. Indeed, some people feel that the movement as peace movement has already reached its peak, and personally I believe that it will lose its present characteristics at the latest when the issue of the so-called NATO "matching decision" has been settled in one way or another.

In regard to the peace movement the Federal Republic of Germany - if this analysis is correct - will assume a position similar to that adopted during the debate on re-armament in the 50s. The prevailing peace policy was then confronted on the one side with political alternatives, such as the neutralization of Central Europe, and on the other with the implementation of and propaganda for programs for conscientious objectors and pacifists. Which new issue the "movement" will then take up is not yet clear.

3. What precedes is not meant to deny the significance of the
peace movement. The influence can be felt, for instance, when
political parties, anxious not to lose votes, make advances to the
peace movement without however being able or willing to change
their own policy fundamentally. This is a hopeless venture and
does not serve the efficiency of the parliamentary system.

The political influence of the peace movement can also be observed
in the GDR. If you follow the information given by the media, you
will notice how the GDR government tries to exploit the peace
movement in the FRG in favor of its own political indoctrination,
highlighting the peace movement as a whole by means of the slogans
it produces during its rallies which make NATO unilaterally re-
sponsible for the threat to peace. This is of course a tricky
strategy because not every citizen of the GDR will blindly accept
the idea that socialist weapons promote peace while Western weap-
ons threaten it.

However, the policies for safeguarding peace of the nuclear powers
in East and West are not substantially influenced by the peace
movement. They have their own internal political laws, and these
are based, on both sides, on a deterrence strategy which has in-
deed maintained peace up to now, however terrible as a method this
might be.

The positive political influence of the peace movement, according
to the Heidelberg Theses of 1959 and the notable speech Carl
Friedrich von Weizsäcker made in 1963, is that, just like the ear-
lier more limited pacifist movements, it keeps people alert to the
inherent risks of all measures for securing peace based on nuclear
deterrence. The Heidelberg Theses show that strategically nothing
has substantially changed in the basic situation for the last 25
years, nor can any fundamentally new elements be added to the
analysis of the situation, and this is an important point in re-
gard to the evaluation of the peace movement. The Heidelberg The-
ses proceed from the insight that in a world that has full knowl-
edge of nuclear contingencies, neither the strategy of deterrence
nor renouncing arms would guarantee a lasting peace in the area of
conflict of the great powers, but that "both sides hold risks that
we must perceive as of a deadly nature."

We have to agree with this assessment: the risks of nuclear deter-
rence are obvious to all, not least to those who are directly re-
sponsible.

History has shown that unilateral total disarmament of one of the
world powers would bring with it by way of consequence the devel-
opment of a world state whose totalitarian potential would be an
explosive source of conflict. The Heidelberg Theses argue that
"capitulation to force, though it may bring about peace for the
time being, can hardly safeguard peace in the long run, because
the victor's violence will come into conflict with itself and with
the oppressed." Such conflicts would sooner or later result in
mass destruction with weapons that could very easily be produced,
even secretly. Those who are ready to sacrifice their own life-
style for the sake of peace in some way jeopardize peace, as do
those who, for the sake of peace, run the risk of losing peace.

Unilateral disarmament measures of individual states, as recom-
mended for example in the Memorandum of the Dutch Reformed Church
for the Netherlands, also endanger peace because, in the perspec-
tive of the deterrence strategy, it would upset the balance of
powers. It is clear that the great majority of citizens in the dem-
ocratic countries are not prepared to run the risk of unilateral
disarmament, nor does the peace movement as such demand such uni-
lateral measures in the West or in the FRG.

But also bilateral total disarmament, contrary to the arguments
advanced in its favor, cannot guarantee peace either in the con-
flict-ridden areas of the superpowers. Everywhere in the world we
can observe that, where weapons become more conventional, there
also the margin which holds back war becomes narrower. Total re-
jection of mass destruction weapons however does not imply that we
may recover nuclear innocence. The formula for the NBC weapons
remains available, and therefore also the possibility to produce
them. One cannot discard the perspective or fear that, in case of
conflict and after the total elimination of weapons of mass de-
struction, one of the opponents may once more produce NBC weapons
in order to settle the conflict to his advantage, thereby bringing
chaos and total destruction. This factor remains a core issue in
the controversy between the power blocs and we must assume that
for the sake of guaranteeing peace, the destruction of existing
nuclear arms will in all probability be opposed once and for all.
Those means that actually exist for global destruction apparently
constitute a lesser threat to peace than those arms potentially
available, especially as nuclear deterrence operates as a "brake":
B and C arms that are not so easily handled and controlled would
be withheld. Without this "brake" they would - on account of the
facility with which they are produced - represent a direct danger.
But this also implies that safeguarding peace by deterrence makes
disarmament acceptable only in the area of quantitative excess ar-
mament, but not in the area of political armament whose purpose is
deterrence. Here, as always in the history of humankind, the es-
calation of the arms race seems irreversible.

The demand for general disarmament also presupposes a different
security system for preserving peace than that of deterrence,
which has determined the lives of the nations up to now. Therefore
the Heidelberg Theses already advocated global policies for na-
tional concerns as the only possible way leading towards disarma-
ment, namely permanent peace among the nations. The idea as such
is not new. It already came up in ancient utopias, later absorbed
pacifist incentives, was taken up again and developed in the era
of Humanism (Erasmus demanded a world government. He argued that
without nonpartisan institutions the doctrine of the "just war"
would also be devoid of sense), and the idea thrived since the En-
lightenment (cf Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795) in various forms.
Similar thoughts in the Heidelberg Theses characteristically ex-
pressed the insight that the means of mass destruction had created
a new situation which left the world only a very short time span
in which to escape annihilation. In this brief period nuclear de-
terrence and absolute personal abstention from belligerent action
together are necessary in order to convince the world that such a
complementary strategy is indispensable if a peace settlement is
to be reached.

This short span of time as envisaged in the Heidelberg Theses is probably over by now, although the deterrence strategy has not yet failed. However, no one knows how long it will continue to help maintain peace. To create a global peace order and global domestic policies remains an urgent task because it is the only alternative to the current antagonism between the blocs of nations. If this point of view is correct, then military security measures to safeguard peace and the peace movement (in whatever form) will need to continue to coexist in order to keep the public aware of the need for fundamental political progress for the sake of disarmament and peace.

In this connection the non-political nature of the peace movement no longer appears as a shortcoming since those who assume effective responsibility for peace worldwide cannot adopt any of the various military or pacifist approaches that are proposed in order to come to terms with currently prevailing tensions between the nuclear superpowers. Rather, the only alternative is to overcome this tension in the context of a trans-national world policy that would in fact be a new policy. However, it is true that from an objective and realistic point of view, the prospects for such a solution of our dilemma - the only solution in my opinion - are rather poor. Weizsäcker's hope that fruitful cooperation, e.g. the complementary effect of deterrence and peace movement (pacifism), could call forth a global peace order, was founded on the view that conflict management between the nations was already in process thanks to the propitious convergence of the technological societies. Similarly the Heidelberg Theses had already in 1959 seen the nuclear deterrence strategy as a "short transitional period" in the process towards a global peace order, which was not only necessary but also made possible by the technological society.

The "convergence theory" prevalent in those days, according to which both social systems would necessarily converge because of technological developments, had always been violently contested by Moscow, since only a worldwide victory of socialism would guarantee a peaceful world order, and indeed the "Prague Spring" crushed the hope that technological constraints might be stronger than ideological fetters. Today technological progress and the fight for energy and raw materials seem rather to be additional factors of conflict between the nuclear powers in East and West. The disparities between the developed and developing nations have increased. Totalitarian and liberal regimes have little to say to each other, the growing difficulties in the Soviet empire make it less and less likely that one day the Soviet Union might become an integral part of a pluralistic collective security system and relinquish for the sake of world peace the absolute claim of its ideology as a peace factor. The prospects of reaching global domestic policies are poorer than ever before, and even C.F. von Weizsäcker mentions "the unsolved problem of a reasonable global peace order" (Evangelische Kommentare, 1981, 48). Recently, in a television interview on the occasion of his 70th birthday, he compared our present situation to that of a group of roped climbers who by mistake had started to climb the north face of the Eiger. Only when they could no longer go forward did their situation start to scare them. Obviously, one cannot simply jump off the mountain even if some voices in the peace movement challenge

people to do so. All one can do is to go on climbing cautiously and courageously until a way out is found.

Our goal continues to be the achievement of global peace and the peace movement, whatever its specific development, continues to have an indispensable function to fulfil as it complements the present political policy of safeguarding peace through deterrence.

4. Concluding remarks

Whatever else might be said about the peace movement, it is certain that theological statements cannot be made on it, any more than on the deterrence strategy. The churches should also refrain from such statements and should leave their members free to express their own opinions and implement them politically if they wish.

Obviously one easily takes up peace movement slogans such as "disarm" or "we want peace." But is there anybody who does not want peace? The politicians who pursue the policy of nuclear deterrence in both power blocs also do so for the sake of peace, as is evidenced by the - relative - success of their endeavors. And who does not deplore the huge cost of armaments and hunger in the world? Who would not rather live in a world without arms? But it is not the intention to make war that renders the disarmament negotiations so difficult, but rather the will to safeguard peace. Thus the peace movement is universal. The rulers and the ruled in the East and West are not divided into those who love peace and those who are against it. There are only different viewpoints on how to act responsibly, different fears and diverging approaches to peace in the midst of all these fears.

In our unredeemed world there is no unequivocal solution to the problem of peace, let alone a "Christian" one. The churches can therefore neither propose nor promote any such solution. Everyone in the East and West not only knows but declares that peace is the condition for survival. Many church-related appeals for peace, many peace rallies and peace resolutions are therefore perceived as inopportune, as merely serving theological self-satisfaction and leaving the congregations at a loss with lifeless truths.

The church's first and greatest service to peace is prayer for peace - not the kind of prayer through which the leader lets the congregation know his or her own views about the right way to peace but rather prayer which has its source in powerlessness and is directed to God alone and which, especially with a view to peace, is at one with Paul: we do not know how and for what we should pray. Such a prayer of the church, founded in the belief that God rules, sustains Christians to face their responsibility for peace, and frees them from their fears.

If we concede that a global domestic policy is the precondition for lasting peace, the church's specific contribution to peace in the world and among nations is that it sets an example for peaceful living and thus becomes the light of the world. There is

no other worldwide cross-cultural community comparable to that of the Christian church. If because of our love for peace we deplore the lack of confidence among nations, our primary Christian task must be to help build up confidence throughout the world and to create fellowship among Christians across political and ideological boundaries. Christians who mistrust each other and churches that are at variance with each other, are unfaithful to their mandate for peace. Already in the New Testament we have the familiar exhortation addressed to Christians: Live in peace with each other.

The church should therefore abandon the peculiar idea that its task is to arouse the conscience of its members in regard to peace. There are already innumerable appeals, including those from official church bodies, that aim to conscientize people; the appeals are often addressed to those in responsible positions and in government. Of course Christian proclamation must rouse people's consciences; of course it must remind them of God's commandments and of God's order. But where, at the present time, in the conflict-ridden areas of the power blocs is the peace commandment ignored? Which politician who disposes of nuclear weapons could be accused of being unscrupulous in regard to the problem of peace? Are not both soldiers and conscientious objectors equally "conscientious" concerning the peace issue? But this does not mean that they know how to solve the problem. As I see it, the church's proclamation, in the present situation, should serve to comfort the consciences of everyone and in particular of politicians.

The mission to secure public peace, or even world peace, is not entrusted to all citizens in equal measure. Nobody should feel coerced into assuming such a mandate. But those who carry direct responsibility for preserving and securing world peace must fully assume this responsibility: wherever their office places them, they must serve peace to the best of their abilities and insights.

In some respects this responsibility has become easier to discharge in the conflictual tension between the super powers: those in power need no longer decide between war and peace, but rather on the right measures for preserving peace and avoiding a nuclear holocaust. But such decisions are extremely difficult to take, and in fact no human being should be thus burdened because, now that mass destruction weapons have been discovered and their plans and formulas can no longer be erased, each conceivable measure is loaded with incalculable and potentially deadly risks. Cheap appeals or demands from those who are not directly responsible deprive politicians of the comfort that the church owes them.

The consolation of the gospel consists first of all in encouraging Christians to assume political responsibility and to publicly acknowledge the office and responsibility of those in charge. The church knows that in our nuclear age we need people who in a yet unredeemed world have to attend to matters of justice and peace, and who serve this end to the best of their human abilities. The church gives thanks to God for providing in his kindness this order. The church in its relations to those who govern us should

resist the trend to dogmatize, just as it should avoid attitudes of refusal and non-involvement.

The consolation of the gospel which comforts our conscience rests above all on the promise that God's peace, which is greater than all political reasoning, sustains the statesmen in all their duties and decision making. It allows them to see their actions as being penultimate, because they are not "the supreme authority and it is not up to them to rule everything"; the gospel comforts us with its message that, when we fail in our work, we do not fail in our being, for God's grace is our refuge.

Such consolation can also become effective politically. It gives us courage to do all that must be done by human beings even though it may be beyond human capacity. It qualifies Christians in particular to carry political responsibility, because they know about the limits and risks of their actions; at the same time they are given the courage to act within these limits and amidst these risks. Therefore the church must above all comfort, encourage, and sustain people's minds for the sake of peace.

Nobody knows how strong the thread is on which the sword hangs above our heads:

> May those who love Christ
> be without fear,
> the peace that comes from him,
> is the supreme good. (Paul Gerhardt)

Translated from the German by LWF Department of Studies.

SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY BETWEEN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN SYSTEMS AFFECTING SECURITY POLICIES AND POPULAR PEACE INITIATIVES

Michael Sahlin

Allow me to begin by quoting some illustrative sentences from a recent statement of some relevance to the title or theme I have been asked to elaborate on:

> I would like to express a special appreciation of the non-governmental organizations, the popular movements, the peace groups, the churches, the doctors, the trade unions, the scientists - all those that have together formed public opinion and have created such a strong popular support for disarmament in the last two years or so.
>
> I certainly do not agree with all arguments or all slogans or all proposals from these groups but I think that we should all recognize what a great service they have rendered. They have made us all much more aware of the dangers of the arms race. They have questioned the necessity of a continual buildup in nuclear weapons and the wisdom of common strategic thinking. They have changed public opinion and thus influential political leaders, for these are normally sensitive to criticism. Many of the groups have often been small and worked under difficult circumstances. Many have had limited financial means, only large resources of idealism.
>
> I am convinced that without all these arguments put forward in books and articles, at seminars and conferences and without these marches and demonstrations we would not have been able to see how negotiations, that have been idle, are now being revived. And we would not have had many proposals to reduce, to freeze, to cut or not to use nuclear weapons that have been put forward lately.

These words are Olof Palme's, former and, perhaps, future prime minister of Sweden. The citation is from his statement of June 23 this year (1982) to the UN Special Session on Disarmament when he introduced and submitted the final report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, a commission composed of high-level, more or less non-governmental and in that sense "independent" representatives from all corners of the globe, East-West, North-South. The report, of which you are no doubt aware, stresses the need for a strategy of "common security" and should be rather unique as an example of a joint East-West attempt to point out the concrete features of a general program of disarmament. In submitting the report Mr. Palme furthermore gives expression, as we heard, to a feeling of gratitude towards a -

presumably - representative popular world movement concerned with issues of peace and disarmament.

This very week (July 5-11, 1982), the UN Special Session in New York is struggling through its last laborious week. According to the last information I was able to receive before coming here, prospects are not bright at all for the session. Rather, there was evidence of a tendency for the superpowers even to fall short of the level of disarmament readiness displayed in 1978 when the first UN disarmament session was held. I have witnessed similar deadlocks, similar inability or unwillingness on the part of the superpowers to enter into non-confrontational dialogue and serious negotiations in Madrid - whereby I am not referring to the "Mundial" but to the "regional," the CSCE follow-up meeting.

Lack of mutual confidence and mutual fear seems to be indicative of the present relationship between the leaders of East and West. Normally and typically, the chances of the superpowers entering into really meaningful arms control negotiations could - under such political circumstances - be expected to be less than slim. But the present situation is not normal. It is new, without historical precedent, and it is contradictory. Probably it will take a long time - possibly several years - before we can judge with some certainty which signs or tendencies will finally prevail: the fact that lack of confidence and respect and verbal bellicosity characterize East-West relations, the fact that the superpowers have nevertheless embarked on bilateral arms control talks a few miles from here, the fact that multilateral disarmament efforts become increasingly incapable of bringing about concrete results, and/or the fact that an increasing number of people in all corners engage in organized work with a view to sounding their concerns on issues of security, peace and disarmament.

The question of the significance and possibilities inherent in popular peace movements relates directly to the question of symmetry and asymmetry between East and West, i.e., such differences between socio-political conditions on the respective sides of the Berlin wall (in a broad sense) which would affect possibilities for cooperation, joint positions and perhaps even joint action between peace groups such as the churches.

In now addressing the concrete theme given to me with a brief attempt at an analysis I should perhaps forewarn that I intend to say more about asymmetry, i.e., differences, hindrances, problems, than about symmetry (similarities, possibilities). I am afraid that problems will be underlined rather than solutions offered. But the point of departure is something of a paradox: has there ever existed a problem definition on which it has been so relatively easy to agree between persons, groups and nations in broad moral-political terms and yet so difficult to find uncontroversial concrete steps towards problem solutions - as the contemporary problem of peace and disarmament? Hardly, I guess. One implication is that whereas it is fine, reassuring and in itself indispensable that the USA and the USSR have finally - and obviously in response to a worldwide call - decided to start negotiations on ways and means to cut down their nuclear arsenals, it is at the same time all too probable for comfort that a very long time will elapse

before these negotiations will yield tangible results, representing a real improvement to global security. Meanwhile it is to be feared that the cause of world peace will constantly be confronted with additional burdens.

Another implication is that the greater the involvement of churches and other non-governmental peace protagonists in actions concerned with concrete military-political solutions to the general problem area of peace and disarmament, the greater their degree of politicization, the more elements of divisiveness are introduced into their life, the more East-West cooperation in this field is likely, logically, to be complicated. The politicization of vitally important issues of security, peace and disarmament emphasizes problems of asymmetry and divergence between Eastern and Western political systems and their vulnerability vis-a-vis each other.

At this point, holding the concepts of politicization and vulnerability in mind, let me turn to political science and the sub-discipline of comparative politics.

In any basic political analysis, the concept of legitimacy is of paramount and fundamental importance. The problem of legitimacy presented itself especially with the process of 20th century modernization and its concomitant processes of politicization (citizens taking increasing interest and part in public affairs) and state growth. The problem of legitimacy arises along with an increasing direct relevance of the question of legitimacy: by what right am I being ruled by those in power? In pre-modernistic society many people could not care less who were their rulers and by what right for they were very little, if at all, affected by politics and government. But as the scope of political government grew, simultaneously with an increasing degree of politicization of social groups and socio-economic problems, the academic question of legitimacy evolved into the political problem of legitimacy.

Democracy, generally speaking, represents a contemporary constitutional solution to the problem of legitimacy. As the famous French political scientist Maurice Duverger put it, "Democracy remains the dominant doctrine of the contemporary age, that which determines the legitimacy of power."

The more a political rulership has to, or wants to, exercise authority over its subjects, the more a choice between legitimacy and repression is forced upon it, the choice, that is, between basing authority (or power) on legitimacy or on repressiveness, force, coercion.

Democracy, as a solution to the contemporary problem of legitimacy, has obviously been the object of manifold definitions, whether as a concept, an ideal type or a real political system. The different definitions differ in emphasis, some stressing social representativeness, others responsiveness, others again participation, etc., as crucial characteristics.

A widely quoted and respected picture of democracy as a political system has been drawn by the American political scientist

Robert Dahl who noted that a system can be said to be democratic according to the degree to which all full citizens were rendered unimpaired opportunities: a) to formulate their preferences, b) to signify their preferences, c) to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighed with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference.

According to this leading theorist, for these opportunities to be realizable, certain institutional guarantees were required, namely the following: freedom to form and join organizations; freedom of expression; right to vote; eligibility for public office; right of political leaders to compete for support and for votes; alternative sources of information; free and fair elections; institutions for making government policies dependent on votes and other expressions of preference.

Dahl notes that these eight guarantees constitute two different basic elements, or dimensions, the one referring to aspects of political participation, the other to aspects of political competition, or contestation, both rather essential to a democratic system. He points out (correctly I think) that in the absence of the right to oppose, the right to "participate" is stripped of a very large part of the significance it has in a country where public contestation exists.

We have here a check-list with which to study and compare real political systems. We can also assume an ideal type system or model which scores high on all these guarantees.

But for comparative purposes I think analysis can be brought one step further by combining Dahl's two "democratic" dimensions into one and instead adding another which could be called "degree of government," or the scope of governmental (state) involvement in society and social life. The four-field matrix provided by combining "high degree" and "low degree" on these two dimensions, to repeat "degree of participation/contestation" and "degree of government" gives us what I think is a fruitful and realistic classification scheme of four, the four, ideal type political systems. One can then discuss whether and to what extent real systems fit into either of the four bases. One can discuss in concrete, non-ideological terms. The four types of political systems thus theoretically derived are: a) liberal-democratic, b) democratic-socialist, c) authoritarian and d) totalitarian.

The liberal-democratic is "high" on participation/contestation and "low" on "degree of government," both factors allowing for and even encouraging socio-political pluralism. Problems of legitimacy have been largely settled by the democratic procedures, although systems nearing this ideal are criticized for sins of omission (unemployment, deficient law and order etc.) due to the limited degree of government which furthermore leaves large sectors open to the domination by "capitalists."

The totalitarian system type (and ideology) is high on the dimension of "degree of government" - the party-state controlling and interfering in almost everything, seeking to mobilize everybody, but is low on genuine participation and contestation. Political

participation does signify party-state control of citizens, not
the other way round. The high degree of control by party-state ne-
cessitates excessive use of repression, of trial and terror, at
least against those segments of society which the party-state does
not claim somehow to represent, mythically or metaphysically. The
democratic-socialist ideal type of course is high on both dimen-
sions. The scope of government covers all society, nothing is non-
political, everything is everybody's common concern, there is no
private ownership, no capitalism, but the state is, on the other
hand, perfectly controlled and participated in by the intensely
politically active citizens.

The authoritarian system scores low on both dimensions: low degree
of participation and contestation and a chief governmental concern
with strategies of de-politicization and political de-mobiliza-
tion, and a low degree of governmental scope. Repression has to be
relied on for authority, but in comparison with totalitarianism it
is selective and defensive, aimed at deterring or crushing mani-
fest political opposition.

This analysis could be carried much further, but I have tried your
patience enough, so I shall hasten to stress the significance and
come to the point.

How do the real political systems in East and West fit into this
general scheme? Whereas no real system fits entirely into any of
the boxes, I think one can say that many systems come near the au-
thoritarian and liberal-democratic ideals. Whether the democratic-
socialist ideal has ever been or could ever be approached in prac-
tical reality deserves the benefit of the doubt. Hence its practi-
cability in ideological rhetorics.

East-European political systems of today, although claimed by
their leaders to be democratic-socialist, are in fact closest to
the authoritarian position in this scheme. If they ever deserved
the label totalitarianism - which Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
still claims but which most scholars tend to deny - this is not so
anymore. They are not democratic-socialist, if only because they
allow very little controlling political participation. And obvi-
ously they are not liberal-democratic because they allow no or
very little contestation and pluralism. They are de-
mobilizational rather than mobilizational and the degree of gov-
ernmental or party involvement in social life is being gradually
reduced. Passive obedience rather than active adherence is asked
of citizens. Terror is becoming less draconic. Western systems
keep struggling with the problems of liberal democracy.

As far as this analysis holds, this would then be the situation
and we can return, as promised, to the concepts and problems of
politicization and system vulnerability.

The strength, I would argue, of the Western liberal-democratic
systems is mainly that the problem of legitimacy is largely set-
tled by democratic procedures. Processes of politicization, e.g.
of the questions of peace, security and disarmament, are not like-
ly to shatter the legitimacy of the system itself, only the posi-
tion and policy of the present government. The latter is obviously

the main weakness: the vulnerability of governments to the machinations of public opinion pressure which in turn can be stimulated by outside propaganda. Opinion groups in the West have access to information and knowledge on important security issues and to information media by which to further mobilize support.

To the extent, then, that questions of peace and disarmament are turned into elements in an East-West ideological or propagandistic struggle the Eastern systems enjoy some tactical initial advantages, due among other things to the lack of Robert Dahl's guarantees offered to interested and concerned groups, e.g. churches. Situations may arise which are quite embarrassing for Western governments, squeezed between the need not to antagonize peace groups and the need not to give away vital security needs.

Let me take one example from my own part of Europe, the discussion on a nuclear weapon free zone in the North. The peace movements in the Scandinavian countries have made this issue the focal point of their activities. The nuclear weapon free zone appears to many as a concrete and realistic action to be promoted, both for its own sake and as a first step to similar arrangements in Europe. Before this year's election (Sweden, 1982) many party politicians have sensed what is moving and adhered publicly to the thought.

The Soviet Union has long cherished the idea of a formalized non-nuclear Nordic zone and encouraged its implementation, sometimes with carrots, sometimes with sticks. In the Pravda, on June 21, it was said, ominously: "The North of the continent should not remain aside of those disarmament efforts because, though nuclear weapons are not stationed there, their sinister shadow looms over the region."

Threatening utterances such as these are likely to give further fuel to popular demand for the establishment of a formal zone. The problem is of course - without commenting on the value of a zone as such - that there are many vital security problems involved, problems such as the fact of Denmark's and Norway's NATO- membership and others which do not lend themselves to easy solutions. Nevertheless, the non-nuclear zone question seems likely to dominate political discussions for a long time.

But, to conclude, in the longer run I find it likely that the vulnerability of the Eastern systems to the politicization of the peace issue will be at least as great, perhaps greater. The weakness of authoritarian systems lies mainly in their weak legitimacy, a problem only temporarily solved by strategies of de-mobilization which are difficult to uphold over a period of time (as shown particularly in Poland). Some current tendencies in the GDR make clear that, if regimes overemphasize the peace issue, this can turn out to be counterproductive. It would be infinitely embarrassing for a regime if it felt obliged to crush by force a movement at home which had arisen as a result of the regime's own peace propaganda and demands for military openness and disarmament steps not only of the other side but also of the regime itself.

Perhaps I should end by saying, in order not to be misunderstood, that it is my belief that the governments of Eastern Europe are

nowadays genuinely concerned, in their special way and with their special motives, with disarmament. I could be wrong, of course, but, as someone said, hypocrisy is the homage paid by vice to virtue.

LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
AND OF THE WARSAW PACT

Introduction and Guidelines to the Panel Discussion

Gustav Däniker

Introduction

I. Outlines for a secure Europe

In order to set a goal to the discussion, the following question
could be asked: What should be Europe's configuration so that it
would become a safe place also for small neutral countries that
are not protected by treaties - at least safer than at the present
time?

We should not give in to wishful thinking. Absence of violence in
all areas, freedom and justice for all nations, cannot be achieved
overnight - any realist knows that only too well. Such demands
that are made again and again by pacifists and utopists must re-
main the ultimate goal of humankind. But they must not veil the
political reality lest such dreams turn into their opposite: the
party that is clever enough to exploit such longing for peace will
all too often be the one to profit; it will impose its own view of
peace.

II. The security policy of Switzerland

As a starting point for and an approach to the notion of security
needs, we shall outline the principles of the Swiss security poli-
cy: It is set down in the report of the Swiss Bundesrat (Federal
Council) to the parliamentary assembly of the 27 June 1973 under
the title: "General Defense Principles" and contains two basic
guidelines.

In accord with its tradition, Switzerland welcomes all serious en-
deavors towards ensuring peace and mastering crises, and it is
ready to actively support them as far as this is possible for a
small state.

On the other hand, our country must be armed against any possible
threat. The emphasis of our security policy is based on avoiding
war by being ready to defend ourselves and ensure our survival.
Therefore, the goal of our policy is "deterrence," which is only
possible if in case of an emergency we have the capacity and will

to defend ourselves effectively.

The various objectives are:
- freedom of action of the legitimate government (no yielding to pressure)
- protection of the population against attacks and occupation
- guarantee of territorial integrity

Our comprehensive aim is "peace in freedom," namely independence. Switzerland is a small neutral state. For centuries it has not waged war nor interfered politically in foreign conflicts.

Switzerland is a genuine democracy enjoying a high degree of social security. The citizens are entitled to vote on constitutional and legislative matters, including matters concerning our army. The Swiss do want this army.

Our security needs are limited to our own sovereign territory. Our goals are therefore modest. But is it asking too much to hope for a Europe from which external aggression would be permanently absent, because, on the one hand, the external security needs of all European nations would be met and, on the other hand, whenever necessary conflict management between them would be ensured by means of negotiations and arbitration?

To reach this goal, a gradual reduction of the present latent aggressiveness and military potentials should be achieved: The first step would be to pass from the prevailing unstable balance to a permanent strategic stability: then from there to a state of lesser aggressiveness: that would find expression in a balance and verifiable reduction of the power structures. The final stage would be security guaranteed to all by means of a stabilizing system of military defense structures that would make interference and exactions impossible.

Or is this utopian? It would be if one assumed that such a process was based on mutual trust, i.e. if it were grounded in the belief that human nature can become basically peaceful. But there is nothing utopian about it, if the required new rationality that enables the above mentioned steps just grows out of sober calculations and self-interests, as a kind of individual, political and optimal solution.

There is evidence that peoples and states can learn in matters of political security: The extreme war, prophesied by Clausewitz, has not broken out since the superpowers and their allies have been equipped with nuclear weapons, quite obviously, because both parties have calculated that not only could there be no victor but that there was a risk of annihilation.

Thus, one cannot exclude the possibility that one day all sides may recognize that political, economic, and social consequences and a series of other negative effects advise against the pursuit of the present security policy, and that they would then renounce the deploying of their respective power apparatus and the threat of actually operating it.

The great majority of the Swiss people is convinced that their army can fulfill its deterrence function:
- because it would fight any aggressor
- because it is well armed and well trained (12 divisions, 20 com-bat-brigades, 800 tanks, 300 planes)
- because the Swiss terrain would be a strong ally
- because it could inflict heavy damage upon any aggressor and would destroy if necessary any major means of communication rather than leave them in the hands of the enemy
- because the survival of the population is guaranteed by civil defense measures
- because it could hold a part of the Alps for a long time.

With its credible armed neutrality, Switzerland contributes to the security of Europe in a small but strategically important central part of Europe.

Moreover, the country's policy offers preconditions for active me-diation between conflicting parties, and its territory provides the necessary infrastructure and security for negotiations. It is an asylum for political refugees and a sound platform for humani-tarian aid.

This role was imparted to Switzerland by its history and its geo-graphical situation. These are also the basis of its own security policy which the organizers of this conference requested me to outline because they felt it could stimulate the following debate.

> Note from the editor:
> In order to structure and guide this discussion the author had submitted topical questions. They are grouped in seven subjects that each refer to a specific aspect of security policies in the East-West conflict. The security of one of the parties concerned depends to a high degree on the securi-ty of the other party involved. Consolidating the elements that are common to the differing socio-political systems may be a way towards achieving common security; this alternative needs to be further elaborated. The following questions point in this direction.

III. Questions

1. Definition of security

Possible causes for war, various kinds of threats.

1.1 What is security? What is security for? For whom? Is security the equivalent of safeguarding peace? Which peace? Peace in freedom or peace to maintain the system, to preserve the power sphere?

1.2 By what criteria does NATO (or WTO) define its "legitimate security interests?"

1.3 In your opinion, what might cause war in Europe?

1.4 By whom or what does NATO (or WTO) feel threatened?

2. How to safeguard security interests

    Escalation or de-escalation of armament? Non-military factors
    of security.

2.1 How can the legitimate security needs be met? What should the
    opposite side do to meet these needs? What would be tolerable?

2.2 Does security depend only on military power relations, or are
    there non-military factors as well? E.g. economic potentials
    and resources; technology, level of instruction; combative-
    ness, morale of the population; social security; ethical fac-
    tors (faith, ideology); public opinion controlling govern-
    ments.

2.3 Does not each armament increase of one side create new insecu-
    rity for the other? ("compelling" the other side to new arma-
    ment efforts = escalation) Could mutual arms limitation or
    even reduction of the armed forces trigger off another
    automatic process in the opposite direction? (= de-escalation)

3. Balance of forces

    New weapons systems, quantity and quality, deterrence or de-
    fense?

3.1 Is military superiority necessary or is a balance of forces
    sufficient for one's own security?

3.2 Which factors lead to a shift in the ratio of forces?

3.3 Can security be safeguarded by dissuasion, e.g. deterrence
    (without military balance)? (example: Switzerland, force de
    frappe) Could not Washington or Moscow be destroyed by an op-
    ponent who is militarily inferior? Therefore why have a bal-
    ance of forces?

4. Armament policy

    Strategic forces, LRTNF, TNF, conventional forces.

4.1 What does the SS-20 program aim at? Is it necessary for legit-
    imate security needs? Or, given certain circumstances, could
    it be given up? Does not indeed the maintenance of this arms
    system weaken the security of WTO in consideration of the ad-
    verse party's reactions?

4.2 Does the NATO decision to restore the arms balance meet its
    purpose? Is not security weakened by inner tensions? Is the
    restoration of the arms balance program a food buy?

4.3 What is the purpose of strategic armament? Do the ongoing pro-
    grams serve this purpose? Are the programs dictated by tech-
    nology or politics? (Soviet anti-satellite program / US ABM-
    project) Is strategic armament still politically manageable?

5. Arms control / arms limitation / arms reduction

SALT/START/MBFR/CSCE, confidence-building measures, new technical means of inspection.

5.1 What possibilities are there, in your opinion, for a de-escalation? Global strategic (SALT/START), euro-strategic (LRTNF), conventional (MBFR), political/diplomatic (CSCE).

5.2 What is your opinion on cooperative control?

5.3 Where can arms control be improved and why? Where not and why?

5.4 How long will it take to reach a new agreement (SALT/START)? Where is the point of no return in the new strategic armament programs?

5.5 What do you think of automated control mechanisms and inspection systems? Does not modern technology provide us with an extraordinary opportunity in this respect?

5.6 Would it not be possible to restrict oneself to weapons of defense with mutual control?

5.7 Are nuclear-free zones an appropriate means? Can they indeed be controlled, or are they merely propagandistic statements of intent one cannot rely on?

5.8 Could the two power-blocs be separated by a neutralized zone? (In the Great North in Lapland, the system is only operating because there is a strong Finnish control brigade that would fight any aggressor.)

6. Additional interactions

Internal disputes in the blocs, interventions outside the European theater, terrorism, influencing of public opinion.

6.1 What are the repercussions on security needs of the internal contentions within NATO or WTO?

6.2 In Afghanistan and the Near East the Soviet security needs were justified by the proximity of these areas to the Soviet Union (similar to Cuba-USA). What are the security needs in Africa or in the Far East?

6.3 Could not abstention from such interventions increase security? For example, a mutual embargo on weapons for trouble spots?

6.4 Does this not call for a joint and effective fight against international terrorism?

6.5 Each side tries to stir up disputes and influence public opinion unilaterally. Is this not already a cold war which only increases insecurity? On the other hand should one not create a "world conscience" through a free exchange of views, in

order to exert pressure on governments?

7. Common interests

    Economic interests, technical cooperation, development aid to
    the Third World.

7.1 What are the prerequisites for a consensus on security policy
    between the two power-blocs? What measures should be taken to
    reach such a consensus? What measures are detrimental to mutu-
    al confidence?

7.2 Would not such a consensus be beneficial also at the economic
    and socio-political level of both parties? Could this not
    liberate forces for considerable peace actions?

7.3 Would intensive technical cooperation and free exchange of in-
    formation reinforce mutual dependency and thus security?
    (Security through dependency)

7.4 Would cooperation in solving economic problems in the Third
    World be a means to practically test common interests?

Translated from the German by LWF Department of Studies.

SERMON ON GALATIANS 3:26-28

Gertrud Böttger-Bolte

"There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female."

This is a verse we like to cite, that comes readily to our lips especially if we indulge in dreaming and believe that to have dreams is not futile, but rather that they have some influence: that they sustain the hope that utopian goals may eventually be attained, the hope to be one in Christ, that barriers will be abolished, that we shall no longer suffer from our vain attempts to cooperate with and understand each other, attempts that so far have led only to policies of fear and terror.

Paul's statement is indeed emphatic; it stems from his vision of the new reality that has come into the world. What makes this statement emphatic? If we read it in context, we notice the passionate tone that betrays anger and disappointment. Paul is writing a bitter and angry letter to a congregation which, according to him, has betrayed the gospel, a congregation which tries to find its own way to Christ, not a way that overcomes barriers, but one that requires barriers, a congregation which weighs its works, even those offered to God, a congregation which attaches too much importance to religious and social structures, which divides Christians into good and bad Christians and which thinks that it can clearly define the ways that lead to God.

And the line is sharply drawn between categories: there are the Christian Jews who are bound to the Old Testament and comply with the law; and the Greeks who do not recognize these laws; the men and women who, according to Jewish law, are strictly separated; the slaves and the free who are separated socially; and all these divisions have their importance in the congregation which Paul addresses.

And what about our congregations? Need I remind you that we too have barriers that separate us, and that we too suffer because of them; need I mention it here in our meeting in which each of us is deeply grieved and longs for the day when we shall be one in Jesus Christ. And yet, ours is not the same situation as Paul's.

A few years ago, a Methodist pastor and his wife from the United States of America came to visit our congregation. Both were colored, he a pastor, she a music therapist. In preparation for the service, she had practiced a hymn with groups of the congregation, to be sung during worship: "Joshua fought the battle of Jericho and the walls came tumbling down." On Sunday morning, the pastor preached powerfully on these words, "and the walls came tumbling down;" yet the walls he wanted to tear down were not necessarily our walls.

He preached about the frontier he had seen between our two German
states, two kilometers away from our town; that it should be done
away with, that the wall should break down. He was sad because
people are separated from each other by barbed wire, mine fields
and watch towers, and he felt that this inhumanity should come to
an end. However, those who were listening to him had learned to
live with this frontier. Of course, we have to bear the conse-
quences of this separation; we feel cut off from the rest of the
world and realize that we cannot keep up with the social and eco-
nomic development of the Federal Republic. And when a cow breaks
through the barbed wire and is blown up by a mine, not even the
local newspaper will mention it. We suffer from the division that
separates families, inhibits friendships, with the result that
people who speak the same language can no longer understand each
other. But in spite of this, we find ways of breaking through the
barriers, ways of remaining together. In spite of the hardships
that are more severe for those directly concerned than for those
who look on, there are bridges that cannot be destroyed and which
are not visible for those who are mere spectators.

The pastor preached about tradition and historical roots. He felt
ill at ease in our venerable church with its thick twelfth century
walls, while we feel protected and sheltered by our church and are
proud of it. He felt constrained by our traditional liturgy, while
many of us cherish these forms of worship that sustain us and have
proved their worth. He wanted the walls to crumble but some of
these walls were not ours, that is they were, but in a quite dif-
ferent sense.

A year later, I was in the USA and had to preach in a small and
poor church. I was the only white person in a congregation of
black people who welcomed me warmly and appreciated the fact that
a white pastor lived with them, visited the poor flats in the
black district, entered pubs with only black customers, visited
sick people in hospitals - and everywhere I was welcomed kindly
and with surprise as a special guest. This tearing down of walls
made me really aware of the invisible barriers, and I asked myself
where the real walls are that must be broken down and which are
the same for everyone.

If we listen to Paul, we hear him say that such walls need not be
broken down. They do exist (for some they are here, for others
there), but they are no longer relevant. They have lost their
meaning, because we are one in Christ. We are part of his order of
salvation. We are the children of God, we are baptized and we have
absorbed Christ, and that is what counts. Parents who have several
children do not expect them to be uniform, to have the same pro-
fession, the same interests and abilities. In a real family, one
child will not be loved more than another, the relationship be-
tween brothers and sisters will not come asunder because of their
differences as long as the family keeps together and love prevails
between parents and children.

You are one in Christ. You belong to one another.

This Paul proclaims with passion. Christ's order of salvation, in-
to which we have been accepted, is greater and more encompassing

than all the petty divisions we set up and which are immaterial.

And once again we have to ask: What does this mean for us? For a whole week we have been endeavoring to find ways to come closer to each other, we who come from different countries with different ideologies, and from different worlds - the First, the Second and the Third World. We make efforts to move towards one another but are still mesmerized by the barriers we cannot do away with. We face the enemy stereotypes, and cannot do away with them, and we make no real progress in our peace work, and yet we all long for and dream of peace. And yet we are baptized, we are the children of God through faith in Jesus Christ, we are of those who have absorbed Christ.

We are actually those who belong to Christ's order of salvation, we are those who are on the way to the peace of God, those for whom barriers have lost their importance, we are those who should not be so much concerned with themselves and their limitations, but rather should accept the exhortation Paul addressed to the foolish Galatians: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus."

May the peace of God, which passes all understanding, keep your hearts and minds in Jesus Christ.

Translated from the German by LWF Department of Studies.

REPORTS OF THE FIVE REGIONAL WORKING GROUPS

REPORT OF GROUP I FROM NORTHERN EUROPE

1. Statement on the peace movement

At present the social phenomenon we call peace movement takes on very different forms. Basically we see the promising trend that people themselves have become concerned about the future and survival of humankind and want to participate in shaping a better world of peace and justice - values which are professed by the Christian faith as well. Such popular movements run the risk to oversimplify the problems and their solutions. Christians therefore must see it as a task to help the peace movement become aware of its shortcomings and limited approaches. We want to emphasize that its approach is basically positive, but that we as Christians should also take a critical stance vis-à-vis the peace movement.

2. Statement on the Heidelberg Theses

We had a long argument about the Heidelberg Theses. According to our understanding of the 8th thesis, we would suggest a slight shift in emphasis, i.e.: Church history teaches us that Christian doctrines have very often been misused to legitimize armament and armed conflicts. Political and military power structures try actively to get this type of support. At the present stage of history, with the threat of nuclear warfare increasing and the cold war approach being perpetuated, we believe it to be important that churches clearly state that the Christian faith can no longer be exploited to theoretically legitimize nuclear armament and the use of these arms. Christian churches can no longer conform to the political and economic needs of power structures on this point. At the same time, Christian churches continue to debate and analyze these problems from the perspective of their own traditions and encourage Christians individually to make their own choices in these ambiguous matters, in accordance with their conscience.

3. Dissenting statement by Professor Carl Brokenhjelm (Uppsala)

The Heidelberg Theses affirm that in the present historical situation there is not only one legitimate Christian standpoint on nuclear armament: some Christians think that the concept of nuclear deterrence is not justified; others claim that at the present time there is no alternative to safeguarding peace with nuclear weapons. We must recognize in both conceptions Christian endeavors to live responsibly in this dark era of humanity. Individual Christians may be in disagreement, but the Christian community cannot

condemn either point of view as un-Christian. There is a real danger for Christians on either side of the dispute to fall victim to interests that are alien to the gospel. Neither those people who are part of the political establishment that favors nuclear armament, nor those that belong to the peace movement that opposes it, can guarantee a genuinely Christian answer to the question of nuclear armament. The Christian response can also be misused and exploited quite independently of the viewpoints defended. Rather an evaluation of responses that seem appropriate to the individual Christian must be made; on the one hand we need sustained efforts to collect reliable and relevant facts which are now being obscured by different ideological perspectives, and on the other hand we need to gain a deeper insight into the Christian vision of the world.

REPORT OF GROUP II FROM THE THIRD WORLD

This report was written on the basis of the various presentations made at the consultation, and on the discussions that followed. Peace is also the concern of the Third World countries. Recognizing that peace is not merely the absence of actual war, we know that within the context of the Third World nations, peace should be understood to mean inter alia at least, justice, participation of all the people at all levels of government in their own country, economic freedom and freedom from poverty, the right to personal freedom and liberty and guaranteed protection of one's life and property. In this context the absence of peace may lead to actual civil war which can easily have international repercussions. There are a number of countries where this type of peace does not exist, as for example in Brazil, South Africa and India. Such trouble spots we perceive as a threat to world peace. The following suggestions show that our efforts should not only tend towards minimizing of this injustice , but towards total eradication of this form of absence of peace.

We also reflected on the relations prevailing between the Third World countries and the rest of the world. We felt that it would be a step towards promoting world peace if the relations between these countries were based on a sound footing, namely that these relations must become free of mistrust, free of economic exploitation, such as fixed prices for the products and raw materials from Third World countries pre-determined by the stronger countries. There should also be no political interference in Third World countries, as indeed Third World countries believe has been the case in the past. We also know that in the past there have been regrettable attempts, guided by self-interest from both the East and the West, to overthrow some governments. We also examined the issue of military service. We felt that this should not be compulsory. It would be an acceptable purpose of an army to defend its home territory against external aggression, but not to oppress its own people. The army must serve to wage "just wars," as one used to call them.

Supply of arms must be kept within the limits indicated above, and must definitely not serve to destabilize a given country. Any regime which violates the basic presuppositions of peace such as human rights, should not be supplied with arms.

We reflected on what reconciliation in Christ means and we noted that it has not been practiced in some Third World countries. This has led so-called Christians to deprive their fellow Christians of their civic rights and to persecute, imprison, torture and kill them. We believe that this indicates that we have not yet attained true reconciliation in Christ. We felt that at different levels the following steps could be taken towards promoting peace in the Third World countries:

First, a fair, carefully researched and unbiased study of social orders, in particular of capitalism and socialism, could be initiated. Its aim obviously would be to try to outline a new economic order. There are indications already that such an economic order could be viable. A study of ideologies should try to evaluate their respective doctrines and practical applications in the light of the gospel (analogies and differences). We also felt that the church should strive to cooperate with and support all movements of groups aiming at promoting peace in their own regions and countries. Such groups actually exist in several countries, in South Africa, for example. The church should stand together and not hesitate to denounce injustice (this of course has been done in the past), promote regional studies in Third World countries and initiate exchange visitation programs and consultations with Third World Lutheran churches. It was also noted that not much is being done in this respect. With a view to arousing public opinion within and without the countries, to put some pressure on regimes that do not respect human rights, the church should, of course, welcome all active groups in the society, whether they are Christian or not. One point should be added here. When visiting the Lutheran Council in Washington D.C. earlier this year, I learned that our church is represented at the United Nations. Knowing this, efforts should be intensified in order to spread the churches' views in this international forum as much as possible, and to include as much information as possible about Third World countries. The opinion was expressed that the churches should meet with government officials to convey their fundamental standpoint on human rights issues. Finally, we felt that the church should try to infuse and encourage true Christian spirit in those who govern us.

REPORT OF GROUP III FROM NORTH AMERICA

We concentrated on three main questions:

1. The peacemaking role of the church within the church.
2. The role of the church vis-à-vis non-Christians.
3. The root causes of war.

First, we tried to define the church's tasks, namely our own

individual tasks within the church. We felt that it is above all
the church's responsibility to stimulate an awareness that em-
braces the whole human community. Second, we agreed that the
church should not only have a vision of peace, but should also
strive to make this vision a reality. It was, however, very diffi-
cult to define this vision. While we tried to define what was
meant by peace, we came across one negative and several positive
elements. We noted that justice is a necessary ingredient of
peace, but that it is far easier to say that human beings must not
suffer hunger than to convert such statement into concrete action.
It became clear in the discussion that we should distinguish be-
tween the peace of God and the peace we know in the world. Tempo-
ral peace cannot be defined as absence of conflict, but nonviolent
conflict management and dynamic change are a necessity and an in-
tegral part of what we understand by peace. The group could not
agree entirely on the position the churches should adopt vis-à-vis
society as a whole on the issue of peace. On some points we were
in agreement, namely: 1. The church, addressing society, must be
the voice of grace and reconciliation. 2. One of the church's
tasks (and not a comfortable one at that) in the struggle for
peace should be to constructively criticize society. 3. Opinions
varied on the degree to which risk should be assumed when it comes
to defending one's viewpoint before state authorities or in mat-
ters of national security. We tried to distinguish between the re-
sponsibility of the individual citizen, the church's responsibili-
ty as a community, and - in a much broader understanding - the re-
sponsibility of the whole people of God. We realized that it is
far easier to differentiate and concede forms of freedom and to
accept risks at an individual level than to do the same at the
communal and institutional level of the church.

As regards the readiness to accept the risk, we did agree that
Christians both in their private and public life must be willing
to take risks when they commit themselves to the cause of justice
and peace. We felt that to undertake action only from sheltered
positions is not Christian.

Third, we concerned ourselves with the root causes of war (the
term is used in the LWF project), and we discussed in particular a
series of topics that had their starting point in sin and the hu-
man grass root situation. We dealt with several related questions,
such as power and how it is maintained. We acknowledged that we
usually struggle for more power than we actually need; that we
mistrust each other; that we are presumptuous and that this pre-
sumption induces us to believe that our world view is better than
the world view of other people so as to get people and society un-
der control. We also dealt with human traits, such as self-assur-
ance and the trend to construct enemy stereotypes outside one's
own cultural horizon, and to consider those who are different as
enemies or as not being of equal worth. As a second point we dis-
cussed and acknowledged the existence of absolute evil or the de-
monic element. In this context Heinz Vetschera's comment that we
must distinguish between demonic deeds and demonic persons was
helpful. He pointed out that Christians should primarily be con-
cerned with demonic or wicked behavior, which does not necessarily
imply condemnation of the evildoer. Thirdly, our attention focused
on the different interpretations of justice and injustice as a

root cause of war; it included the problem of economic injustice
as it is being practiced across the boundaries of political sys-
tems. As a fourth point, we elaborated on the problem of a humani-
ty that is split up by race, religion and ideology - a state of
affairs that predisposes to and rationalizes sinful attitudes, and
serves to mutually reinforce sinful action. As a fifth point, we
also explored ideology per se as a source of conflict, and not as
a reinforcing factor, e.g. as legitimizing unjustified demands.
Finally we discussed another element that must be considered as a
root cause of war, i.e. the appraisal or mis-appraisal of other
societies and nations, and the human inability to have a clear
perception and understanding of oneself and the other. This lack
of perceptiveness hampers our faculties for political analysis and
has negative consequences for peace.

REPORT OF GROUP IV

(Group of church delegates who live in a socialist society)

Our discussion was grounded in our own specific socio-political
context that is permeated with a relentlessly propagated systemic
peace concept, namely that "socialism equates peace." "The stron-
ger socialism, the more peace is secure." This is the ideological
milieu to which we are constantly exposed. We live in this situa-
tion because God has placed us there with the mission to proclaim
the gospel.

We concurred that it is necessary for us to get away from the
systemic peace principle of our societies in favor of a peace con-
cept that is based on personal interaction. We must learn to con-
ceive peace as an intrinsic quality of our daily lives and ac-
tions; peace must become a basic trait of our behavior in everyday
life. This concerns primarily our relations in the family and at
our place of work. Obviously this inter-relational peace approach
must not be restricted to a seemingly unpolitical domain: It was
stressed that we can make contributions in our respective coun-
tries by participating in discussion with people in responsible
positions on issues such as work ethics, divorce, alcoholism, etc.
We consider such discussions valuable and would recommend that
they be further developed. The group recommends as especially val-
uable in terms of peace work that church officials and persons in
leading positions with different world views engage in dialogue on
subjects of common concern and on fundamentally controversial
issues, reflecting the different world views in a given context in
the light of a biblical Christian understanding.

We raised the question whether the thesis is correct that peace in
Europe after the Second World War had only been secured because of
the existing arms potential or whether the remembrance of experi-
ences during that war had not also contributed towards maintaining
peace. In our countries, and in particular in the Soviet Union,
these experiences have marked the people profoundly, so that they
have not been inclined to risk another war. Our question was: Has

the mass destruction potential by itself maintained peace, or are
there also other reasons? We reflected on what our specific con-
tribution as Christians should be, and what it means to discover a
link between the promise of peace in Christ and peace in the po-
litical sense. We believe it to be insufficient when our commit-
ment is motivated and shaped only by political reasoning. Is the
human mind in its thinking, analyzing and planning process not
constantly anew dependent on critical constraints imposed by our
faith and by the Holy Spirit? The human mind, when relying exclu-
sively on itself, loses its sense of proportion and becomes unrea-
sonable. Thus, in our secular governments, we can only apply rea-
son coram deo.

We tried to come to an understanding on the root causes for armed
conflicts. We noted how complex - especially from our perspective -
these causes are and how diversified (e.g. ideologically,
economically), and that there is not just one cause to explain
war, but that it is the expression of our fallen world. A Chris-
tian anthropology has to assert itself over against an optimistic
anthropology as we know it since the Enlightenment and also find
it in Marxism. Although communal life can be made more humane, the
basic threat of war in our world cannot be eliminated because the
deepest root cause for war is human sinfulness from which only
God's grace can free us: to serve our neighbors as Christ taught
us. Thus we are motivated for a distinctive Christian witness to
peace also in our radically different environment, and we urge our
governments to renounce preemptive strike tactics, whether with
conventional or nuclear arms.

We dealt in detail with the question of conscientious objection.
In the GDR there are opportunities to serve with construction
units. We asked the Slovakian and Hungarian churches to discuss
the right to opt for conscientious objection, and also to stand up
for this right. This right does not yet exist in these countries,
nor do they have any suitable legislation that would offer the
draftee an alternative solution. In this context we discussed the
8th Heidelberg Thesis. We noted analogies of opinion between the
Scandinavian group and ours. However, compared with the Scandina-
vian group the proportions in our group are reversed: we had a ma-
jority advocating the continued validity of the Heidelberg Theses
and only a minority expressed doubts.

In conclusion, we should like to suggest that the LWF plan a con-
sultation in the near future that would focus on the threats to
peace as a result of the North-South conflict.

REPORT OF GROUP V FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

We agreed on one point, namely that we had diverging views on all
the topics we had covered. We realized that it would not have made
sense to elaborate on the points of our dispute in the plenary; it
would have been far too time-consuming. I shall therefore restrict
myself to indicate briefly the controversial issues. The starting

point of our discussion was the question whether we as a church in a divided country were not in a special situation that forced us to reflect what it means that on both sides of the border that divides Europe - and in a certain sense also the whole world - Christians are living and actively engaged in these countries and their institutions, and serving in military units. What does this mean to us? We would have liked to include in these deliberations our brothers and sisters from the GDR, and we hope that eventually we shall have such an opportunity in the interregional working groups. As it was, we were obliged to discuss our viewpoints amongst ourselves, viewpoints that refer to the specific situation of our church.

We first discussed (and this was the first point of our dispute) the church-state relations in the FRG, and we tried to pinpoint the position of the Lutheran church vis-à-vis the constitutional form of our state.

Secondly, we reflected on how the free West relates to other regions in the world. We tried to interpret the term "free." This gave rise to the argument as to whether the expression had merely a descriptive function, or rather had a hostile connotation.

Thirdly we asked ourselves what the implications of the economic structures, which are linked to the political structure of our state, would be for Third World countries. We highlighted three points:

- The relation of the church to the constitution of the Federal Republic;
- the relation of the Western states and churches to Eastern states and churches;
- the relation of the industrialized nations and of their economic system to Third World countries.

On these issues no consensus could be reached.

REPORTS OF THE FOUR INTERREGIONAL GROUPS

INTERREGIONAL GROUP I

The task for this consultation is to coordinate Lutheran efforts
for peace. In a context in which many people - political groups,
citizens movements, physicians, military organizations, etc. - are
concerned about peace, it is important to begin with the distinc-
tive perspective which the church brings to the issue.

The gospel

The gospel proclaims that peace is a gift of God, rooted in the
justification which God has given us through the death and resur-
rection of his son, Jesus Christ (Romans 5). It became ours in our
baptism. From the very beginning this was not only a matter of a
personal and inner peace with God. To be a child of God means to
be a member of his entire family, of a community which transcends
the barriers of race and culture as well as national boundaries.
All this is from God, who has reconciled us to himself and to one
another (Ephesians 2).

Our end is as our beginning. Ahead of us is that eschatological
vision of what our reconciliation is to be in its fullness. It is
shalom, the wholeness of life, where those who have been enemies
come to be together (Isaiah 2), where justice dwells in the land
and people no longer dominate one another (Amos, Isaiah, Micah,
Luke 1), where all people have what they need to sustain their
lives and to contribute their best to the community, and where
people respect one another and freely give of themselves to one
another (1 John 4). It is the life of grace, a gift of God.

The ministry

It hardly comes as a surprise that people with such an identity
and such a vision are called to a "ministry of reconciliation" (2
Corinthians 5).

This ministry is exercised "between the time," in the present era.
In our days we are all too keenly aware that this reconciliation
is not fully realized in our own individual lives. At the same
time that we are justified, we are also sinners.

That is true also for the social and political dimensions of this
time-between-the-times. These aspects of life are also gifts of
God, but they, too, are imperfect manifestations of his shalom.

How shall the church minister in such a situation? On the one
hand, the church affirms that the world of political affairs is
God's world, that the eschatological vision of peace includes the
political dimensions of reality. God works through governments for
justice, peace and freedom in the world; this means that govern-
ments have to respect and protect human rights and to minimize
economic need, social injustice, oppression and violence. The
church has to speak the truth to authorities and it must criticize
where governmental policies lead to systematic torture and mass
detention as in Latin America (with US co-responsibility), and in
the Soviet Union. The churches' understanding of the law is a dy-
namic one, since it is enlightened by the gospel. When the church
criticizes government policies it should listen carefully to views
expressed by movements for social change and support their cause
in so far as it meets the criteria of a just social order and hu-
man rights.

On the other hand, the full vision of shalom implies at the same
time a continual judgment over anything less than the full reali-
zation; so the church has a prophetic role to play in its ministry
of reconciliation that includes the following tasks:

1. Bearing the signs of peace. By its life and its message the
   church is to be a sign of peace in a troubled world, bearing in
   its own body the marks of the God of shalom. It also points to
   those places where it discerns that God is at work for peace in
   the contemporary world.

2. Representing the whole human family. God's love for all people
   exposes the sin of regarding other people as less than human,
   of making them pawns to be manipulated. The distinctive quali-
   ties of each culture are to be honored, but racism and tribal-
   ism violate shalom.

3. Representing especially the poor of the world. Because the poor
   and the outcast are so often the victims of oppression, they
   show clearly that God's reconciliation has been violated. The
   church stands by them both to heal their wounds and also to
   condemn the systems (of West or East or whatever origin) which
   are the source of their oppression.

4. Identifying idolatry. Ideologies are effective elements in the
   political area. There is a temptation to give them greater al-
   legiance than is appropriate. They may even come to destroy the
   very people they claim to save. The church calls people and
   leaders to the freedom to explore modifications and alterna-
   tives of their systems as they participate in God's work of
   shalom.

5. Identifying hybris. Throughout human history there are examples
   of individuals and of groups whose pride, whose drive for pow-
   er, and whose selfishness have developed out of proportion to
   their appropriate roles in life. Their actions present a seri-
   ous threat to peace and justice. The church is particularly
   aware of these temptations from its own historical experience
   and has the responsibility of helping society to recognize such
   instances in public life.

6. Demystifying the enemy. This present era will be filled with conflicting ideas and interests as long as it continues. In one sense we need the other to become ourselves. However, it is tempting to exaggerate the threat of the enemy out of proportion to the reality of the situation. Therefore, the church serves the cause of peace by asking that opponents be judged more carefully, often with the help of a third party.

7. Holding up hope. The complexities and ambiguities in the search for peace weigh so heavily on those who take that quest seriously that there is a temptation to resignation. Many groups striving for peace give up before long because it does not come quickly. The participation of the church in its concern for peace is enduring. Because in the end this is God's world, we are called not to despair even in the darkest of times but to live and work sustained by the hope we have in the promises of God.

In order to accomplish this dual task of the church it is essential that the church's witness to peace include both those Christians who support and sustain viable political systems and also those Christians who call into question present policies and structures. The church in its ministry of reconciliation provides an appropriate arena for such people to come together in frankness and openness to engage in a serious exploration of the present situation. Each emphasis can serve the other as all seek to be faithful to their high calling from God to be peacemakers and ministers of reconciliation.

INTERREGIONAL GROUP II

The general feeling in our group was that we had fruitful discussions and that our debate yesterday and today led to some specific proposals which I shall take up here.

We covered the three areas which had been suggested for our group work: our understanding of peace, the relations between the peace of God and the peace of the world and comments on the Heidelberg Theses. I shall summarize our discussion in 7 points:

1. We reached a kind of consensus that the peace of the world cannot be equated with the peace of God, which is beyond our understanding, but we want to affirm the consecutive relationship between the peace in God and secular peace; the peace of God must have consequences for the social and political peace; "Be not only the bearers of the word, but also the doers."

2. What are these consequences that we expect? Ultimately a just peace based on freedom, justice and participation are the constitutive elements. The immediate goal therefore is to minimize oppression, injustice and violence.

3. We then wanted to examine the role institutions play in the

promotion of peace, and the kind of institutions that could promote peace efforts. The discussion focused on institutions of international law and on how they could be strengthened and developed. In our view three preconditions have to be met before an institution of international law can attempt to safeguard peace in the world: Firstly a Court of Law, secondly an Executive Board and thirdly a kind of retributive system for violations of the laws. We were very much aware of the difficulties we would face in attempting to realize these presuppositions, as such endeavors threaten the sovereignty of nations.

4. In this context we should like to suggest that the LWF convene a consultation with theologians, international lawyers and others with the objective to analyze and eventually strengthen the institution of international law: and we would ask if it were possible to set up some guidelines in such a meeting based on the traditional doctrine of just war, not understood as a doctrine that justifies war, but as a doctrine that tries to limit and prevent conflicts and wars in the world. We might also envisage to convert the doctrine of "just war" into a doctrine of just peace.

5. A discussion on the relations between the concept of just peace and the maintenance of an adequate deterrence potential followed. Some members of the group claimed that a just peace in the present situation cannot be maintained without an adequate deterrence potential. In this connection it was, however, pointed out that for the maintenance of such a deterrence potential we may have to pay a high price, and that maintenance of the balance of terror may involve injustice, and in particular it may affect Third World countries and ignite the outbreak of smaller conflicts in which the superpowers would strive to increase or maintain their power influence. We also discussed whether it would be possible to proceed with a genuine curtailment of the current armament that would be compatible with adequate deterrence. One of the points we raised in this connection was the possibility of eliminating the first strike capability of the Soviet bloc and the NATO bloc.

6. We also briefly discussed the Heidelberg Theses concentrating on one item in particular. It is stated in the 4th thesis that: "It is not the purpose of this report, beyond listing initial steps undertaken in the area of politics and international law to outline a concrete program for action; this would go beyond the competence of its authors who were not selected for such a task." We believe that our suggestion to convene a consultation with theologians, international lawyers and others could be seen as going a step further than the proposals in the Heidelberg Theses.

7. Peace is not only a Christian concern, it is an overall human concern and we underlined in the final stage of our discussion that it is important, therefore, not only to listen to other Christians, but also to be sensitive to the aspirations of other religions and ideologies and non-Christians, and that it is particularly important in this connection that we see the Third World as an active participant in this process.

INTERREGIONAL GROUP III

We spent some time trying to work out a definition of peace. We
felt that this is not an easy task. Besides the current defini-
tions of peace in the statements of Christian churches and groups
there is also an international tradition of defining peace. We
suggest to look into the UN Charter to identify internationally
agreed definitions of peace and to find out which countries sub-
scribe to this understanding. In this sense we support the recom-
mendations of the international working group II.

As to the connection between a minimal and a maximal understanding
of peace we found two possible ways of linking them together: One
way would be a kind of "striptease" process where you start at the
minimum point and go to the maximum point. Another way would be to
visualize this as concentric circles where you have a small circle
as the minimum peace and then wider and wider circles going up the
maximum position of peace. These models raise one question: Is the
end point and the biggest circle the shalom or will the shalom be
something definitely different from the end point of the maximum
peace?

The peace of God we saw as something that is given to us; it is
the fact that we are justified so that we no longer are forced to
justify ourselves by trying to get more than the others, but we
can be kind to others like brothers and sisters who need not fight
one another. Another element in this peace is that God has prom-
ised peace in eternity at the end of the world, and that is our
hope. And Christians are moved by this hope to work for peace. But
the peace in Christ also has a kind of critical function. It can
question and correct our understanding of peace so that neither
the church nor the Christians selfishly believe that they alone
have the solution. The Christian peace is also a dimension of hope
in a situation of darkness. This can be something that gives us
strength to continue. One of the group members referred to the
very well known story about Luther who said that even if he knew
it was the last day of the earth, he would then go to plant an ap-
ple tree. That could be a useful parallel, I think, to this Chris-
tian hope. Much time was spent discussing the problem of violence.
I do not think we solved any problem, but I think that the discus-
sion for us was fruitful and perhaps from this discussion we can
add some elements for further reflexion. While discussing we felt
that we could learn a lot from things which have been done earli-
er. We have the discussion on the doctrine of just war but we also
have the UN Charter and the international laws of warfare and the
traditions of neutral states that can all be useful for further
discussions on these topics.

We concluded our discussion with the question of the legitimate
use of violence and the extent to which churches can support it.
There may have been situations where it was understandable that
the use of violence was considered a necessary evil. But consider-
ing violence to be a necessary evil does not mean that one wants
to legitimize it. So we have to distinguish between peace and ways
of focusing it.

INTERREGIONAL GROUP IV

We had a first round of discussions on the varying definitions of peace without coming to an agreement. One participant felt that the minimalistic understanding of peace, to protect people against violence and safeguard their life, should be appreciated as a first step, as we have learned that peace is an ongoing process. The thesis was challenged by another participant who argued that by no means can the church justify the acquisition of arms, and, in particular, it cannot approve nuclear armament. From the out-set, the church had to advocate a maximalistic understanding of peace. Fortunately the discussion was discontinued as we felt that it could not lead us anywhere.

In a second round, we tried to get a clear idea of the correlation between the peace of God and secular peace, and we noted that the peace of God actually springs from God's action, it is a gift. The peace of God always points beyond a given situation into the fu-ture. It transcends every situation; we must consider this also in our peace work. In this connection we talked about the church's task to be alert, about its prophetic, critical ministry. The church must have the possibility also to say "no" to existing de-signs. Face to face with the state and society, its primary task is watchfulness and to see to it that God's commandments can be kept, that structures are such that God's commandments can be re-spected. But beyond this the church must have the possibility to object to existing plans. The church must watch out in order to prevent that situations develop which in actual fact would disavow the commandments of God. Elaborating on these points we dealt with the Heidelberg Theses (in particular with theses 6-8) and stressed that the church's watchfulness also implies that it assess the provisional character of what has there been defined as complemen-tarity.

It belongs to the church's ministry to watch out that systemic, ideological peace concepts do not develop into an absolute peace concept - as if it were possible to establish paradise on earth with political means. Indeed, in the course of history we have been shown over and over again that "paradise" built by human hand can bring much terror in its wake.

In the third round of discussion we tried, taking the interrelat-edness of the peace of God and world peace as our starting point, to define a political concept of peace, and here we felt that a situation-related comprehensive peace understanding must apply. In this context and from this perspective peace implies freedom of religious observance, i.e. that each person be free to attend wor-ship services wherever and with whom he or she wishes. It further implies living under conditions of political freedom, and freedom from war and the threat of war. Elimination of poverty, protection of one's freedom, life, and property, and liberation from discrim-ination in whatever form, be it on the grounds of sex or race, are also components of peace. We realized that this comprehensive con-ception of peace with the shalom dimension of wholeness and well-being of the human person can only be achieved step by step; that the process of attaining such a peace will endure until Judgment Day. What matters, therefore, is that, quite realistically, we

strive in a continual process to reduce violence, repression, poverty and need.

TURKU STATEMENT ON PEACE

Executive Committee of the LWF, Turku, 1981

"Statement on Peace

1) The LWF Executive Committee is intensely aware of the increased tensions between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in general and the USA and the USSR in particular. There is an urgent need for a widespread response from Christians.

2) The Executive Committee deplores

   - the large-scale increase in military spending on both sides, the escalation of the arms race, and the development of new weapons, such as the neutron warheads, in various countries;

   - the massive build-up of intermediate range nuclear missiles by the USSR and USA and their placement in Europe;

   - the slow progress of the Madrid follow-up conference on the Helsinki Final Acts (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe);

   - the weakening of contacts and communication between the leaders of Western countries and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe;

   - the consequent spread of dread, fear and resignation among peoples;

   - the continuation of numerous armed conflicts in different parts of the world;

   - the prolongation and intensification of such conflicts by big power involvement in them on the basis of ideological self-interest;

   - the use of the world's limited resources on arms, which sharply curtails resources available for development work and for attempts to eliminate social and economic injustices.

3) The Executive Committee affirms

   - that the foundation for Christian engagement for peace is God's own will of peace for his whole creation;

   - that the promise of the coming of God's kingdom motivates the church in its work for peace and also brings hope and

endurance even when the events of the world spread despair;

- that Christians in their aspiration for peace share the longing and agony of the whole human race, and that they need to join their efforts for peace with all people of good will whatever their religion or view of life;

- that peace is more than absence of war, it is a condition in which social justice prevails and human rights are protected;

- that there can be no lasting peace as long as people starve, injustices prevail, people are oppressed, persecuted or discriminated against because of their faith, view of life, race or ethnic origin;

- that the Christian community, which is called together from all nations and sent into the world by God, transcends all national, ideological and political boundaries and thus is made a sign of reconciliation and serves as a significant bridge of understanding between peoples living in different social systems;

- that Lutheran churches need to work together with all other Christian churches in order to manifest the possibility of peace between nations and races given in Jesus Christ;

- that churches are called to continued repentance and renewal so their own life can demonstrate the peace which they are called to proclaim to nations;

- that Christians have a responsibility to seek peaceful means for resolving political conflicts and for eliminating injustices and oppression, recognizing that the choices presented are often between greater or lesser evils; and

- that differing convictions exist among Christians concerning the methods for promoting peace, and that respect, dialogue and cooperation between the church members whose views differ are essential.

4) More specifically the Executive Committee recommends to the member churches that they

- intensify direct personal communication between Christians living under different social systems, thus countering the temptation to adopt cold war attitudes or to consider other nations and groups as enemies;

- increase efforts to share across ideologically dividing lines reliable first-hand information about the life of churches and their societies;

- consult with each other regarding church actions supporting peace, disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, support of negotiations and the pursuit of human rights, social justice and national independence;

- develop patterns of peace education and service programs
  for peace in cooperation with other churches, and wherever
  possible, with peace research centers and other such orga-
  nizations;

- assist their members in contributing to peace through
  prayer, peace Sundays, peace weeks and also other actions
  that call attention to the need for peace;

- communicate to governments, political leaders and the wider
  public the churches' concern and efforts for peace.

Attention should be drawn especially to:

- the churches' concern for a successful conclusion of the
  current Madrid follow-up conference on European Security
  and Cooperation;

- the need for immediate action to reduce the threat of nu-
  clear war;

- the efforts and experiences of churches in their work for
  peace in other countries and especially those living under
  different social systems.

5) The Executive Committee in commending this statement to LWF
   member churches is assuring them that the LWF will assist
   them in their efforts and does so with the conviction that
   the promise of God's love for his world and his church stands
   firm."

Furthermore, upon the recommendation of the Officers, the Execu-
tive Committee

VOTED: to request the General Secretary to take necessary steps,
       in cooperation with all LWF Departments, to facilitate ef-
       fective cooperation of Lutheran churches as well as be-
       tween them and other churches in the pursuit of world
       peace and to ensure necessary assistance to them in their
       work, in cooperation with the WCC and the CEC.

HEIDELBERG THESES 1959

Thesis 1

World peace has become an essential condition
for living in our technological age.

In the confused debate about the nuclear question people are right-
ly looking for a simple statement which could serve as a guideline
for action. We believe that this simplicity cannot be found in
rules which command or forbid individual actions, but rather in
the aim of the action. This aim must be the realization of a last-
ing world peace.

In times past world peace was probably viewed as an unattainable
ideal. Christians must have been inclined not to expect it until
the Last Judgment. But for our technological age it has become an
essential condition. Peace today is beginnng to be possible pre-
cisely because it is indispensable. Nuclear weapons are only the
most evident sign today of the change in human existence which
makes world peace a precondition for our life. The constant in-
crease of areas which can be directed from one centre, the reduced
number of really sovereign states, the growing economic interde-
pendence in the world as well as the constant further development
also of all conventional arms are further symptoms of the same
process.

The need for world peace is not a tenet of Christianity and cer-
tainly not a romantic doctrine, but rather an expression of pro-
fane reason. World peace in our technological age is not paradise
on earth. It could easily be that we will only obtain it at the
cost of civic freedom, especially if it came as the result of a
third world war. It may be easier to plan peace rationally in an
enslaved world than in a free one. It may well require our utmost
efforts, not so much to attain it at all, but so that it does not
come in the wake of disaster and so that freedom is still pre-
served within it.

Thesis 2

Christians must demand special contributions of
themselves so that peace may become reality.

Although the necessity for world peace is part of profane reason,
Christians have a special task if it is to be achieved. A
rationally planned peace is ambiguous as is seen, for example, in
the fact that it could go hand in hand with rationally planned
slavery. Today humankind, torn between the fear of war and the
fear of slavery, is tempted either to surrender to slavery or to
allow the outbreak of a war for which it is armed. Fear is the
worst counselor but fear is an attribute of this world, and the

advance in technological resources that has freed us to a large
extent from the fear of the forces of nature has with good reason
increased our fear of our fellow creatures. It is precisely our
age, enlightened by reason, that is suffering from a vague fear of
its own unpredictability. To Christians and through them to all
their brethren the assurance is given: "In the world you are
afraid but take heart; I have overcome the world." Through Chris-
tians the peace of God should become effective in the world, since
he alone can make the peace of the world a blessing.

How can this happen? We must turn once more to the task dictated
by profane reason.

Thesis 3

War must be abolished by persistent and progressive effort.

Although we recognize that war must be abolished, this is not the
same as actually abolishing it. Since 1945 there have constantly
been limited armed conflicts. It is possible, indeed increasingly
probable, that nuclear weapons will be used in future limited con-
flicts. A conflict of this kind could, at any time, develop into a
global world war.

Because wars continue to occur we must work towards the humaniza-
tion of war. This includes as absolutely essential the attempt to
prevent the use of nuclear arms in local conflicts. But we would
consider it to be a tragic mistake if one were to accept that the
continuance of limited wars constituted a stable situation. Not
the elimination of nuclear weapons from warfare, but elimination
of war itself must be our aim.

The reports in this volume discuss the realistic approaches that
can currently be envisaged to reach this aim. We do not count ca-
pitulation to a dictatorial world power as one of the real possi-
bilities. Humankind today is not prepared to accept that. More-
over, capitulation to force, although it might initially bring
about apparent calm, can hardly guarantee a lasting peace, because
the victor's violence is bound to come into conflict with itself
and with the oppressed. But all the other approaches take up much
time and their success is uncertain.

This should not surprise us. The presence of war amidst humankind
can be compared to a thousand year old chronic disease. The pos-
sibility of war is preconditioned by innumerable institutions and
ways of reacting. The present balance of terror relies on people's
constant readiness to wage war in order to arrest its outbreak; it
resembles a dangerous vaccination with the serum of the illness
itself. The most that we can expect is that it will grant us some
time for constructive peace work.

Thesis 4

Active participation in work for peace is our simplest
and most obvious duty.

The greatest threat to peace is that we waste the period of time
resulting from the present balance of forces in idle resignation.
Paralysis is the worst effect of fear, the lack of commitment is
usually only a cloak for it. The length and uncertainty of the
road are no justification for not taking the first step.

It is not the purpose of this report, beyond listing initial steps
undertaken in the area of politics and international law, to out-
line a concrete program for action; this would go beyond the com-
petence of its authors who were not selected for such a task. But
we believe that we can state one thing: for every person, and es-
pecially when he or she enjoys civic freedom, there is at least
one particular instance where a contribution can be made, even if
it consists only of acts of individual, practical, neighborly
love. Every resolution of a conflict contributes to making peace
possible; every meaningful, active exercise of freedom contrib-
utes to the preservation of freedom. Around every person who has
overcome fear an atmosphere is created that does away with inertia.
To underestimate the importance of these apparently small human
steps could mortally endanger the larger objectives.

Thesis 5

The way to world peace leads through a danger
zone in which justice and freedom are in jeopardy
because the traditional justification of war is
no longer valid.

For a long time the predominant dogma of Christendom was that the
Christian, even if he or she was prepared to renounce the use of
force for self-defense, could not do without it when it came to
defending his or her fellow human beings. The use of force was de-
limited by certain rules. In the case of war these were summarized
in the doctrine of the just war; its aim was not to justify but
to limit the evils of war which was recognized as inevitable. War
was only to be waged to prevent a greater evil and only in such a
way as not to become a greater evil itself. Nobody can deny that
in the course of the centuries there have been repeated flagrant
violations of this principle in Christendom. But at least its
basic meaning was clear and its application was at least a possi-
bility.

We cannot see how this principle can still be applicable in the
case of nuclear war. It destroys what it claims to protect. How
can we evoke the order of preservation, as willed by the Creator,
as a justification for nuclear warfare? We need not doubt the
subjective sincerity of those who hope that the development of
small and cleaner nuclear weapons will make nuclear death more hu-
mane, any more than the possibility that limited conflicts could
at one point be fought with these weapons. But even their effect

is bad enough, and the risk of going beyond such artificial
boundaries in regard to the use of available weapons is so great
that we think it impossible to establish a new, stable order of
humane warfare.

But this implies that in our world there are situations in which
justice has no longer any weapons. The ultima ratio of belligerent
self-help becomes a threat to life and morally indefensible be-
cause of the means which would have to be used; in many instances
there are no institutions to which violations of justice or free-
dom could be submitted with any chance of success. In the course
of history individual nations or groups have always been in this
situation but today it affects the whole world.

The citizens of countries in the Western world are thus faced with
a dilemma - should they use nuclear arms to defend the laws gov-
erning civic freedom, or should these be left unprotected and
handed over to the opponent? We do believe, however, that in many
cases reference to this dilemma is merely a pretext for a policy
that, in fact, aims at national or personal power. We are also
aware that the citizens of communist states may well be in a simi-
lar predicament as regards concern for the safeguard of the essen-
tial characteristics of their social system. But, however the di-
lemma may be defined or interpreted, we cannot deny that it does
in fact overshadow world politics today.

We shall now turn to the decisions which this dilemma requires us
to make.

Thesis 6

We must try to look at the various moral decisions
which the dilemma of the use of nuclear weapons
imposes on us as being complementary actions.

The Spandau Synod of the Evangelical Church in Germany in 1958
made the following statements on these decisions:

> The differences which exist among us in our views on nuclear
> arms are profound. They range from the conviction that the
> very production and stockpiling of any type of weapons of
> mass destruction is a sin before God, to the conviction that
> one can conceive of situations that would justify before God
> resistance with similar weapons because of one's duty to de-
> fend others. The gospel keeps us together and we must strive
> to overcome our differences. We pray that God by His word
> will bring us to a common understanding and decision.

So far it has not been possible to reconcile these viewpoints, nor
is it likely to happen in the near future. The authors of the re-
port in question expressed in the work assigned to them convic-
tions which cover to a substantial degree the scope of the Synod's
statement. They experienced themselves how difficult it is to
overcome these divergences and they reached no agreement on a num-
ber of important points. Nevertheless, their two-year experience

of continued discussion has led them to believe that the statement, "We remain together under the gospel," has a more profound meaning than merely tolerating the irreconcilable at the present time.

Love must urge us to examine with special care the reasons which lead our brothers and sisters to come to different decisions and to understand them even though we may reject these reasons. Of course, there are cases where this understanding should not result in tolerating acceptance. But we do believe that there can be a common basis while coming to opposite conclusions on nuclear issues and that, seen in this light, they challenge one another.

Prevention of nuclear war and the realization of world peace must be the goal that constitutes the common ground. Forms of action that are not based on this aim seem to us impossible for a Christian. But in our threatened world, with its lack of examples to follow, people with different backgrounds and insights can be led to this goal along different paths. It could be that one person can only follow his or her path because there is someone else following another path (cf Thesis 11). Borrowing a term from physics we call such paths complementary.

We shall describe these paths and their interrelations as we understand them.

Thesis 7

The church must recognize the renunciation of arms as a Christian way of acting.

In former times the absolute renunciation of arms by the Peace Churches was condemned by the dominant churches. Today, even among those who are not pacifists, the conviction is growing that this renunciation must be acknowledged as a possible attitude for Christians. The horrors of nuclear arms are so great that it would seem inconceivable to us that a Christian should not at least seriously test whether their proscription, irrespective of the consequences, is not a divine command that can be understood immediately.

The only conceivable justification for the possession of nuclear weapons is that their presence today provisionally safeguards world peace. But their presence can only be effective if one threatens to use them in certain cases. Such a threat is only effective if it is really likely to be carried out. But we are no longer able (cf Thesis 5) to justify the actual use of such arms in terms of traditional war ethics.

In our view there is at least one general and one individual consequence to this line of argument. The general consequence is that we must acknowledge explicitly that there can be no fundamental justification for nuclear war based on the dogma of a just war. As regards the question whether nuclear armaments can nevertheless be defended, see Thesis 8.

The individual consequence is that the church must respect the attitude of those who, pressed by their conscience, voluntarily refuse to have anything whatsoever to do with nuclear arms. Even someone who takes the opposite decision does not know whether the other person's approach is not more in line with the gospel. In situations such as these, insight often comes only after taking risks; only the actual next step will show if the ground is firm.

However, we would not claim that this decision is the only possible one for a Christian. We will not go into the question whether, or under which circumstances, it can be separated from the refusal of any kind of military service.

Thesis 8

The church must recognize that those who take part in the
attempt to safeguard peace in freedom through
the presence of nuclear arms are still today acting
in a Christian way.

If one side deliberately rejected nuclear weapons, the other side would thereby be guaranteed overall military superiority. We would assume that anyone who decides personally to reject nuclear arms is aware of what he or she is doing and recognizes the implications of an overall renunciation by one side. It is impossible to know beforehand the outcome of such a shift in the balance of power. But if, in the case closer to us, the Western world renounced the use of nuclear arms, there would surely be a risk that for an unforeseeable period of time we might lose what we understand by justice and freedom. Now do we know to what extent or under what conditions a Christian life would be possible in the kind of world in which we would then be living.

Maintaining Western nuclear armament is an endeavor to avoid this risk. Instead it involves the risk of nuclear warfare. This is the attitude which the Western world in fact adopts. We have to realize that every political proposal which, if it is to have a chance of being implemented in the foreseeable future, must presuppose that nuclear arms will be retained, at least on the American side.

This alone need not induce the church to acknowledge this attitude. In the course of history the church again and again finds itself in situations in which it has to say "no" to the only policy that is likely to be realized at the time. However, we feel that since there are risks on both sides which seem to us to be virtually lethal, it is impossible to reject the approach of safeguarding peace through nuclear armament. But it must be made absolutely clear that the only aim of this approach is to maintain peace and prevent the use of nuclear arms, and further that such an approach can only be accepted as a provisional solution.

Thesis 9

For a soldier in an army equipped with nuclear weapons
it is true that, if you say "A" you must expect to have
to say "B"; but woe to the irresponsible.

For the Christian, the question of nuclear arms is often a politi-
cal decision over which he or she has no say, but which has to be
faced when it comes to military service. We believe that basically
the decision here is taken when he or she enters military service
and that this ought to be stated publicly. To allow for particu-
lar groups of nuclear conscientious objectors within an army which
possesses nuclear weapons is hardly feasible; to demand this
seems to us to displace the decision to the wrong place. We do
believe that it will be impossible for Christians to serve in such
an army unless they understand their service as a contribution to
maintaining peace and unless they can assume that their government
also has the same understanding. But accepting military disci-
pline implies that a soldier is ready to use the heaviest avail-
able arms if so required; otherwise the threat which is intended
to safeguard peace is an illusion. In our situation the military
leadership must of course reckon with the possibility that a sol-
dier might not execute certain orders for reasons of conscience;
hence also woe to those who give irresponsible orders. The mili-
tary machine cannot escape being part of the unbearable ambiguity
of our situation. But this cannot justify the soldier having basic
mental reservations; as we see it, one cannot put on uniform if
one intends from the very beginning not to obey orders when there
really is a war.

We refer here to soldiers because their situation makes the prob-
lem very clear, especially to the general public. The same con-
flicts of conscience often arise more unobtrusively for other peo-
ple, e.g. those who produce or might produce arms, office staff,
workers in factories and on building sites, and in the last resort
the politicians, members of parliament and voters.

The following reflection shows how questionable this situation
will always be: if there were to be an outbreak of nuclear war,
the only justification that we could admit for the use of those
weapons - since we have clearly rejected the traditional justifi-
cation for it - would be the recognition that the threat was mean-
ingless without the readiness to act on it; in other words, that
the consequences of the failure to maintain peace by deterrence
had come about and we had to bear them. A Christian can only un-
derstand this as a judgment of God on all of us.

Thesis 10

If the church speaks at all on world politics, it
should address the nuclear powers and call to their
attention the need for a peace order; and it should
advise those states that are not armed with nuclear
weapons not to strive to attain them.

The political effectiveness of the church does not seem to us to be strongest and most beneficial when it addresses political decisions directly. But situations constantly arise in which the decision to say nothing constitutes an expression of opinion. It is only in this sense that we deem it necessary to spell out what the church should say to governments under certain circumstances.

It would seem pointless to us if today the church wanted to persuade the world powers to renounce nuclear armament. On the other hand its task must be to constantly sharpen awareness that the present situation must not last. It has always been its task to take a critical stance in questionable situations even when the world believed that nothing could be changed. Nowadays it is unfortunately the non-Christian who is inclined to believe that changes are possible, whereas the majority of Christians are doubtful.

The church, in our opinion, should dissuade the states which do not yet possess nuclear arms from acquiring them. It must sensitize people across national frontiers to the dangers of "atomic chaos." It will be able to do this without taking sides on specific political issues which go beyond the actual information at its disposal.

Thesis 11

Not everyone must do the same thing, but everyone must know what he or she is doing.

We are prepared to face the criticism that what has been said in the theses is too little and eludes hard decision making. In our personal decisions some of us have gone further than was possible in the consensus statement that we elaborated with difficulty. No one could be more acutely aware than we ourselves of all that we left undecided, probably because our scrutiny did not go deep enough.

But we wish to make it clear that we thought it worse to have superficially uniform decisions rather than diverging ones that indicate what he or she stands up for. In fact, today the two attitudes we have described undergird each other. In a highly questionable manner nuclear armament does still provide an open space where people like those who object to armament can enjoy civic freedom and live according to their convictions without being punished. It is our belief that they help in a hidden way to preserve a spiritual arena where new decisions may perhaps mature. Who knows how soon, without these people, the defense of freedom that hypocrisy always imperils might not degenerate into stark cynicism.

Reflections such as these do not justify the present situation except in terms of a brief transition period. The church must face the alarming fact that it can do so little. We bear the sins of the past in our body. The collective conscience is slow to arouse and to get moving. There must always be individuals whose

conscience and discipline qualify them to take the lead. To en-
courage this development is what our last thesis aims at: Every-
one must know what he or she is doing.

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Translated from the German by LWF Department of Studies.

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July 5-12, 1982, in Chavanod, France

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b) Participants
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Publications of the LWF Department of Studies

A bibliography of all publications of the Lutheran World Federation 1970-1981 has been published in:

LWF Documentation, No. 10, December 1981.

Some of the recent publications of the Department of Studies are mentioned here again:

- Confessing Christ in Cultural Contexts. Lectures and Reports from an International Consultation, 1981, in Jerusalem (Vol. I), 1981 (Sfr. 8.--)

- A Lutheran Agenda for Worship: Resource Material for the Churches' Study in the Area of Worship, 1979 (Sfr. 3.50)*

- The Ministry in the Church, Report of the Roman Catholic/Lutheran Joint Commission, 1982 (Sfr. 10.--)

- How Christian are Human Rights? Report on an Interconfessional Consultation (Geneva, 1980), 1981 (Sfr. 5.--)*

LWF Studies:

- Christian Ethics and Property. 1982 (Sfr. 5.--)*

- The Significance of Judaism for the Life and Mission of the Church. Report of an International Consultation, (Bossey, 1982), 1983 (Sfr. 5.--)*

- The Lutheran Understanding of Ministry. Statement on the basis of an LWF study project. (Geneva, 1983) (Sfr. 3.--)

- Lutheran Understanding of the Episcopal Office. Statement by the Consultation on Episcope. (Geneva, 1983) (Sfr. 3.--)

- Church and Nation Building: Report of an International Consultation held at Bulawayo, Zimbabwe (Sept. 1982), 1983, (Sfr. 9.--)*

- Confessing Christ in Cultural Contexts. Essay and Articles. (Vol. II), 1983 (Sfr. 5.--)

- Becoming Friends in Christ. The Relationship between Man and Woman as Seen by Luther. 1983 (free)

- The Debate on Status Confessionis. Studies in Christian Political Theology. 1983 (Sfr. 8.--)*

- Worship Among Lutherans. Northfield Statement on Worship (1983) and Tantur Report on Worship (1981), 1983 (free)

These publications can be obtained from the Department of Studies
* Up to five copies free of charge.